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Suppose you are strolling through an isle of your local supermarket, browsing 
for something to drink. Rows and rows of options line up in front of you. 
How will you decide what you will pick? There are a multitude of causes 
that might be listed. You could pick your favorite brand, or perhaps just 
choose the closest or the cheapest. Or you could simply pick the brand you 
always pick. It could be that a particular brand was recommended by a friend, 
or that you had just seen an enticing advertisement promoting another brand. 
However, probably, you would not assume that the choice you made was 
caused by a few flashes of the brand name on a television screen hanging 
above the shelves; flashes that were presented so briefly that you did not 
even consciously register their presence. This phenomenon is called sublim-
inal advertising. In the current dissertation we will examine its process and 
feasibility.
The possibility of influencing consumers outside of their awareness has in-
trigued marketers, consumers, advertisers, scientists, and policy makers alike. 
Since the concept of subliminal advertising was introduced in 1957, it has 
caused great controversy. Not only was it questionable on ethical grounds, but 
it was also unclear whether subliminal advertising could actually influence 
consumer decisions. In the current dissertation, I will first define subliminal 
advertising, then outline a short historic context, and discuss the previous 
scientific findings. Then I will present several empirical chapters that aim to 
provide more insight into the working and limits of subliminal advertising. 
I will end with a critical discussion, summarizing the findings, discussing the 
viability and the ethics of subliminal influence, and the possible processes 
underlying its’ effect.
Subliminal advertising: a definition
Subliminal is a term taken from Latin meaning literally “below threshold” 
(i.e., sub limen). The human perceptual system is described to have two 
thresholds: a subjective and an objective threshold (Cheesman & Merikle, 
1986). The objective threshold is confined by the limitations of human 
physiology. For example, people cannot see anything as small as an atom, 
due to the limited resolution of our retina. In the same way, no individual 
can see a light beam traverse from its source to an object in real-time, as 
light moves faster than the frequency of our visual perception (although 
nowadays, it is possible to capture it on film, using a camera that records 
a trillion images a second; Velten et al., 2013). The subjective threshold, on 
the other hand, is limited by awareness. Conscious processing is a costly 
process and the conscious has limited capacity (Bargh, 1984; Miller, 1956; 
Nørretranders, 1991). Therefore, due to the many stimuli in the environment, 
people are not able to process every single sensation consciously. Mainly 
those presented with very high intensity or those important to the perceiver 
at that moment are prioritized and enter our conscious system (Dehaene, 
Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). As the unconscious system 
has much more processing capacity (Dijksterhuis, 2004), the remaining stim-
uli are processed unconsciously. Those stimuli thus fail to reach the subjective 
threshold. 
The term subliminal stimulus indicates that such a stimulus is presented in a 
way that it is highly unlikely that this stimulus will reach the subjective 
threshold. For example, if a word is flashed for only several milliseconds, it 
is picked up by the human sensory system, but people are generally unable 
to report its presence, even if they are asked to attend to it (e.g., Cooper & 
Cooper, 2002). Its counterpart is a supraliminal stimulus (“supra” meaning above), 
which is presented in such a way that it is possible to be consciously processed, 
although other factors might limit awareness. The subjective threshold is 
sensitive to individual differences, context, goals, and needs (Dijksterhuis, 
Aarts, & Smith, 2005).
There are several ways of subliminal presentation. In the more popular notion, 
it is the embedding of persuasion messages in print advertisement, made 
hidden through distraction or distortion. Even though at first sight most 
people will not notice the message, it is quite possible to detect it, if point-
ed out. As such, this is not strictly a subliminal presentation. A more reliable 
way to present stimuli subliminally is to present them either with very weak 
intensity (e.g., a very soft sound) or for a very short duration (e.g., a word 
flashed only milliseconds). To ensure a lower probability of detection, it is 
important to hide the message among other presented stimuli, a method 
called masking (Kahneman, 1968). For example, it is less likely that a soft 
subliminal audio message is detected when it is superposed by other sounds. 
In the studies presented in this dissertation, we will present subliminal 
stimuli visually – as this is demonstrated to be most effective (Mayer & 
Merckelbach, 1999; Theus, 1994) – by presenting them for a duration of less 
than 20 ms. To mask the stimulus, in most cases, the stimulus is preceded and 
followed by a string of random letters. Using such a procedure, even if 
participants were asked to closely watch the location of the presentation, 
and were given the explicit objective to identify the presented stimulus, 
they were never able to do so.
Before continuing to discuss the effects of subliminal stimulation, it is 
necessary to provide a basis that shows that subliminal perception is possible. 
At the end of the 19th century, researchers were experimenting with sub-
liminal stimuli and especially with the question whether people are capable 
of subliminal perception. Peirce and Jastrow (1885) pioneered in this field. 
They had participants pick the heaviest of two balls of very similar weight. 
1312
general introductionchapter 1
Although on all trials, participants indicated that they were guessing (i.e., 
indicated a certainty of 0), they were correct 60% of the time. Even though 
participants were not consciously aware of any difference between the balls, 
the weight difference did affect their decisions. Since then, this finding was 
repeatedly replicated by others (for a review, see Adams, 1957). Thus, even 
though people are not aware of a stimulus or stimulus characteristic, they 
can still use this information unconsciously.
If subliminal stimuli are unconsciously picked up by the perceiver, can they 
be a means of persuasion? This is the question that is asked in studying the 
topic of subliminal advertising. Subliminal advertising is defined as the use of 
stimuli that are presented outside of awareness with the intention to influence 
consumer behavior. As such, it takes the form of a brand name or persuasive 
message presented in such a way that consumers are unable to consciously 
notice it. 
The myth of subliminal advertising
In 1957, a marketing researcher named James Vicary, already renowned for 
his controversial take on persuasion (Packard, 1957), described how he had 
increased sales in a New Jersey movie theatre by presentation of subliminal 
stimuli. During six weeks of testing, he had exposed the viewers of the 
movie “Picnic” not only to the contents of the movie, but also to the words 
“Eat Popcorn” and “Drink Coke”, flashed every 5 seconds. These words were 
presented so briefly – for 3 ms – that the moviegoers were not aware of their 
presence. Still, as Vicary claimed, those words influenced people’s decisions: 
Coca Cola sales went up 18% and Popcorn sales increased by 58%. When 
his findings became publicly known they caused a major upheaval. Especially 
in the cold war era, when people’s minds were filled with horror stories of 
espionage, mind control, and brainwashing, the possibility to influence be-
havior unobtrusively through movies and television shows was one of the 
general public’s greatest fears. As a reaction, Norman Cousins wrote in the 
popular U.S. magazine Saturday Review that James Vicary should take his 
invention of subliminal advertising “and everything connected to it and attach it 
to the center of the next nuclear explosive to be scheduled”. The public interest was 
threatened to such an extent that even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
issued a report on the topic. In Australia and Britain subliminal advertising was 
banned, and in the United States the National Association of Broadcasters 
prohibited its use (Pratkanis, 1992). As a result, James Vicary became famous 
overnight, and is still known for his invention of subliminal advertising.
However, it is less well-known that Vicary had never published his results, 
and when he was urged to replicate his findings no effects were found 
(Weir, 1984). In fact, in a 1962 interview, Vicary retracted his claim, stating 
that he had fabricated the results of his study to save his marketing firm from 
going bankrupt. However, this retraction failed to draw as much attention 
as the original claim and the notion that people are easily manipulated sub-
liminally has never since subsided from the public’s opinion. In the decades 
that followed, several researchers failed to replicate Vicary’s findings, and, as 
a result, it was concluded that subliminal advertising was ineffective (Trappey, 
1996). This lead to an interesting paradox: Although scientific evidence was 
inconclusive, lay people were outraged at the discovery of a method to influ-
ence behavior unconsciously. 
Experimental research investigating Vicary’s claim
In this section, I will give an overview of the empirical work regarding sub-
liminal advertising. In an early attempt to find evidence for perception of 
subliminal messages, Calvin and Dollemayer (1959) flashed participants – in 
a study ostensibly about telepathy – with either the words “Choose Left” of 
“Choose Right”. Subsequently, participants had to indicate of one of two 
identical circles whether the left one or the right one was correct. Overall, 
they found that participants did not perform above chance, and, those 
participants that did, indicated that they could read the presented message. 
The authors thus concluded that they failed to find evidence for subliminal 
perception. Similarly, Champion and Turner (1959) flashed people for 10 ms 
with a picture of a spoonful of rice, accompanied with the words “Wonder 
Rice”, for 180 times during a 30 minute movie. They observed that people 
in the experimental group did not outperform controls when asked to link 
the correct brand name to the picture. In their view, this suggests that, as no 
effects were found on this simple recognition task, it is very unlikely that 
subliminal stimulation would have marketing value. In a more commercial 
replication of Vicary’s claim, De Fleur and Petranoff (1959) subliminally 
flashed the phrase ”Buy X” – where X represents several different products on 
television during a period of 5 weeks – in combination with special discounts 
on the products, and measured the number of purchases of these products. 
Their conclusion was that the special discounts substantially increased sales, 
but that subliminal advertising did not have any effect. 
In a similar attempt, Byrne (1959) flashed the word “beef” during a movie. 
Although participants in the experimental group were not more likely to 
select a beef sandwich from a variety of options, they reported higher levels 
of hunger than controls. Hawkins (1970) replicated these findings, demon-
strating that participants who were subliminally exposed to the word “Coke” 
did not choose Coke more often, but did report higher levels of thirst. More 
recently, Dijksterhuis, Aarts, and Wegner (2001; reported in Dijksterhuis et 
al., 2005) exposed participants either to a 15 ms presentation of the word 
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“Coke”, the word “drink”, or a control string containing four random letters. 
In line with previous research, participants primed with “Coke” did not 
choose Coke more often than an alternative drink, but both experimental 
groups did consume more liquid, regardless which beverage was chosen. In 
conclusion, subliminal priming of a product did not seem to influence 
product choice, but did seem to increase the need – and the associated, need 
fulfilling, behavior – that is activated by the product.
 However, despite a lack of research findings, the belief in subliminal adver-
tising remained strong. Whereas shortly after Vicary’s claim 41% of the U.S. 
population knew about subliminal persuasion (Haber, 1959), in the 80’s more 
than 80% was familiar with the term, and 68% of those believed it was a viable 
means of persuasion (Synodinos, 1988; Zanot, Pincus, & Lamp, 1983). Without 
any scientific backing, and even with a public retraction of the original claim, 
how could the belief that subliminal messages can shape our behavior remain 
so influential?
The story of self-help tapes, backwards masking, and 
sexual embedding 
Throughout the years, despite scientific failure to find any effect of subliminal 
advertising, there has been a recurrence of claims of subliminal influence, 
which fueled the public’s belief. In the 70’s, the author Wilson Key became a 
best-selling author by writing several books about sexual embedding. Sexual 
embedding relates to the alleged practice of advertisers’ to hide a sexual stim-
ulus in printed advertisements. According to Key, an advertisement containing 
embedded sexual stimuli increases the level of arousal of the perceiver, which 
might be an effective marketing strategy. In his books, Key provides several 
examples of sexual stimuli in ads (Key, 1972, 1976, 1980). The fact that these 
examples are often so vague or well-hidden that it is hard to interpret them 
as sexually arousing, often only visible after extensive enlargement of the 
picture, isolation of the sexual stimulus, or blatantly connecting the dots (e.g., 
see Figure 1.1; Can you find the word “Sex” on the camel’s back or in the 
ice cubes?), is according to Key only further proof of their subliminal nature 
and cause of their success. His argument concludes that, if advertisers take the 
effort to use sexual embedding, and spend a big budget on it, it must be 
effective (Pratkanis, 1992). However, Key provides us with no scientific 
evidence for this effect of ‘subliminal’ influence, mainly using the fear of 
subliminal advertising to strengthen his argument. Up to this day, advertis-
ers have always denied the use of sexual embedding (although they often 
use blatant sexual messages), nor is there any evidence of the effect of the 
practice on consumer behavior (Gable, Wilkens, Harris, & Feinberg, 1987; 
Kelly, 1979; Kilbourne, Painton, & Ridley, 1985; Rosen & Singh, 1992). 
Furthermore, these sexual stimuli are not strictly subliminal, as, whenever they 
are pointed out, they are quite easily spotted, and, as such, are not presented 
below the threshold of conscious perception (see Figure 1.1).
In the 80’s, subliminal influence surfaced in a different way. Associating 
themselves with the upcoming New Age movement, subliminal messages 
were not being used to influence people against their will, but to provide 
self-help tapes containing subliminal messages that would unconsciously 
structure people’s mind for success. Even today, websites promoting the so-
called subliminal tapes and CD’s are easily found, promising improvements 
in love, money, health, memory, sexuality, and many more qualities (e.g., 
http://www.hypnovision.com). 
Figure 1.1. Examples of sexual embedding.
Although these businesses claim that their promises are supported by empiri-
cal research, in fact, they cite either studies that were supposedly conducted 
but never published, or studies that are only loosely related to subliminal in-
fluence (e.g., describing lexical priming effects; Pratkanis, 1992). A strong case 
against the effectiveness of subliminal messages on self-help tapes was provided 
by Pratkanis, Eskenazi, and Greenwald (1994). They provided participants 
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with a tape containing either the subliminal message “I have high self-worth 
and self-esteem” or “My ability to remember and recall is increasing daily”. 
They randomly distributed the self-help tapes to their participants. However, 
the twist was that half of the tapes were mislabeled with the incorrect effect: 
Tapes containing the memory message were labeled to increase self-esteem 
and vice-versa. No effect of the actual message on the tapes was found on 
either self-esteem or memory. Instead, participants showed a large placebo-
effect, such that the attribute displayed on the label was increased (see also, 
Greenwald, Spangenberg, Pratkanis, & Eskenazi, 1991).
At the start of the 90’s, the rock band Judas Priest was brought in disrepute 
for their supposed use of backward masking, a technique in which a message 
is recorded backwards into a song. This practice was believed by people to 
be the verbal equivalent of subliminal presentation. The band was accused of 
causing the suicide of two of their fans by exposing them to the words “Do 
it” backwards masked in their song “Better By You, Better Than Me”. Based 
on testimonies of several experts, arguing that there was neither evidence of 
comprehension of backward messages, nor support for their effect on be-
havior (Moore, 1988; Vokey & Read, 1985), the judge ruled the rock band 
innocent, leading to outrage among the general public (Stroebe, 2012). 
Even more recently, in the Republican election campaign of 2000, an attempt 
of subliminal influence was identified. The republicans were accused of sub-
liminally flashing the word “rats” – preceding the words “bureaucrats” by a 
few moments – right next to the democratic candidate Al Gore. Again, even 
though no evidence existed that this could actually direct votes away from 
Al Gore (although George W. Bush won the election by just a few votes), 
the democrats accused the Republicans of unethical campaign tactics and 
the incident received worldwide news coverage.
All these examples aim to illustrate the fact that subliminal advertising is a 
topic that is very much alive since its introduction in 1957. Despite a lack of 
scientific evidence, there is a durable belief in the effect of subliminal messages 
on behavior among lay people. At the end of the 20th century, there was a large 
discrepancy between public and scientific opinion. Several reviews of the 
field of subliminal persuasion pointed out that it is highly unlikely that people’s 
behavior is easily manipulated by subliminal exposure (Moore, 1988; Pratkanis 
& Greenwald, 1988; Theus, 1994). Trappey (1996) presented a meta-analysis 
on the effectiveness of subliminal advertising concluding that the effects of 
subliminal stimuli on choice behavior were, at most, negligible. It was even 
stressed that researchers should not get involved in this field of study, as 
“perhaps now [it] is the time to lay the myth of subliminal sorcery to rest and direct 
our attention to other, more scientifically documented ways of understanding the 
causes of human behavior and improving our condition” (Pratkanis, 1992).
Is subliminal advertising a myth? Is it impossible to influence behavior through 
the unconscious, using subliminal stimulation? Following the absence of 
scientific evidence, Moore (1992) tried to provide theoretical arguments to 
debunk subliminal advertising. He argued that subliminal advertising is not 
likely to affect behavior because the stimulation is too weak to have any effect 
among countless other, supraliminal stimuli. Indeed, as subliminal stimulation 
is of weak intensity, it is likely to yield activation of weak intensity, making 
it a poor competitor with other stimuli. However, as it has been demonstrated 
that stimulus frequency is generally positively associated with greater psycho-
logical effects (Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985), the effect of subliminal 
stimulation might also be enhanced to a sufficient level of activation through 
multiple presentations of the subliminal ad. In Trappey’s (1996) meta-analysis 
the subliminal ad was presented only once in 17 of the 23 reported studies. 
Therefore, even though there was no evidence for subliminal advertising 
effects, it was also not disproven. Dijksterhuis, Aarts and Smith (2005) – in 
their article aptly titled “The power of the subliminal” – argued that subliminal 
stimulation may give more sway over human behavior than is being credited 
by many psychological researchers.
The power of the subliminal
Since subliminal perception was first studied at the end of the 19th century, 
and was proved a reliable finding in the first half of the 20th century 
(Adams, 1957), several developments have been made in fields other than 
subliminal advertising. Subliminal presentation has shown to influence evalu-
ations, semantic activation, social judgments, and even (spontaneous) behavior 
(for an overview, see Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). For example, it has reliably 
been demonstrated that subliminally priming unknown stimuli increases 
evaluation of these stimuli (Bornstein, Leone, & Galley, 1987; Monahan, 
Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000). In another example, behavior is influenced by 
subliminal primes: People exposed to subliminally presented pictures of 
African-Americans behaved more aggressively toward an unreasonable 
request of the experimenter than people exposed to a Caucasian faces, 
supposedly because the African-American faces primed the stereotype of 
aggressiveness, and in turn made aggressive behavior more likely (Bargh, 
Chen, & Burrows, 1996). In general, it is argued that (subliminal) presentation 
primes a construct, increasing its accessibility, and putting it, so to speak, 
in front of the mind (Higgins, 1996; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Wheeler & 
DeMarree, 2009). As a result, this accessible construct is more likely to 
influence behavior in any way that is applicable, such as guiding judgments, 
evaluations, or spontaneous behavior. 
Why have many studies failed to find that subliminal advertising guides 
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consumer choice in a similar manner? Also basing themselves on the prin-
ciple of subliminal construct activation, Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna (2002) 
made a critical observation, which might explain this discrepancy: They 
argued that a subliminally presented stimulus cannot create goals and thoughts, 
but it can prioritize. Hence, subliminal priming should aim to activate cog-
nitions that are already goal relevant, or in their words, subliminal stimuli 
should be “striking while the iron is hot” (p. 556). In their experiments, to ensure 
a higher-than-average level of deprivation, participants were asked not to 
eat and drink for three hours before coming into the lab, after which they 
had to conduct a taste test, sampling two types of cookies. To manipulate 
thirst, half of the participants were then instructed to drink as much water 
as they could, ostensibly to cleanse their taste palate. The other half did not 
drink anything and thus remained thirsty. Crosscutting this manipulation, 
half of the participants were exposed to subliminal presentations of thirst-
related words, such as “thirsty” or “dry”. Results showed that for participants 
who were still thirsty, thirst-related subliminal priming increased liquid 
consumption, whereas this effect was absent for non-thirsty participants. In 
their second study, they showed that subliminal priming can also be used to 
persuade. After participants were exposed to thirst-related words, they read 
two printed advertisements describing the brand “Power-Pro” as a drink 
that restores electrolytes, and, in contrast, the brand “Super-Quencher” as a 
brand that quenches thirst. Their results showed that participants who were 
primed with thirst-related words and were thirsty were more likely to select 
“Super-Quencher” more often in a subsequent choice. Albeit not directly a 
display of subliminal persuasion – a supraliminal ad was needed to persuade 
people – Strahan and her colleagues did put forward an important insight: 
Subliminal stimulation in itself might not be enough to persuade people; it 
has to resonate with a pre-existing goal.
Can this idea be applied to subliminal advertising? What if the brand that is 
being presented subliminally is goal relevant? Recently, Karremans, Stroebe 
and Claus (2006) addressed this question. They selected two thirst-quenching 
brands from a pre-test (“Lipton Ice” and “Spa Rood”, a Belgian brand of 
mineral water), and flashed half of their participants 25 times with “Lipton 
Ice” for 23 ms. The other half was primed with a nonsense string instead, 
which was an anagram of “Lipton Ice” (i.e., “Nipeic Tol”). Subsequently, 
participants could indicate which drink they would prefer to drink right now, 
choosing between Lipton Ice and Spa Rood. Critically, after their choice, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate how thirsty they felt. In line with the results 
of Strahan and colleagues (2002), people who indicated not feeling thirsty did 
not show a difference in preference between the two brands. However, 
participants who reported high levels of thirst showed a clear preference for 
Lipton Ice if that brand was subliminally presented. In a second study, thirst was 
manipulated by having half of the participants taste very salty liquorice. Again, 
only thirsty participants chose Lipton Ice more often when it was primed. 
Karremans and colleagues concluded that goal relevance of the subliminally 
advertised brand is a necessary condition for successful subliminal persuasion.
Even more recently, Bermeitinger and her colleagues (2009) set out to repli-
cate these findings and to extend the findings in two important ways. First, 
they aimed to demonstrate that goal relevant subliminal advertising effects 
were not specific to the goal to drink, and second, they wanted to show that 
subliminal advertising could not only influence a hypothetical choice, but 
also actual consumption behavior. In their study, they had participants play 
a simple computer game, in which they had to control an avatar to evade 
campfires and catch banknotes by jumping at the right time. During breaks 
in the game, to help them focus on the game, participants were allowed to 
consume as many energy pills as they wanted from two bowls, containing two 
different brands, indicated by two different logos on the bowls. To measure 
the relevance of the energy pills, before playing the game, all participants had 
indicated how tired they felt. In line with expectations, those participants 
who felt tired ate more energy pills from the bowl of which the logo was 
primed during the game. Those that did not feel tired showed no effect of 
subliminal advertising. Thus, Bermeitinger and colleagues replicated the 
finding that subliminal advertising is effective for goal relevant brands, and 
furthermore demonstrated that it can influence actual consumption and can 
be generalized to different goals.
The current dissertation
After a debate of more than 50 year, finally, a theory-driven approach of 
the phenomenon has yielded some initial evidence of successful subliminal 
persuasion: Subliminal advertising can influence consumer behavior as long 
as the advertised brand is goal relevant. Now that there is some evidence 
accruing in line with this notion, it is important to obtain more knowledge 
about subliminal advertising. To refer back to the opening example of this 
introduction: Is it possible to influence what people choose or put on their 
shopping lists? Did Vicary’s claim of influencing consumer behavior in a 
movie theatre have a core of truth? What are other limits and requirements 
of subliminal advertising? Through what mechanisms does it influence con-
sumer behavior? To answer these questions, we focused on factors limiting 
subliminal advertising effect and aimed to examine the process underlying 
its’ effects. Instead of asking the question whether subliminal advertising can 
affect consumer behavior, we asked when and how it does so. In the next 
section, I will summarize the empirical chapters that examine these questions.
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Chapter 2: The role of habits
In the opening example of this introduction, we already put forward past 
behavior as a possible source for current behavior. Indeed, habits exert a 
strong influence on (consumer) behavior. Past behavior is one of the best 
predictors of future behavior (Bentler & Speckart, 1979; Triandis, 1979). As 
such, it is important to know how consumption habits influence subliminal 
advertising. Next to this, habitual behavior is often automatic in nature: It 
can occur without awareness, with no conscious intentions, and generally 
does not involve a lot of effort. Habits are conceptualized as a specific context-
behavior link that is automatically activated when the context is primed (Wood 
& Neal, 2007). As subliminal advertising serves as a similar mechanism, (i.e., 
priming a specific behavior) it is of relevance to examine the interplay of 
these processes. More specifically, in Chapter 2, we examined whether sub-
liminal advertising can influence product choice when the primed brand is 
the habitual brand versus when it is competing with a habitual brand.
Chapter 3: subliminal ads in context
Previous research on subliminal advertising has presented the subliminal ads 
in a neutral context (e.g., Karremans et al., 2006). In this chapter, we will put 
subliminal advertising in a more naturalistic setting to examine how context 
influences subliminal persuasion. More specifically, if subliminal ads are shown 
during a television program, does the valence of the program influence the 
effect of subliminal ads on product choice? To approach this question, in 
Chapter 3, we relate subliminal advertising in a valenced context to evalua-
tive conditioning. According to evaluative conditioning theories, evaluation 
of a stimulus can change due to multiple pairings of that (neutral) stimulus 
with an affective stimulus (De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). Thus, 
subliminally presenting a brand name in a valenced context might change 
the evaluation of the brand in the direction of the valence of the context. 
In Chapter 3, we examine whether subliminal advertising in a negative 
(compared to a positive context) will have adverse effects on brand choice, 
and if this is dependent on goal relevance of the brand.
Chapter 4: goal relevance in evaluative conditioning
In the previous chapter, we observed that subliminally presenting a brand in 
a negative context influences the evaluation of that brand more when the 
brand was goal relevant. In Chapter 4, we further examine the role of goals 
in evaluative conditioning. Is a goal relevant conditioning procedure more 
effective than an irrelevant procedure? To this end, we presented participants 
with beverages and paired them with relevant unconditioned stimuli (dis-
gusted faces) or irrelevant stimuli (fearful faces). We examined whether the 
goal to drink was positively related to conditioning effects, especially when 
the procedure was relevant to that goal.
Chapter 5: Warning against subliminal advertising
Subliminal advertising has been scorned as unethical by the public and adver-
tisers. The base for this resentment is the fact that people believe that it is 
impossible to shield oneself from subliminal influence, due to its unconscious 
nature. In Chapter 5, this assumption is tested by providing participants with 
the knowledge that they are being influenced by subliminal messages (without 
disclosing the nature and content of the influence) to examine whether brand 
choice is still being influenced by subliminal presentation of the brand name 
when people are warned.
Chapter 6: Accessibility as the process underlying of 
subliminal advertising
What psychological processes underlie subliminal advertising effects? Based 
on priming literature, subliminally priming a brand name should increase 
cognitive accessibility of the brand. Brand accessibility is a strong predictor 
of consumer behavior (Nedungadi, 1990). However, the effect of priming on 
accessibility has always been conceptualized as a direct link between exposure 
and accessibility. As subliminal advertising effects on choice are subject to 
goal relevance, could it be that priming effects on accessibility are sensitive to 
goal relevance of the stimuli as well? Therefore, in Chapter 6, we examine 
the influence of goal relevance on the effect of subliminally priming a brand 
name on brand accessibility. 
Chapter 7: General Discussion
In this final chapter, we will summarize our findings on the working and 
limits of subliminal advertising, and discuss how these new insights relate to 
the questions often raised regarding subliminal advertising. Is subliminal 
advertising an applicable and powerful means of persuasion? How does it 
relate to other forms of persuasion? Is it necessary to regulate subliminal 
advertising through legislation? Can people prevent being influenced? In 
answering these questions we will provide answers and suggestions tackling 
the current controversy, as well as generate new questions for future research. 
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Abstract
Despite years of controversy, recent research demonstrated that, if goal-relevant, 
subliminal advertising can be feasible. To further elucidate the workings and 
limits of subliminal advertising, the present study examined the role of habits. 
Participants chose between two brands, one of which was subliminally primed. 
If neither brand was habitually consumed more frequently than the other, 
results from previous research were replicated. However, subliminally priming 
the more habitual brand did not increase brand choice. Remarkably, when 
the advertised brand was competing with a more habitual brand, priming 
increased choice for the primed brand even at the expense of the habitual 
choice.
 
Ever since the marketer Vicary claimed to have influenced consumer choices 
by subliminally flashing brand names in a movie theater in the 1950s, sublim-
inal advertising has been a controversial topic (Pratkanis, 1992). Vicary’s claim 
was revealed as a hoax, and experimental research mostly failed to replicate 
Vicary's results (for an overview, see Moore, 1988; Pratkanis & Greenwald, 
1988). For example, although subliminal presentations of the brand name 
“Coca Cola” increased overall consumption, it did not increase choice for 
that brand over alternatives (Cooper & Cooper, 2002; Dijksterhuis, Aarts, & 
Smith, 2005; Hawkins, 1970). Nevertheless, a meta-analysis of 33 studies 
yielded a significant effect of subliminal brand presentation on choice for 
that brand, even though most individual studies in the analysis did not find 
significant support for such an effect (Trappey, 1996). 
These results suggest the possibility that subliminal priming influences product 
choice only under very specific conditions, which have to be met for sub-
liminal advertisements to be effective. Karremans, Stroebe, and Claus (2006) 
argued that goal relevance of the subliminal ad might be a necessary condition 
for subliminal advertising to work. This argument was based on the more 
general idea that subliminal priming may be especially effective when the 
prime is goal-relevant, that is, when people are motivated to pursue a goal 
to which the prime is relevant (Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002; Veltkamp, 
Aarts, & Custers, 2008; Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). In the case 
of subliminal advertising, Karremans et al. (2006) demonstrated that subliminal 
priming of a brand of beverage increases choice for that beverage, but only 
when participants were thirsty. For participants who were not thirsty, sub-
liminal priming did not affect choice. Recently, Bermeitinger et al. (2009) 
conceptually replicated these findings in another domain, demonstrating that 
people can be subliminally stimulated to choose a particular brand of energy 
pills, but only if they are tired and motivated to concentrate. These findings 
indicate that especially when people are motivated to make a choice between 
products, subliminal priming of the name or logo of a brand can influence 
brand choice.
More generally, these findings suggest that previous attempts to find sub-
liminal advertising effects may often have failed because they did not take 
theoretical developments on the effectiveness of subliminal priming in general 
into account. The goal of the present research is to further elucidate the 
conditions under which subliminal advertising will be effective. Specifically, 
in the present study, we will examine the role of consumption habits, and 
how they restrict the effectiveness of subliminal advertising. We argue that 
strong pre-existing habits towards an advertised brand are likely to restrict the 
workings of subliminal ads. Another interesting and related issue is whether 
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pre-existing habits can be overridden by a subliminal ad of an alternative 
brand. For example, if a thirsty person has always bought a can of Perrier in 
the past, can subliminal ads of a different brand of beverage (e.g., Lipton Ice 
tea) influence choice when standing in front of the vending machine? These 
questions will be addressed in the current research. 
The role of habits 
A habit is often conceptualized as a learned response pattern that has become 
automatic through repetition of the habitual behavior (Aarts, Verplanken, & 
Van Knippenberg, 1998; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Triandis, 1979). In recent 
theorizing, habits are described as direct associations between a context and 
a response pattern (Wood & Neal, 2007). According to these authors, when 
a goal in a specific context is typically and repeatedly solved with a specific 
means, a direct association between the performance context and the means 
is formed. In future situations, this direct association between context and 
behavior ensures that, if this association is primed by the context, the behavior 
is performed automatically, without any mediation of the relevant goal. 
For example, applied to consumer choices, if a choice is prompted between 
several brands, and one of the brands has been chosen habitually in past 
choices, then this brand will be automatically chosen this time as well, without 
any interference of goals or conscious decision-making.
We argue that, for this reason, subliminal ads of a habitually consumed brand 
are unlikely to affect choice for that brand. In the case of beverages, when 
given a choice between two brands of beverages, we expect that regardless 
of prime or goal relevance of the brand, the brand that is habitually chosen 
(at least more so than the other brand) will be chosen anyway. Thus, in this 
manner, habitual choices should constrain the working of subliminal adver-
tising. Interestingly, this simple logic seems to have been largely overlooked 
in previous research on subliminal advertising, and may directly explain why 
several previous studies failed to find subliminal advertising effects when 
priming participants with Coca-Cola (Cooper & Cooper, 2002; Dijksterhuis 
et al., 2005; Hawkins, 1970). After all, Coca-Cola is often people’s (and 
students’ in particular) habitual choice when choosing a soft drink, and 
subliminal ads are thus unlikely to affect choice for Coca-Cola. 
Does this imply that habitual choices cannot be influenced by subliminal 
ads? 
If the primed brand competes with the habitual brand, the situation is arguably 
more complex. For example, if an individual, who generally chooses San 
Pellegrino – the habitual choice –, is primed with Perrier, and the person 
gets the choice between San Pellegrino and Perrier, will the prime overrule 
his or her habitual choice, inducing a choice for Perrier? As noted above, 
previous research has demonstrated increased accessibility due to priming of 
a brand affects choice for that brand, but only if the prime is goal-relevant 
(Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans et al., 2006). Moreover, research in a 
different domain has demonstrated that priming a construct increases the 
use of that construct in person perception, even when it conflicts with a chron-
ically accessibility construct (which would be applied when no priming is 
present; Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988). Similarly, in the current research, 
when a brand is subliminally primed, the increased accessibility of the brand 
may influence brand choice even at the expense of the habitual brand, but 
only if the primed brand is goal-relevant. 
It is important to note that a primed alternative brand might only overrule 
choice for a habitual brand when both brands are similar in their goal-relevant 
qualities (i.e., instrumentality, attractiveness). In the case of brands of drinks, 
the primed brand and the habitual brand should be similar in the extent to 
which they quench thirst and in the extent to which they are liked. In the 
current research, we therefore chose brands that in a pilot study were rated 
as equally tasty, and equally thirst-quenching. 
The current research and overview of hypotheses
To examine our research questions, a similar paradigm was used as in the 
Karremans et al. study (2006). Participants were subliminally primed with a 
target brand of a beverage (Lipton Ice), and were asked immediately there-
after to choose between that brand and one alternative, comparable brand 
(Spa Rood, a well-known brand of mineral water in the Netherlands). 
Our predictions can be summarized as follows: For participants with no 
habitual preference for either brand, we expected to replicate previous 
results (Karremans et al., 2006): The prime should positively influence choice 
for Lipton Ice, but only for thirsty participants1 (Hypothesis 1). However, we 
did not expect to find this effect for people who habitually drink the primed 
brand more than the alternative. In this case we expect participants to 
choose that brand, regardless of priming or thirst (Hypothesis 2). For partici-
pants with a stronger habit towards the alternative (i.e., non-primed brand), 
it was expected that the primed brand would be chosen over the habitual 
brand, but, again, only if participants are thirsty (Hypothesis 3). In the control 
condition, in which participants receive no prime, we simply expect choice 
for the habitual brand, regardless of thirst.
Finally, it is important to note that in the current study we will examine, and 
measure, the moderating role of relative habit strength. When given a choice 
between two brands of beverages, say brand A and brand B, an individual is 
likely to automatically choose brand A if his or her past habit for choosing 
brand A is stronger than his or her habit for choosing brand B, irrespective of 
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the absolute habit strength for brand A. We expect, thus, that priming brand 
A will not be effective if the habit for brand A is relatively stronger than the 
habit for brand B. In another example, even if an individual has a strong 
habit for brand A, but at the same time has a strong habit for brand B, when 
given a choice between A and B this person is unlikely to automatically choose 
A. In this example, as we hypothesize, priming brand A is likely to affect choice 
for brand A (for a thirsty person). Hence, in light of these considerations, we 
measured and examined the role of relative habits in the effectiveness of 
subliminal advertising. 
Method
Participants and design. One-hundred-and-forty-six students of the Radboud 
University Nijmegen participated for either course credit or 10 Euros. Their 
mean age was 21.4 years. Of the 146 participants, 119 were female. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the Lipton Ice prime or the no prime 
condition.
Procedure. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were asked to read the instruc-
tions and were seated behind a PC to conduct a series of experiments. The 
current study was the last in a row of several unrelated experiments. The 
actual experiment started with the subliminal priming manipulation. Im-
mediately after the priming task, product choice was measured. Subsequently, 
participants reported habitual consumption and level of thirst. At the end of the 
experiment participants were probed for prime awareness. After participants 
were finished, they were thanked for their participation and paid in either 
course credits or coupons.
Independent variables. prime condition. The priming manipulation followed 
a similar procedure as used by Karremans et al. (2006). The task was framed 
as a visual detection task. Participants were shown a string of uppercase B’s 
in every trial, and were instructed to count the trials in which a lowercase b 
occurred (e.g., BBBBbB). After every five trials they had to report the number 
of trials containing a lowercase b they had counted. As the actual priming 
manipulation, before every trial, a prime was presented for 17 ms. To mask 
the prime it was preceded and followed by a random letter string for 500 
ms. After the backwards mask, the string of B’s was presented for 2 seconds. 
Participants were subjected to 20 trials. As in the studies conducted by 
Karremans et al., in the experimental condition the prime was the brand 
Lipton Ice, and in the control condition the prime was a non-word containing 
the same letters as Lipton Ice (i.e., Nipeic Tol).
thirst. Participants reported their current level of thirst on four items (e.g., 
“I am thirsty”; “At the moment, I want something to drink”) on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 – not at all – to 7 – very much. Cronbach’s alpha for these 
questions was .90. 
habit. Participants’ consumption habits were measured in one question for 
either brand (Lipton Ice, Spa Rood; e.g., “When you drink a soft drink, how 
often do you normally drink Lipton Ice (Spa Rood)?”), on a 6-point scale 
ranging from Never to Always.2 To distinguish participants with stronger 
habits towards the primed brand, participants with stronger habits towards 
the alternative, and participants with equal habits, the difference between 
the habitual consumptions of the primed brand and the alternative brand 
was computed. In this manner, we created an index of participants’ relative 
habit strength, with a higher score indicating relatively stronger habits 
towards the primed brand (i.e. Lipton Ice) as compared to the alternative 
brand (i.e., Spa Rood). This measure was scaled so that 1 point is equal to 1 
standard deviation, but it was not centered around the mean, as the absolute 
zero point is more informative (i.e., indicating equal habits).3
Dependent measure. product choice. Participants were presented with a choice 
between Lipton Ice and Spa Rood. Spa Rood is a common, well-known 
brand of bottled sparkling water in the Netherlands. This brand was selected 
from a range of 20 brands that are typically sold in Dutch supermarkets. 
These 20 brands were compared in a pre-test (N=15) on three features: 
consumption habits (on a 9-point categorical scale ranging from 1 = never 
to 9 = always), their ability to quench thirst (on a 9-point scale ranging from 
1 = not at all to 9 = very much), and their overall evaluation (on a 9-point 
scale ranging from 1 = negative to 9 = positive). The selected brands, Lipton 
Ice and Spa Rood, scored similar on consumption habits, t(14) = 0.85, p = 
.41, MLipton Ice = 1.93, MSpa Rood = 2.20, on thirst quenchiness, t(14) = 0.46, 
p = .65, MLipton Ice = 6.20, MSpa Rood = 5.87, and overall evaluation, t(14) = 
1.48, p = .16, MLipton Ice = 6.20, MSpa Rood = 5.20.
To make a choice, participants were presented with both brands. One was 
presented on the left and the other on the right of the screen. Participants 
could then choose which beverage they would like to drink at that moment 
by pressing either a left button (Q) or a right button (P). The positions of 
the brands were counterbalanced.
Prime awareness. Participants were subjected to a funneled debriefing 
procedure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). More specifically, they were asked if 
they noticed something peculiar about the priming task. Also, they were 
informed that a word was primed, and were asked to write down what they 
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thought the word was. In addition, they could choose from three possible 
brands the one that they thought was primed (i.e., Lipton Ice, Spa Rood, and, 
another well-known Dutch brand, Dubbel Friss). None of the participants 
noted any peculiarities that were associated with the priming. Also, when 
asked which word was primed, no one reported Lipton Ice (or Nipeic Tol in 
the control group). On the multiple choice question, participants reported 
each brand an equal number of times, and this was not affected by condition.
A prime recognition task, which consisted of ten trials of the priming 
manipulation, functioned as a second probing measure. Participants were 
informed that a word would be primed between the two random letter strings, 
and were instructed to guess which word it was. Half of the participants 
were primed with Lipton Ice, the other half with the control prime. Again, 
they were asked to write down what the prime was, and were given a choice 
between three brands. Some people reported Lipton Ice as the prime on the 
open-ended question. However, there was no difference in recognition be-
tween people in the prime condition and the control condition, indicating 
that people made an educated guess based on the options that were presented 
in the funneled debriefing task. This conclusion is further verified by the 
same amount of occurrences of the other multiple choice options in the 
open-ended question.
Results
Overall, Lipton Ice was preferred over Spa Rood. 71 % of the participants 
chose Lipton Ice, which differs from chance, t(145) = 5.73, p < .001. This 
did not differ between primed participants and controls (resp. 73% and 71%, 
F < 1). Table 2.1 presents the mean values and standard deviations of the 
assumed determinants of choice of soft drink. 
Table 2.1. Descriptives of the predictors.
Mean (SD) Min Max
Thirst 4.02 (1.30) 1 6.75
Lipton habit 2.77 (1.31) 1 6
Spa habit 2.17 (1.49) 1 6
Relative habit 0.60 (1.98) -5 5
Simple correlations between these determinants and choice are presented in 
Table 2.2. Furthermore, as the independent variables, thirst and habit, were 
measured after the priming procedure, it is necessary to exclude any effects 
of priming. ANOVA’s with priming as independent variable and respectively 
thirst and habit as dependent variables revealed no significant effects (F’s <1).
Table 2.2. Simple correlations between predictors and dependent variable. 
Thirst Lipton habit Spa habit Relative habit
Thirst
Lipton Ice habit .15
Spa Rood habit .15 .01
Relative habit -.01 .66* -.75*
Choice Lipton .10 38* -.40* .55*
*p < .001
To examine whether the effect of subliminal priming on choice is moderated 
by thirst and habits, a logistic regression analysis was conducted on choice for 
Lipton Ice, with prime condition, thirst, relative habit, and their interactions 
as predictors.4 First of all, the main effect of habit was significant, B = 2.64, 
Wald(1, 139) = 10.88, p < .005. When habit increased (i.e., people had 
stronger Lipton Ice habits than Spa Rood habits), the odds for choosing 
Lipton Ice over Spa Rood also increased. This strong main effect of habit 
indicates not only the external validity of the difference score, but also shows 
that the concept of habit can be captured in one item. 
More importantly, the analysis yielded an expected, but marginal significant 
three-way interaction between habit, thirst and priming, B = -1.45, Wald(1, 
139) = 3.32, p = .07. To examine the interaction between priming and thirst 
at different levels of habit, the simple slope method was applied (Aiken & West, 
1991). In our study, this meant estimating different slopes of the two-way 
interaction between thirst and priming on different levels of habit. As habit 
is the difference between Lipton Ice and Spa Rood consumption, it is infor-
mative to calculate significance levels when habitual consumption is equal 
(habit = 0), when Lipton Ice is habitually consumed more than Spa Rood 
on one standard deviation from zero (habit = 1), and when Spa Rood is 
consumed more than Lipton Ice (habit = -1). It is important to note that, 
by using this method, we did not divide participants in different groups, based 
on their habit score. Instead, the slope was calculated on different levels of 
habit, taking the data of all participants into account.
When regressed on the zero-point of habit (i.e., people with equal Lipton 
Ice and Spa Rood habits) the interaction between priming and thirst was 
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significant, B = 1.15, Wald(1, 139) = 3.92, p = .05; as in previous research, 
thirst was positively associated with choice for Lipton Ice when participants 
were primed, B = 0.61, Wald(1, 139) = 4.84, p = .03, but not when partici-
pants were not primed, B = -0.53, Wald(1, 139) = 1.11, p = .29 (see Figure 
2.1).5 This finding supports Hypothesis 1, in that, for participants with no 
habitual preference for either the primed or the alternative non-primed brand, 
especially thirsty participants chose the primed brand. Thus, we replicated 
the findings of Karremans et al. (2006) for participants with no habitual 
preference.
Figure 2.1. The influence of priming on the probability of choosing the primed 
brand as a function of thirst for participants with no habitual preference.
When participants indicated that they drank more Lipton Ice than Spa 
Rood (habit = 1), thirst and priming did not interact, B = -1.16, Wald(1, 
139) = 0.72, p = .76 (see Figure 2.2a). In fact, the probability of choosing 
Lipton Ice was almost equal to 1, regardless of level of thirst or priming or 
thirst. This finding supports Hypothesis 2: priming a habitual brand does 
not increase choice for the brand, as the brand presumably is already chosen 
automatically. 
Perhaps most interestingly, when participants indicated that they habitually 
drank more Spa Rood than Lipton Ice (habit = -1), thirst and priming did 
interact, B = 1.73, Wald(1, 139) = 6.50, p = .01. Thirst was positively associated 
with choice for Lipton Ice only when Lipton Ice was primed, B = 0.82, 
Wald(1, 139) = 5.65, p = .03, and not when Lipton Ice was not primed, 
B = -0.91, Wald(1, 139) = 2.43, p = .09 (see Figure 2.2b). In other words, 
even for habitual Spa Rood drinkers, priming Lipton Ice positively affected 
choice for Lipton Ice to the extent that people were thirstier. These findings 
are in line with Hypothesis 3, indicating that priming an alternative drink 
can actually overrule choice for the habitual brand. 
Figure 2.2. The influence of priming on the probability of choosing the primed 
brand as a function of thirst for participants with equal habits (a) vs. a stronger habit 
(b) for the primed brand.
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Additional analyses, using both habits separately (i.e., consumption habit of 
Spa Rood and Lipton Ice both entered in the logistic regression model) 
yielding similar results, which are described in Footnote 4. 
In sum, these results generally confirmed our hypotheses. Subliminal priming 
of a brand positively affected choice for that brand to the extent that people 
were thirstier, but only when people had a relatively weak habit to drink 
Lipton Ice over Spa Rood. Participants, who had a strong habit to drink 
Lipton Ice over Spa Rood, chose Lipton Ice anyway. People who had no 
habitual preference or even people who had a stronger habit towards Spa 
Rood were influenced by brand priming if they were thirsty.
Discussion
In the present article, the workings – and limits – of subliminal advertising 
were further explored. Previous work has shown that subliminal priming of 
a brand name only influences subsequent brand choice when it relates to an 
active relevant goal (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans et al., 2006). The 
present findings build on this notion, and demonstrate that the effect of 
subliminal advertising is also moderated by existing habits. As to the limits 
of subliminal advertising, for a relatively strong habitually chosen brand, 
priming of that brand did not influence brand choice – even if the primed 
brand was goal-relevant. As to the workings of subliminal advertising, the 
findings demonstrate that, remarkably, if people habitually consumed an 
alternative brand more frequently than the primed brand, participants were 
actually influenced by brand-priming such that they were more likely to 
choose the primed brand over the habitual brand.
The finding that priming a habitual brand does not influence brand choice 
in favor of that brand may seem straightforward: a brand’s habitual consumer 
need not be persuaded. However, as briefly alluded to in the introduction, 
this finding clarifies why previous scientific attempts to influence consumer 
choices subliminally have often failed. Probably influenced by Vicary’s claim 
to have successfully influenced Coca-Cola sales, researchers often chose 
“Coca Cola” as the primed brand, and failed to find an effect of priming on 
brand choice (Cooper & Cooper, 2002; Hawkins, 1970). The reason for 
their failure, we would suggest, is that “Coca Cola” is the best known soft 
drink brand in the world, and is a habitual choice for a lot of people. In a 
pilot study we conducted, when asked to name six soft drink brands, over 
70% of the participants named “Coca Cola” first, showing the chronically 
high accessibility of the brand. Provided the restricting role of habits, as 
illustrated here, it seems likely that studies that used “Coca Cola” as the 
prime did not find results because of the brand being strongly habitual. 
Habit – or previous behavior – is often seen as a strong determinant of 
behavior, needing no mediation of attitudes or intentions (Bentler & Speckart, 
1979). It is therefore remarkable that a subliminally primed brand name, 
which supposedly has only a negligible influence on behavior (Trappey, 
1996), overruled the habit for the alternative brand in the present research. 
However, in line with these results, previous research has shown that priming 
a trait influenced person perception even when a conflicting chronically 
accessible trait was present. This effect of priming was, however, relatively 
short-lived (Bargh et al., 1988). The present findings could thus be resulting 
from a temporal advantage of the primed brand over the habitual brand, as 
the moment of choice always immediately followed the priming manipulation. 
Future research could focus on this possibility by varying the duration between 
priming manipulation and the moment of choice.
More broadly speaking, the current findings have implications for research 
on the impact of brand priming on motivation and behavior. For example, 
recent studies have shown that brand priming (either subliminally or 
through incidental brand encounters) can affect actual consumer choices 
(Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, & Tanner, 2008; Ferraro, Bettman, & Chartrand, 
2009), or affect behavior that is symbolically associated with the brand 
(Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008). As a specific example, priming 
participants with the computer brand Apple made them subsequently more 
creative. An interesting question, based on our results, is whether such effects 
would be moderated by habits of the brand: are habitual Apple users as 
strongly influenced by an Apple prime as non-habitual users? We suggest 
that it might be important to take habits into account whenever examining 
the effects of brand priming. 
Although not a central goal of the present research, it is important to note that 
the influence of habits on consumer choice in our study was not dependent 
on goal activation. That is, when not being primed, participants chose the 
habitual brand irrespective of thirst. This finding seems consistent with recent 
theorizing on the nature of habits, in which habits are seen as automatic 
behavioral responses in a certain context (Wood & Neal, 2007), whereas 
others have described habits as automatic associations between goals and means 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Aarts et al., 1998). In the current study, simply 
giving participants a choice for two brands is sufficient to elicit a habitual 
response, independent of the participant’s current goal state. Thus, this finding 
is consistent with a goal-independent model of habits, in which the context 
is sufficient to initiate habitual behavior.
How do the current results relate to recent developments in other domains 
of subliminal priming research? Although subliminal advertising and other 
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research lines on subliminal priming are related, subliminal advertising 
research is conceptually different. Whereas most research on subliminal 
priming focuses on priming goals or behavioral representations (for a recent 
overview, see Custers & Aarts, 2010), in the present research participants are 
primed with the means to attain a goal or enact a behavior. Thus, rather than 
priming people with a goal (e.g., quenching one’s thirst) that should initiate 
goal pursuit (e.g., drinking), subliminal advertising entails priming of a means 
(e.g., a brand of a beverage) to accomplish a goal that people already pursue. 
As an example of goal priming, Sheeran and colleagues (2005) recently re-
ported that priming socializing (i.e., a goal) increased participants drinking 
behavior (i.e., a means), but only if they habitually used drinking behavior 
to socialize. In their study, it is apparent that, although they successfully 
influenced participants’ goal pursuit, their choice of means to attain that 
goal was directed by their habits, not by subliminal priming, as they did not 
prime any means. The current results demonstrate that if the means itself is 
primed, it affects choice of means directly, even overriding conflicting habits.
The present findings indicate when and when not to employ subliminal 
advertising, and therefore may have important practical implications. For 
example, our results suggest that it would be ineffective for advertisers of a 
dominant brand to invest in subliminal advertising. On the other hand, 
based on the earlier findings regarding the importance of goal relevance 
(Karremans et al., 2006), a very unknown or novel brand does not benefit 
from subliminal advertising either, as the brand is not yet associated with 
a goal. Therefore, the range of brands that could successfully benefit from 
subliminal advertising should lie in the middle of this spectrum, ideally, 
being strongly associated with a goal, but not a top-of-the-mind brand. As 
our results further suggest that subliminal advertising can successfully compete 
with habitual influences, it could be a useful technique especially when a 
brand is competing with a very dominant brand.
We should acknowledge some limitations of the present research and sug-
gestions for future research. First, although our research demonstrates that 
subliminal ads can override other influences of behavior, even habits, we 
acknowledge that we should be cautious in generalizing our findings to 
real-life settings. Although we have recently demonstrated subliminal brand 
priming effects with primes embedded in a movie (see Chapter 3), further 
research is needed to assess the extent to which subliminal advertising is 
feasible in less controlled settings. Second, a related issue, when considering 
the applicability of subliminal advertising, is its longevity. Although little is 
known about the duration of subliminal advertising effects, the literature on 
trait priming (e.g., Bargh et al., 1988) would suggest that priming effects on 
brand accessibility might be short-lived. 
Third, another interesting issue for future studies is to examine the exact 
processes of how habits moderate subliminal advertising effects on product 
choice. For example, as briefly noted in the introduction, priming the brand 
may raise accessibility for individuals with no habitual preference for the 
brand, and in turn affect choice. Although accessibility increases may still 
occur for individuals with a strong habit, chronic accessibility may already 
be above a threshold such that it does not further affect choice. Thus, although 
increased accessibility of the brand may occur among both low and high 
habit people, accessibility may only be associated with choice among indi-
viduals low in habit. Future studies could test this by including accessibility 
measures of the primed brand. 
Fourth, our measure of habits relied on single-item scores asking participants’ 
frequency of past choice for both brands. However, we did this because there 
can be little doubt that asking people how often they perform a specific be-
havior is the single best measure of the frequency with which they perform 
this behavior. More problematic is the related question whether frequency 
of past behavior is the best indicator of habit, given the recent evidence that 
the stability of the context in which a specific behavior is performed is a 
second essential determinant of habit formation (Danner, Aarts, & Vries, 
2008; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Wood, Tam, & Witt, 2005). However, since 
there was no evidence in our pilot studies that people drink Spa Rood in 
completely different contexts from Lipton Ice, we assumed that frequency 
of consumption would be the most valid measure of drinking habit. 
Notwithstanding these possible limitations, it is important to emphasize that 
the current research does corroborate with recent research (Bermeitinger et 
al., 2009; Karremans et al., 2006) that, given the right circumstances, subliminal 
advertising can be effective, a claim that has been disputed for decades 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2005; Hawkins, 1970; Pratkanis, 1992).6 At the same 
time, our research provides a plausible explanation for why earlier attempts 
to demonstrate subliminal advertising effects failed, as researchers often used 
a top-of-the-mind, habitual brand. Based on recent theoretical developments 
in the subliminal advertising priming literature, the present research has 
revealed important new insights into the possibilities and limitations of sub-
liminal advertising. Using theoretical knowledge from cognitive and social 
psychology, it should be possible to predict when subliminal advertisements 
will, and when they won’t be effective, providing a useful foundation for 
application. In any case, the present research does add further credence to 
Vicary’s original claim that subliminal advertising might be feasible – although 
the effect is not as straightforward as he seemed to think. 
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Footnotes
 
1 For the sake of simplicity, we discuss the hypotheses in terms of thirsty and non-thirsty 
participants. However, as thirst is a continuous factor in our experiment, we expect thirst 
to enhance the effect of subliminal advertising: Greater levels of thirst increase the effect 
of priming.
2 Measuring habits through frequency of behavior has a long tradition in social psychology 
that dates back to Triandis (1979). As Landis, Triandis and Adamopoulos (1978) stated in 
commenting on a study of voluntary blood donation, “Obviously the frequency of previous 
voluntary participation is the most relevant question, and was in fact used as the measure 
of the habit component” (p. 229). Interest in the habit concept was revitalized by Bentler and 
Speckart’s (1979) demonstration that past behavior was an excellent predictor of future 
behavior. Although following Oulette and Wood (1998) it has recently been suggested 
that a measure of habit should incorporate information about the stability of context as 
well as self-reported frequency (Danner et al., 2008), stability of context is less relevant in 
our study, since we compare the identical behavior (drinking) performed towards two 
different brands of soft drink.
3 In addition to the theoretical reason for examining relative habit strength, as outlined in 
the Introduction, results showed that the difference score explained more variance in 
choice, and was better normally distributed than the combination of both habits separately.
4 The four-way interaction between priming, thirst, Lipton Ice habit, and Spa Rood habit 
was marginally significant, B = 3.57, Wald(1,145) = 3.43, p = .06. Thirst is only associated 
with choice for the primed brand, if participants have low habits towards the primed 
brand, and high habits toward the alternative brand.
5 Although a pilot study revealed that Lipton Ice and Spa Rood were evaluated as equally 
thirst-quenching, the data suggest that at higher levels of thirst, participants favored Spa 
Rood over Lipton Ice. Although these results were non-significant (neither for participants 
with no habit for one of the two brands, nor for participants with a relative habit for Spa 
Rood), we speculate that when actually being thirsty, Spa Rood might be seen as a better 
thirst-quencher than Lipton Ice. This (non-significant) finding does not undermine any 
of the other reported results supporting our hypotheses.
6 By demonstrating the feasibility of subliminal advertising, our findings and those of 
Karremans et al. (2006) and Bermeitinger et al. (2009) will reopen the ethical debate wheth-
er subliminal advertising should be permitted. Even though our findings suggest several 
limitations of the effects of subliminal advertising, the fact remains that this technique 
provides a means of influencing consumers without their being aware of this influence. 
We would like to point out, however, that advertisers already use a whole arsenal of strate-
gies (e.g., banner ads on internet sites) that influence consumers without their awareness 
(for a review, see Fennis & Stroebe, 2010).
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Subliminal Ads in 
Context: Movie Valence 
Moderates the Effect 
of Subliminal Brand 
Priming
 
This chapter is based on:
Verwijmeren, T., Karremans, J. C., Stroebe, W., Wigboldus, D. H. J., van Ooijen, I. (in preparation). 
Subliminal ads in context: Movie valence moderates the effect of subliminl brand priming.
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Abstract
After Vicary’s claim of subliminally influencing movie-goers' consumer 
behavior, subliminal advertising became highly controversial. Recent research 
demonstrated in controlled lab-settings that subliminal advertising works 
for goal-relevant brands. In three studies, we examined effects of subliminal 
ads in a movie). The present research especially investigated the influence of 
the valence of the movie on effects of subliminal ads on product choice. 
In Study 3.1, subliminally priming a goal-relevant brand during a movie 
resulted in a preference for that brand. Study 3.2 and Study 3.3 showed 
moderation of this effect by movie valence on both brand evaluation 
(Studies 3.2 & 3.3) and brand choice (Study 3.2). Specifically, subliminal 
ads in a positive movie increased choice for the primed brand, whereas ads 
in a negative movie decreased choice. These effects were not replicated in 
Study 3.3. Although studies 3.1 to 3.3 provide initial evidence that sub-
liminal ads embedded in movies can affect brand choice, and that this effect 
is moderated by the valence of the movie, the fact that this pattern could 
not be replicated in study 3.3 necessitates further research on this issue. 
In 1957, the marketer James Vicary shocked the world with his claim to 
have successfully influenced movie-goers to buy more popcorn and coke, 
by repeatedly flashing “Drink Coke” and “Eat Popcorn” for 1/300 of a 
second during the movie. Psychological research initially failed to replicate 
his results, and Vicary retracted his claim later on (Pratkanis, 1992). However, 
because his ‘discovery’ of subliminal advertising received a great deal more 
media attention than his retraction, the public opinion on subliminal adver-
tising did not change and the fear of being subliminally manipulated remained. 
To protect the public, subliminal advertising was banned in Australia and 
Britain with severe consequences for those, who disobeyed the law. Also in 
the USA, the use of subliminal messages was banned for all members of the 
National Association of Broadcasters. 
At the time, these measures seemed unnecessary because there appeared to 
be overwhelming scientific evidence that subliminal advertising did not work 
(Theus, 1994; Trappey, 1996). Already in 1958, a panel at the convention of the 
American Psychological Association concluded that there was no visible 
danger to the general public from the indiscriminate use of subliminal tech-
niques. And two decades later, an influential review of research on subliminal 
advertising drew the following conclusion: “There is no empirical documen-
tation for strong subliminal effects, such as inducing particular behaviors or 
changing motivation. Moreover, such a notion is contradicted by a substantial 
amount of research and it is incompatible with experimentally based concep-
tions of information processing, learning and motivation” (Moore, 1982, p. 46). 
However, even though most studies failed to find effects on measures of 
choice, several studies found other effects of subliminally presented brands 
or products. For example, Hawkins (1970) reported that flashes of the word 
Coke did not increase choice for Coke, but did increase participants’ feelings 
of thirst (see also Cooper & Cooper, 2002). Similarly, subliminal priming of 
the word beef did not increase choice for this product, but increased feelings 
of hunger (Byrne, 1959). Although these studies thus suggested that priming 
a product does not increase choice for the product, subliminal advertising 
did elicit the need associated with the primed product. Other studies indicate 
that subliminal ads influence eating and drinking behavior. After priming 
either the word drink or the word cola participants drank more than in the 
control condition (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, & Smith, 2005). However, again, 
priming the word cola did not influence participants’ choice for that brand. 
More recently, however, evidence emerged to suggest that given the right 
conditions, subliminal advertising might be effective after all. Strahan, Spencer, 
and Zanna (2002) demonstrated that participants were more strongly influ-
enced by printed advertisements when these were accompanied by subliminal 
primes that were goal-relevant. In their study, participants showed a preference 
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for a beverage advertised as being thirst quenching, after being primed with 
thirst-related words. However, this effect occurred only when participants were 
already thirsty. Thus, only when a certain need is already present, does sub-
liminal priming of that need influence behavior. Inspired by these findings, 
Karremans, Stroebe and Claus (2006) examined whether subliminally priming 
the name of a particular brand might increase choice for that brand, if the brand 
was goal-relevant. In support of this assumption, they found that a primed 
beverage was chosen more often than an alternative brand, but only among 
thirsty participants for whom the prime was goal-relevant. Bermeitinger et al. 
(2009) conceptually replicated these findings, demonstrating that sublimi-
nally priming a logo of energy pills increased choice for that brand, but only 
if participants had the goal to concentrate and believed that energy pills would 
help. It is interesting to note that Vicary already explained the failure of a 
demonstration of subliminal advertising in 1958 by arguing that only “Those 
who have needs in relation to the message will be those, who respond.” 
(reported in Rogers, 1992, p. 15).
These findings may help to explain previous unsuccessful attempts at sublimi-
nally influencing consumers’ brand choices (for an overview, see Trappey, 
1996), as a majority of participants in these studies may not have needed the 
advertised products. Recently, we suggested habit as an additional explanation 
for the failure of previous studies to show priming effects on brand choice 
(see Chapter 2). Many of these studies have used well-known and widely 
consumed brand names, in particular Coca Cola, to examine subliminal 
advertising effects (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2005; Hawkins, 1970). The Coca 
Cola Company has a huge advertising budget to keep their brand at the top 
of consumers' minds. Since the major effect of subliminal advertising or prim-
ing is to increase the cognitive accessibility of a primed brand, this method 
might work best for brands that are not highly accessible. In support of this 
hypothesis, we demonstrated that subliminally priming participants with a 
brand of soft drink influenced only those (thirsty) participants, who reportedly 
drank the brand irregularly. Priming was not effective for participants, who 
were regular consumers of the brand and for whom the brand was chronically 
accessible. 
Taken together, the findings reviewed so far resolve some of the inconsis-
tencies surrounding the effectiveness of subliminal priming as an advertising 
strategy, because they demonstrate that only under certain conditions (i.e., 
goal relevance, low accessibility) subliminal brand priming influences brand 
choice. However, a limitation of these effects is the fact that they were all 
demonstrated under highly controlled circumstances in laboratory settings. 
As is usual in psychological experiments, participants were placed in a cubicle, 
designed to be as neutral as possible, to minimize outside influences. To 
determine the applicability of subliminally presented brands as a persuasion 
technique, an important question remains: Do subliminal advertisements 
influence consumer choice if presented in a more naturalistic setting? For 
subliminal presentation of brand names to be relevant for advertising 
practices, effects should not depend on these controlled settings, and should 
be present even when subliminal ads are presented in an environment with 
distracting, supraliminal stimulation, for instance while watching a movie at 
home. 
Presenting subliminal advertising in a movie raises two main problems. First, 
a movie distracts attention away from the subliminal prime. Moore (1988) 
concluded that advertisers have nothing to gain from subliminal manipulation 
as “… there is abundant evidence to indicate that a weak and unattended 
stimulus would be rendered functionally absent by other concurrent stimuli 
and the activities attendant on them.” (p. 311; see also Pratkanis & Greenwald, 
1988). Thus, although more recent findings have shown that subliminal 
advertising can be feasible under laboratory conditions, this leaves open the 
question whether these effects would also replicate under real world condi-
tions, where subliminal advertisements are embedded in a movie, offering 
plenty of supraliminal distractions. There has been previous research in which 
subliminal primes have been embedded in a movie. Cooper and Cooper 
(2002) subliminally presented both pictures of a Coca Cola can and the word 
thirsty during an episode of the Simpsons. Compared to participants who 
were not exposed to primes, these participants reported increased levels of 
thirst. This suggests that subliminal priming can influence participants’ thirst 
when the primes are presented in a movie. However, this research did not 
address the issue of whether subliminal advertising embedded in a movie 
can influence brand choice. Although subliminal priming effects have been 
demonstrated in a wide array of areas (for an overview, see Dijksterhuis et 
al., 2005; Fennis & Stroebe, 2010), effects on brand choice have been elusive. 
Second, presenting subliminal advertisements in a movie raises a theoretically 
interesting issue: The content of the movie might influence the effects of the 
advertisement. Although such context effects could also occur with (supra-
liminal) TV-advertising (Coulter, 1998; De Pelsmacker, Geuens, & Anckaert, 
2002), effects are likely to be weaker in that case, because advertising is usually 
separated from the film or show. Furthermore, such advertisements usually 
embed the brand name in some context, be it pictorial, text or both, thus 
further separating the brand name from the movie context. With subliminal 
advertising, context effects could be much more powerful, because the brand 
name is embedded in the ongoing film and no other context is present. This 
raises the important question whether subliminal advertising may have dif-
ferential effects when employed in a movie with positive content, eliciting 
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positive emotions, compared to a movie with negative content, eliciting 
negative emotions. Specifically, through evaluative conditioning (De Houwer, 
Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001), the valence of the movie might transfer to the 
primed brand, influencing brand evaluations and choice, such that a brand 
presented in a positive movie might become more positively evaluated and a 
brand presented in a negative movie might become more negatively evaluated. 
In the current chapter, three studies are presented that addressed the questions 
whether (a) subliminal ads can be successfully employed in a naturalistic setting 
(i.e., when watching a movie), and whether (b) the presentation context 
(i.e., the content of the movie) moderates subliminal advertising effects. To 
examine whether subliminal brand primes can be effective while being 
embedded in a film, Study 3.1 exposed participants to a beverage brand 
name that was embedded in a movie that they were watching in the lab. 
Subsequently, participants were asked to make a hypothetical choice between 
two brands of beverage. In Study 3.2, we examined the question whether 
movie valence influences subliminal advertising effects. Furthermore, we 
aimed to demonstrate subliminal advertising effects in a more naturalistic 
environment. Therefore, participants were seated in a living-room setting, 
and were subliminally exposed to a brand name while watching a movie 
with a positive valence or with a negative valence. At the end of the movie, 
participants made the actual choice between two brands of soft drink by 
selecting one of two bottles. In Study 3.3, we aimed to replicate the results 
found in Study 3.2 with different brands.
Study 3.1
Study 3.1 tested if repeated subliminal presentation of a soft drink brand 
name embedded in a movie can affect choice for that soft drink. As previous 
research has demonstrated that goal-relevance is a crucial moderator for 
subliminal ads to be effective (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans et al., 
2006), thirst was manipulated. We expected that the effects of priming a 
beverage would be more pronounced among thirsty as compared to non-
thirsty participants. Moreover, the primes were presented in a movie with a 
positive valence. Therefore, we examined whether the valence of the movie 
would influence the evaluation of the primed brand. 
Method
Forty-six undergraduates participated in this experiment, receiving five Euros 
or partial course credits. As a manipulation of thirst, half of the participants 
had to discern a letter on a piece of very salty candy with their tongue, 
ostensibly as a detection task. This manipulation was adapted from a method 
used by Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and De Vries (2001) and Karremans et al. (2006, 
Study 2) to induce thirst. Then, all participants watched a movie clip of 
approximately 5 min, containing 121 primes. The clip was taken from the 
popular animated comedy Madagascar. The film clip displays a (talking) lion 
and zebra running through a field. The film clip is colorful, slightly comic, and 
overall positive. Half of the participants were primed with the brand name 
‘Lipton Ice’, the other half with ‘Spa Rood’, a popular mineral water in the 
Netherlands. A pre-test demonstrated that these brands did not significantly 
differ on overall liking and the ability to quench thirst. Primes had a height 
of 30 pixels on a 19-inch screen, were shown for 17 ms, in random intervals 
ranging between 500 and 2500 ms, on random locations on the screen, and 
were preceded and followed by a mask made of a row of X’s (both presented 
for 17 ms). 
After watching the movie, participants were asked to make a hypothetical 
choice between two brands. The brands appeared at either side of the screen, 
and participants could indicate which drink they would prefer if they would 
be offered a drink right now, by pressing ‘Q’ for the left brand and ‘P’ for the 
right brand. The locations of the brands were counterbalanced. After the 
measure of choice, brand evaluation was measured using four items on a 7 
point Likert scale (e.g., “I like this brand”), as well as consumption habit 
(i.e., “How often do you use this brand?”). Finally, participants were probed 
for prime awareness, with a funneled debriefing procedure. Six participants 
identified the prime correctly and were excluded from analyses.1 Some 
participants reported having seen flashes or reported seeing the mask (i.e., a 
row of X’s).
Results and discussion
As the dependent variable, choice of the primed brand was defined as a binary 
variable with a value of 1 representing choice of the primed brand and a 
value of 0 representing choice of the alternative brand. Logistic regression was 
conducted to examine whether choice of the primed brand was predicted 
by the thirst manipulation. Indeed, thirsty participants chose the primed 
brand more often than non-thirsty participants, B = 1.43, Wald(1,39) = 4.44, 
p = .035. One-sample t-tests showed that, if participants were thirsty, they 
chose the primed brand more often than expected by chance, M = 73%, 
t(21) = 2.34, p = .029. If participants were not thirsty, their choice for the 
primed brand did not differ from chance, M = 38%, t(17) < 1 (see Figure 
3.1). To examine whether brand evaluation was affected by brand priming, 
an ANOVA was conducted with evaluation of the primed brand as depen-
dent variable and the manipulation of thirst as predictor. No difference was 
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observed between thirsty people (M = 4.82) and people that were not (M = 
4.26), F(1,45) = 0.93, p = .341. 
Thus, results show that subliminal advertising can work when the primes 
are presented in a movie, but again, as shown in previous studies, only when 
the primed brand is goal-relevant. Interestingly, if the brands are presented 
in a positive movie, brand evaluation was unaffected, suggesting that choice 
was affected by a non-evaluative process.
Figure 3.1. The effect of subliminal ads presented in a movie.
Study 3.2
Study 3.1 provides encouraging results suggesting that, even when the 
brand name is subliminally presented in a movie, subliminal advertising can 
be effective. The aim of Study 3.2 was to extend the findings of Study 3.1 by 
further examining the possible role of the content of the movie. To address 
this issue, we examined the effects of subliminally priming a brand of beverage 
on consumer choice when the primes were embedded in a movie of either 
positive or negative valence. 
How would priming a brand in a valenced movie affect brand evaluations 
and choice? Repeatedly pairing a stimulus with positive of negative valence 
is referred to as evaluative conditioning (De Houwer et al., 2001). According 
to evaluative conditioning principles, the valence of the context in which 
the brand is being primed might “spill over” to the primed brand. However, 
there is also some suggestive evidence demonstrating that such conditioning 
effects may be more pronounced when the conditioned stimulus is goal-
relevant (see Chapter 4; Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, De Houwer, & Crombez, 
1996; Garcia & Koelling, 1996). In other words, only for thirsty people the 
valence of the movie might transfer to the subliminally primed brand, which 
in turn could affect brand choice (Kraft, Granbois, & Summers, 1973). This 
process may not occur for non-thirsty people. However, the results of Study 
3.1 suggest that, at least in the positive movie we used, this reasoning did not 
apply: the relation of thirst with the effectiveness of subliminal ads on choice 
was not mediated by evaluation.
To further address the issue of whether subliminal ads can work in a real life 
setting, several changes were implemented to make the experimental situation 
more representative of real-life. Instead of conducting the study in laboratory 
cubicles, it was conducted in a room that was decorated as a normal living 
room. Thus, participants were sitting in a comfortable couch in a living 
room (see Figure 3.2) while watching a movie containing subliminal primes 
of a brand. 
Figure 3.2. The living room setting of Study 2.
Fourth, although in Study 3.1 the prime itself was rarely seen, people reported 
seeing flashes due to the masking procedure. In Study 3.2, we therefore decided 
to drop the row of X’s as masks from the procedure. After all, the function of 
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the (post) masks is to block visual memory through visual stimulation. In a 
film context, the use of post-mask is superfluous, because visual memory of 
the prime is blocked by visual stimulation due to the changing frames in the 
movie. This procedure had also been used by Cooper and Cooper (Cooper 
& Cooper, 2002), who found no evidence of prime recognition in their 
extensive post-tests. Finally, instead of a hypothetical choice, participants 
were presented with a bottle of both the primed and an alternative brand, 
and choice was measured by observing which bottle they actually drank from.
Method
One-hundred-and-four participants were subliminally primed with brand 
names during a movie clip. Participants were seated in a comfortable chair, 
in front of a television, in a room decorated as a living-room (see Figure 3.2). 
The brand priming followed the same procedure as in Study 3.1, except for 
two differences. First, in this study, participants were primed while watching 
a movie-clip evoking either positive or negative affective responses. For the 
positive movie-clip, the same fragment was used as in Study 3.1. The negative 
movie-clip was taken from Trainspotting, which included a man crawling 
into a very filthy toilet, followed by a scene in which a mother finds her 
dead baby. Thus, this movie elicited both sadness and disgust (importantly, 
we will get back to this in the General Discussion). Second, as mentioned 
before, the primes were not masked with a text string at the same location, 
as the movie itself serves as a mask. 
After viewing the movie-clip, participants were presented with two bottles, 
one of each brand; they could freely choose the drink they preferred. Finally, 
participants reported their level of thirst, and were probed for prime-awareness. 
Eleven participants reported having seen the primed brand and were omitted 
from analyses.
Results and Discussion
First, the effect of priming on brand choice was examined. Choice for the 
primed brand was submitted to a logistic regression analysis with self-reported 
thirst and movie valence (positive vs. negative) as predictors. The expected 
interaction between movie valence and thirst on brand choice was significant, 
B = -1.76, Wald(1, 90) = 9.92, p = .002. If participants were primed while 
watching a positive movie, thirst was positively associated with choice for the 
primed brand, B = 0.90, Wald(1,90) = 5.37, p = .020. In contrast, if primed 
during a negative movie, thirst was negatively associated with choosing the 
primed brand, B = -0.85, Wald(1,90) = 4.58, p = .032. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.3, only thirsty participants responded differently to subliminal 
brand priming depending on the movie valence.
Second, the effect of priming on brand evaluation was examined. A regression 
analysis with evaluation of the primed brand as dependent variable, and thirst, 
movie valence, and their interaction as their predictors, yielded a marginally 
significant main effect of thirst, β = -.19, t(86) = -1.82, p = .073. However, 
this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect of thirst and 
movie valence, β = .22, t(86) = 2.02, p = .046. Consistent with the findings 
of Study 3.2, simple slope analyses showed that thirst was associated with a 
more negative evaluation of the primed brand in the negative movie condition, 
β = -.41, t(86) = -2.46, p = .016. In the positive movie condition, however, 
thirst was not significantly associated with evaluation, β = .02, t(86) = 0.17, 
p = .868. 
Figure 3.3. The context-dependent effects of subliminally primed ads on brand choice.
Finally, we examined whether brand evaluation mediated the effects on 
brand choice. As we expected (and observed in Study 3.1 and 3.2) that thirst 
was not related to brand evaluation in the positive movie condition, but that 
there was such a relation in the negative movie condition, we expected that 
the effect of thirst on choice would be mediated by brand evaluation only 
in the negative movie condition. As such, we tested a moderated mediation 
model (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Mediation is defined as an indirect effect 
of the independent on the dependent variable through a mediator variable. 
The indirect effect can be conceptualized as the path from the independent 
variable to the dependent variable via a mediator variable. Therefore, its’ effect 
5958
Subliminal Ads in Contextchapter 3
can be calculated as the product of the effect of the independent variable on 
the mediator on the one hand and the effect of the mediator on the dependent 
variable – controlling for the independent variable – on the other hand. In 
moderated mediation, the size of this indirect effect is dependent on the value 
of a moderator. In our case, this means that the product of the effect of thirst 
on brand evaluation and the effect of brand evaluation on brand choice is 
dependent on movie valence: We expected the indirect effect to be significant 
only in the negative movie condition. 
The indirect effect of thirst on brand choice, via brand evaluation, was 
calculated in both the positive and the negative movie condition using 
bootstrapping – a robust method of testing for mediation (Hayes, 2012). In 
the negative movie condition we found, as expected, a significant negative 
indirect effect of thirst on brand choice of M = -0.36, with 95% confidence 
limits from -0.83 to -0.06. However, in the positive movie condition, no 
indirect effect was observed: M = 0.02, with confidence limits from -0.20 
to 0.32. Moreover, the direct effect of thirst on brand choice, while controlling 
for brand evaluation, was significant in the positive movie condition, B = 
0.85, Z = (1,86) = 2.28, p = .025, whereas it was not in the negative movie 
condition, B = -0.75, Z = (1,86) = -1.70, p = .093, indicating that an indirect 
path – via brand evaluation – explained the effect of thirst on brand choice 
in the negative movie condition, but not in the positive movie condition. 
Summarized, if a brand is primed in a positive movie, brand evaluation is 
not affected. However, brand choice is increased by priming if the brand is 
goal-relevant. On the other hand, if a brand is primed in a negative movie, 
brand evaluation is negatively affected, resulting in decreased choice for that 
brand.
Study 3.3
The goal of Study 3.3 was to replicate the results of Study 3.2 with different 
brands. We selected two other brands from our pre-test – “Nestea” and 
“7Up” – and presented them again in a positive or a negative film clip. We 
hypothesized to replicate the results from Study 3.2: In the positive movie 
condition, we expected a positive relation between thirst and choice for the 
primed brand. In the negative movie condition, we expected a negative rela-
tion between thirst and choice for the primed brand, which we expected to 
be mediated by evaluation.
Method
A total of 106 students of the Radboud University Nijmegen participated 
in this study. The brand priming task followed the same procedure as in 
Study 3.2, except that we chose two other brands from our pre-test that fitted 
our requirements, and again, primes were masked as in Study 3.1. In this 
study, either the brands “7Up” or “Nestea” were primed. Again, a pre-test 
demonstrated that these brands did not significantly differ on overall liking 
and the ability to quench thirst.
After watching the movie, participants were asked to make a hypothetical 
choice between two brands and report their brand evaluation and habitual 
consumption in the same way as in Studies 3.1 and 3.2. Next, participants 
reported their level of thirst on four items (e.g., “I feel thirsty”) on 7 point 
Likert scales. 
Finally, participants were probed for prime awareness. Again, none of the 
participants reported having seen the prime, or could identify the brand that 
was primed. Participants could indicate what brand they had seen, or if they 
did not see anything. Several people selected one of the two brands (31 out 
of 106). However, only 13 of those 31 were correct (42%), which did not 
differ significantly from chance, t(30) = 0.90, p = .378. To be sure that none 
of our participants were aware of the primes, we present the results excluding 
those 13 participants. Including them did not change the pattern of results. 
As in Study 3.1, most participants reported having seen flashes or reported 
seeing the mask (i.e., a row of X’s).
Results and Discussion
To examine whether brand choice was influenced by priming in valenced 
movies, choice for the primed brand was submitted to a logistic regression 
analysis with self-reported thirst and movie valence (positive vs. negative) as 
predictors. Main effects of both movie and thirst were not significant, Wald’s 
< 1. Next to that, we did not find the expected interaction to be significant, 
B = 0.04, Wald(1,90) = 0.01, p = .927. These data do not support the hypothesis 
that brands presented in a positive movie are chosen more by thirsty people 
(as was the case in Study 3.1 and 3.2), nor that brand choice was affected by 
the presentation of a brand in a negative movie (as was the case in Study 3.2). 
To examine whether evaluations of the brand were influenced by subliminal 
priming in valenced movies a linear regression analysis was conducted with 
evaluation of the primed brand as dependent variable and movie valence, 
self-reported thirst and their interaction as predictors. The main effect of 
movie valence was not significant, t < 1. The main effect of thirst was showing 
a trend, β = -0.16, t(90) = -1.56, p = .12, indicating that people who reported 
higher levels of thirst evaluated the primed brand more negatively. Although 
the interaction between movie valence and thirst was not significant, β = 
.12, t(90) = 1.16, p = .249, simple slope analyses indicate that the negative 
effect of thirst on evaluation of the primed brand was entirely driven by the 
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negative movie condition. That is, there was a marginally significant effect 
of thirst in the negative movie condition, β = -.28, t(90) = -1.96, p = .053, 
while, as in Study 3.1 and 3.2, the effect of thirst on prime evaluation was 
not significant in the positive movie condition, t < 1. These results suggest 
that thirst is negatively related to the evaluation of the brand if it is primed 
during a negative movie.
Thus, in Study 3.3, we did not replicate the findings of Study 3.2 of sublimi-
nal advertising on brand choice, nor did we replicate the moderating role of 
context valence as presented in Study 3.2. It is difficult to pinpoint why this 
is the case. Although there were some procedural differences between the 
studies – different brands, living room setting vs. lab setting, and actual vs. 
hypothetical choice – there is no clear reason how these could explain the 
inconsistent results. We did however replicate the results of Study 3.2 on 
evaluation of the brand – at least to some extent. In the current study, 
a marginally significant negative relation was observed between thirst and 
evaluation of the primed brand in the negative movie condition. In the 
positive movie condition this relation was not significant. This is in line with 
the results from Study 3.2 and corroborates the idea that subliminal adver-
tising in a negative context can have negative consequences. 
In conclusion, the results from Study 3.3 fail to support the conclusions 
drawn from Study 3.2. However, as failure to replicate does not necessarily 
indicate that an effect is not real, the results of both studies stress the necessity 
of future research in examining the role of context in subliminal advertising.
General Discussion
The present research suggests that subliminal ads embedded in a movie can 
affect brand choice. Note that when thirst was not taken into account, no 
main effect of brand priming emerged. This null-finding might explain why 
so many previous attempts to find reliable subliminal advertising effects, in 
which goal-relevance of the primed brand was not considered, have been 
unsuccessful. Previous studies showed that the effectiveness of subliminal ads 
depends on the motivational state of the perceiver (Bermeitinger et al., 
2009; Karremans et al., 2006). Furthermore, the results of Study 3.2 (and to 
some extent, the results of Study 3.3) suggest that the content of the movie 
can influence the effect of subliminal advertising. Goal-relevance of the 
primed brand was positively related to brand choice when the brand was 
presented in a positive movie, but brand evaluations and brand choice were 
negatively related to goal-relevance when the brand was presented during a 
negative movie.
These findings are in line with evaluative conditioning principles. As described 
in the Introduction, evaluative conditioning is defined as a change in evalua-
tion of a neutral conditioned stimulus after it is repeatedly paired with a 
valenced unconditioned stimulus (De Houwer et al., 2001). The results of 
the current studies indeed show a change in evaluation of the primed brand 
in the direction of the valence of the movie. The fact that the evaluative 
conditioning effect was moderated by goal-relevance of the primed brand 
can be explained by recent developments in evaluative conditioning research 
that demonstrate that a goal-relevant conditioning procedure yields larger 
effects than an irrelevant procedure (see Chapter 4). (Verwijmeren, Karremans, 
Stroebe, & Wigboldus, 2012) (Verwijmeren, Karremans, Stroebe, & Wigboldus, 
2012) In this research, we demonstrated that thirsty people rate beverages 
more negatively when they are paired with disgusted faces (i.e., displaying a 
highly relevant emotion to the goal to quench thirst) than with fearful faces 
(i.e., displaying a less relevant emotion). Thirsty participants did not make 
different judgments of irrelevant products paired with fear or disgust, nor did 
non-thirsty people show this effect. In line with this notion, in the current 
studies, we observed that the evaluation of subliminally presented beverages 
in a negative movie was more strongly affected when people were thirsty.
This principle might also explain why evaluation of the primed brand was 
affected when presented in the negative movie, but was not when presented 
in the positive movie. It could be that the negativity elicited by the negative 
movie was more goal-relevant than the positivity elicited by the positive 
movie. As described in the Method section of Study 3.2, the negative movie 
elicited disgust, a relevant emotion to the goal to quench thirst, whereas the 
positive movie was positive, eliciting happiness or joy, which are neither 
goal-relevant. The present research, however, was not specifically designed 
to address this issue. Hence, we are not sure whether the effects found in the 
negative movie were due to negativity of the movie, resulting in a negativity 
bias (bad is stronger than good; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 
2001), or were specifically driven by the fact that the movie was goal-relevant. 
Our results suggest two different mechanisms through which subliminal 
advertising can affect brand choice. First, as discussed above, the priming 
effect in the negative movie condition is best explained through evaluative 
conditioning (De Houwer et al., 2001). If a brand is repeatedly presented in 
a relevant affective context, brand evaluation is influenced by this context. 
This change in brand evaluation subsequently predicts a change in the like-
lihood that the brand is chosen. Second, in a neutral, or an irrelevant affective 
context, brand evaluation is unaffected by priming the brand. However, as 
the likelihood of choosing the primed brand is increased if the brand is goal 
relevant, regardless of evaluation, a non-evaluative explanation is more likely. 
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We suggest that mere brand accessibility can increase brand choice. In fact, 
most priming effects are explained through an increase in construct accessi-
bility (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Srull & 
Wyer Jr., 1979). However, in the present research, and in previous subliminal 
advertising research (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans et al., 2006) the 
effect of priming is moderated by goals. This raises the question whether an 
increase in accessibility leads to differential effects depending on the goal 
relevance of the construct, or whether the increase in accessibility might 
itself depend on goal relevance. Future research might ask if it is the case 
that subliminal priming only affects construct accessibility if the prime is 
goal relevant.
Of course, we must note that although in two of the three studies we find 
evidence for subliminal advertising, in Study 3.3, we fail to replicate the effect. 
Apart from the procedural explanations for this failure to replicate (see the 
discussion above), it might be that subliminal advertising in a context is less 
reliable than subliminally priming a brand name in a ‘clean’ and non-distract-
ing task, where attention is controlled to be at the location of the prime. As 
described in the introduction, context can serve as a distracter, causing the 
prime to be neglected. Previous objections to subliminal advertising stated that 
it might never work if presented in a distracting context (Moore, 1988; 
Pratkanis, 1992). Still, in Study 3.1 and 3.2, we observed that, for thirsty 
participants, brand choice was affected by subliminal advertising, suggesting 
that Vicary’s fantasies were not so far-fetched after all.
Another important question is whether more conventional advertising 
techniques are sensitive to context valence as well. For reasons discussed 
earlier, we would expect such effects to be weaker in conventional than in 
subliminal advertising. Although there is some research that demonstrates 
context effects in conventional advertising, the question of the relative 
strength of effects has not been addressed. Murry, Lastovicka, and Singh 
(1992) examined whether program-elicited feelings and program liking 
influenced brand attitudes. In this study, television ads were either presented 
in a negative, neutral or positive program. Although the feelings elicited by 
the program did not influence attitudes towards the brand, the extent to 
which people liked the program did predict brand attitudes. In another line 
of research, it was demonstrated that unobtrusively coupling a brand to humor 
increased brand choice, through an increase in implicit attitudes (Strick, 
Holland, van Baaren, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 2013; Strick, van 
Baaren, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2009). Both findings suggest that 
advertising context is also important for explicit, conventional ads. The current 
findings corroborate with this view, and expand that notion to subliminal 
advertising.
Do our findings imply that subliminal advertising can be readily used as a 
marketing device? Should the discussion on the ethics of subliminal ads be 
reopened and reevaluated? Some countries already banned subliminal ad-
vertising, but most have no legislation controlling the issue. Although the 
present research advances the notion that subliminal ads can indeed influence 
consumers' choices outside their awareness, we suggest that more research is 
needed before advertising companies should invest and governments should 
legislate – especially as our findings are not very clear-cut. Aside from context 
and goal-relevance, other factors might impair the applicability of subliminal 
ads. An important factor that would greatly determine the usefulness of sub-
liminal marketing techniques is the durability of the effect. It is not clear 
whether subliminal advertising could affect behavior over a longer period of 
time, as choice is typically measured immediately after the priming procedure. 
If subliminal advertising is simply a form of concept priming (i.e., the concept 
of the brand), the effects are bound to wear off within a period of a few minutes 
(Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988), making subliminal ads poor persuasion 
tools. However, subliminal priming of a goal-relevant brand is perhaps better 
described in terms of goal priming. The accessibility of goal-related knowledge 
decreases only after the goal has been reached (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 
2007), which could ensure that increased accessibility of subliminally presented 
ads could endure until the relevant goal is attained. Future research is needed 
to determine whether subliminal ads will affect people’s consumer behavior 
even after a delay. 
In conclusion, the present research shows context as an important moderator 
of subliminal advertising effects. Next to that, it provides initial evidence for 
two different mechanisms through which subliminal advertising can influence 
brand choice: An evaluative path and a non-evaluative path. Thus, the current 
research advances our knowledge of subliminal priming, and provides a basis 
for future directions. Moreover, aside from demonstrating presentation 
context as an important boundary condition of subliminal advertising, the 
current findings are the first to demonstrate the effectiveness of subliminal 
advertising in a real-life advertising situation. Since Vicary's claim, scientists 
have tried to convince the general public that subliminal persuasion is a myth 
(e.g., Pratkanis, 1992). The present research, however, strongly suggests that, 
under the right conditions, subliminal ads can influence consumer decisions, 
even in naturalistic settings.
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Footnotes
 
1 It is unclear whether these six participants were aware of the prime or guessed the correct 
prime by looking at the remainder of the experiment (as Lipton Ice and Spa Rood had 
a central place in the experiment). As only 6 of the 10 participants guessed correctly, it is 
more probable that they were guessing. To be more certain of subliminal presentation, we 
excluded those that guessed correctly. Including these participants yielded similar results, 
Wald(1, 45) = 3.00, p = .08.
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Abstract
An important process by which preferences emerge is evaluative conditioning 
(EC), defined as a change in the evaluation of a stimulus by pairing it repeated-
ly and consistently with an affective stimulus. The current research focuses 
on the role of motivation in this learning process. Specifically, in two studies, 
it was investigated whether a conditioning procedure that is relevant to an 
individual’s current goals is more effective than an irrelevant procedure. To this 
end, beverages were conditioned with either disgusted faces (relevant) or 
fearful faces (irrelevant). Results showed that in particular thirsty (rather than 
non-thirsty) participants’ choice for, and evaluation of, the beverages were 
influenced by pairing beverages with disgust versus fear. As similar results were 
obtained under supraliminal and subliminal presentation of the conditioned 
stimuli, it is suggested that goals can also affect automatic, associative learning, 
adding to the emerging body of research demonstrating that goals uncon-
sciously affect evaluative processes.
Why do people like the things they like? Where do our preferences come 
from? One important process by which preferences emerge, or are ‘learned,’ 
is evaluative conditioning (EC). EC is defined as a change in the evaluation 
of a stimulus by pairing it repeatedly and consistently with an affective stimu-
lus (De Houwer, 2007). Although previous research has identified several 
important prerequisites for this type of associative learning to occur (see 
Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010), the role of 
motivational processes has been largely neglected in this field of research. In 
line with the general notion that evaluative processes are influenced by goals 
(Ferguson & Bargh, 2004), we argue in this article that the acquisition of 
preferences through evaluative conditioning may also be influenced by 
goals. To test this general idea, we examined whether the goal to drink (i.e., 
being thirsty) would amplify the impact of associating a brand of beverage 
with disgust compared to fear.
Evaluative Conditioning
Evaluative conditioning captures a specific form of learning preferences by 
mere co-occurrence of two stimuli. It is ascribed to have both automatic 
and propositional learning properties. That is, an association may originate 
from a logical inference made between the two stimuli (e.g., “this brand 
name was always accompanied by a very bad smell, so I do not like it”; e.g., 
De Houwer, 2009), or can be formed automatically (for a comprehensive 
overview of psychological processes underlying EC, see De Houwer, 2011; 
Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009; Martin & Levey, 1978). Previous work has shown 
that several factors influence the effectiveness of evaluative conditioning. 
Mostly, research has focused on the specific methodological procedures 
used for evaluative conditioning that make conditioning to be more or less 
successful (for a meta-analysis, see Hofmann et al., 2010). One of these is 
whether participants are aware of the pairing of the CS and US (contingency 
awareness; e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007). Other factors 
include CS modality, US modality, whether the US is presented subliminally 
or not, and whether or not evaluation of the CS was urged to be spontaneous 
(vs. deliberative). 
The potential role of goals in evaluative conditioning
Relatively little is known about the effects of the psychological state of the 
individual on the learning and emergence of preferences (De Houwer, 2011). 
In psychology, educational science, and also in artificial intelligence, there is 
general consensus that learning is directed by goals (e.g., Blumenfeld, 1992; 
Pintrich, 2004; Ram & Leake, 1995). As the multitude of information in any 
given situation is so overwhelming, it is necessary that the inferences that 
7372
Goal Relevance Moderates Evaluative Conditioning Effectschapter 4
are formed and remembered are not only valid, but are also useful. Learning 
without direction – the unfocused collection of knowledge – is a phenome-
non that is seen as non-adaptive in human beings and other organisms, and 
as bad programming in computer science (Ram & Leake, 1995). In line 
with this notion it seems reasonable to assume that also EC, as a form of 
learning, is geared toward matters that are important to the individual. For 
example, it would be functional to be quicker to form judgments about 
people that you are going to collaborate with than about someone you 
might never meet. In other words, if the preference that is being learned has 
relevance to an individual’s current set of goals, that person should create a 
stronger association.
There are several processes by which goals may affect the strength of EC effects. 
Goals exert strong influences on perceptual, cognitive and evaluative process-
es (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Shah, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2002). Goal relevant information is more easily recognized 
(Gollwitzer, 1999), and goal-relevant knowledge is more easily retrieved 
(Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & de Vries, 2001; Moskowitz, 2002), whereas concepts 
that might obstruct goal pursuit are inhibited (Shah et al., 2002). Because 
perception and recollection of goal relevant information is facilitated, CS-US 
pairings that are relevant to the goal might be easier encoded and retrieved, 
yielding larger EC effects. For example, negativity of a nasty taste – rather 
than an unattractive color – may become relatively easily associated with a 
beverage, especially for a person who is thirsty (i.e., has the goal to drink). 
Furthermore, goal relevant stimuli are automatically evaluated more positively 
than irrelevant stimuli (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Goals create a framework 
within which stimuli are automatically categorized as relevant for goal-pursuit 
(positive), irrelevant to the goal (neutral), or detrimental to goal attainment 
(negative; Ferguson, 2008). This ‘evaluative readiness’ could facilitate the 
learning of preferences through evaluative conditioning.
Recently, research has demonstrated that goals can indeed affect the strength 
of evaluative conditioning. EC effects were larger for participants for whom 
the goal of processing objects in terms of similarities was induced, compared 
to participants with a processing goal of focusing on differences (Corneille, 
Yzerbyt, Pleyers, & Mussweiler, 2009). In a similar vein, Gast and Rothermund 
(2011) showed that EC effects are strengthened with an evaluative focus. If, 
during the learning phase, participants had the goal to evaluate the stimuli, 
EC effects were stronger. If participants had to judge the stimuli on an ir-
relevant attribute, no effects were found. In these studies, goals were activated 
that promote evaluative conditioning in general. A focus on similarity or on 
evaluating is compatible with the structure of an evaluative conditioning 
task, leading to larger EC effects. However, these studies do not answer the 
question whether goals can also influence effects in conditioning procedures 
that differ in their relevance to a current goal.
There is some initial evidence suggesting that a conditioning procedure that 
is relevant is more effective than an irrelevant procedure. Specifically, larger 
conditioning effects on withdrawal behavior are reported when the US is 
related to the CS in a meaningful manner. For example, in a classic condition-
ing study, behavior of rats was influenced more strongly when water was 
conditioned with nausea than with electric shock, presumably because nau-
sea has greater relevance to drinking water (Garcia & Koelling, 1996). Also 
in an EC paradigm with humans, larger conditioning effects were observed 
when a movie-clip of someone expressing disgust was paired consistently with 
the taste of a beverage, than if this disgusted face was paired consistently 
with the color of the beverage, as flavor is more strongly related to a disgusted 
reaction of another person than color (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, De Houwer, 
& Crombez, 1996). Overall, such findings suggest that conditioning effects 
are sensitive to the relevance of the conditioning procedure.
Although these procedures may seem inherently relevant, we argue that 
they are particularly relevant in relation to a specific goal. Suppose that the 
rats in the aforementioned study were not thirsty, and thus did not have the 
motivation to drink the water, it would be less relevant to them that the water 
causes nausea. Therefore, we suggest that the goal relevance of the evaluative 
conditioning procedure depends both on a relevant connection between CS 
and US and the current goals of the individual. Specifically, in the current 
research, we examined whether evaluative conditioning of a brand of beverage 
would be more effective when pairing the brand with disgust rather than 
fear (i.e., as disgust is more relevant to drinking), and whether this effect 
would be most pronounced among individuals who are thirsty. To examine 
these predictions we conducted two studies in which brands of beverages 
were conditioned either with disgust or fear, for participants low and high 
in thirst. 
Study 4.1
In Study 4.1, we conditioned two logos of unfamiliar brands of mineral water 
with faces expressing either disgust or fear. Afterwards, we measured evaluation 
of the brands, and preference for the disgust-conditioned brand over the 
fear-conditioned brand. As it was expected that evaluative conditioning would 
yield larger effects when it was relevant to an individual’s current goal, we 
hypothesized that thirst would be negatively related to the evaluation of the 
beverage conditioned with disgust, whereas no such relation should exist 
for the beverage conditioned with fear. To exclude the possibility that thirst 
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increases the effectiveness of the USs displaying disgust regardless of the goal 
relevant link with the CS, we also conditioned goal-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., 
logos of airline companies) with the same emotional faces. No relation was 
expected between thirst and evaluation of the conditioned airlines.
Method
Participants and Design. One-hundred and twenty seven undergraduates 
participated in Study 4.1 for partial course credit. Participants were subjected 
to a 2 (product: beverage, airline) X 2 (emotional expression: disgust, fear) 
within-subjects design, with thirst as a continuous independent variable, 
varying between individuals.
Materials. As CSs, two brands of both mineral water and airline companies 
were used. A pre-test indicated that almost no one knew the brands, and 
that these brands were all evaluated as neutral (approximately 4 on a 7-point 
Likert-scale). The stimuli showed respectively a picture of a bottle of the 
brand, and the logo of the airline. The brand name was always displayed 
underneath the picture as well as embedded in the picture (see Figure 4.1). 
As USs, 10 emotional faces were used, five of which displayed disgust and five 
displayed fear. These faces were selected from the Radboud Faces Database 
(RAFD; Langner et al., 2010).
Figure 4.1. Brands presented in the conditioning task.
Procedure. In the first part of the experiment, the CSs were introduced, as 
either being a brand of mineral water or an airline company. First, on the 
same screen, the two beverages were presented, accompanied with the text: 
“These are the brands of mineral water:” The airlines were introduced in a 
similar way. After this introduction participants completed an evaluative condi-
tioning task in which the beverages were conditioned either with disgust (i.e., 
relevant for beverages) or with fear (i.e., irrelevant for beverages). As a control, 
fear and disgust were also conditioned on airline names. The assignment of 
emotional faces to the brands was counterbalanced. A trial consisted of the 
presentation of the picture of a brand for 2s, followed immediately by the 
presentation of a picture of an emotional face for 2s. In the interval between 
trials, a blank screen was presented for 4s. Each brand was coupled with all 
the faces of one emotional category twice, resulting in 10 couplings of the 
brand to the emotional expression. In all, the evaluative conditioning task 
consisted of 40 trials.
Next, evaluations towards these four brands were measured, using a seven-point 
Likert scale. As positivity and negativity are two orthogonal constructs 
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994), and in this study the focus lies on the nega-
tivity toward the brands, the statement was framed in terms of negativity 
towards the brand (i.e., “I find this brand negative”), with a ‘1’ meaning not 
at all negative and ‘7’ meaning very negative. Following evaluation, choice between 
the brands within a category was measured. First, both beverages were pre-
sented and participants could press a left key to choose the brand presented 
on the left, and a right key to choose the brand on the right. Then, the same 
procedure was applied to choose between the airlines. 
Thirst was measured on a seven-point Likert scale using two items (e.g., 
“How thirsty do you feel at this moment?”), with ‘1’ meaning not at all thirsty 
and ‘7’ meaning very thirsty. Finally, participants were asked to indicate per 
brand whether they were familiar with the brand. Afterwards participants 
were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Five participants indicated that they were familiar with one of the two bev-
erages and were excluded from analyses.
To test the hypothesis that conditioning beverages with disgust compared to 
fear will amplify conditioning effects, especially for thirsty participants, 
choice for the disgust-beverage over the fear-beverage was regressed onto 
thirst. The intercept, which can be seen as an a priori difference in chance 
between choosing the disgust- and the fear-beverage, was not significant, 
Wald < 1. As expected, thirst was significantly associated with choice for 
the disgust-beverage, so that more thirst decreased the chance of choosing 
Dasani Lauquen Avianca Aerovista
 Beverages Airlines
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disgust-conditioned beverage, B = -0.48, Wald(1,121) = 6.13, p = .013 (see 
Figure 4.2a). 
A GLM repeated measures analysis was conducted with thirst as a continuous 
independent variable, and evaluation of both the disgust-beverage and the 
fear-beverage as dependent variables. The main effect of emotional expression 
was not significant, nor was the main effect of thirst, F’s < 1. However, the 
expected interaction of emotional expression with thirst was significant, 
F(1,120) = 5.48, p = .021, η2 = .044.1 Controlling for the evaluation of the 
fear-beverage, thirst was negatively associated with the evaluation of the 
disgust-beverage, β = -.14, t(120) = 2.04, p = .043. Higher levels of thirst 
were associated with more negativity of the disgust-beverage, compared to 
the fear-beverage (see Figure 4.2b). 
To test whether the effect of thirst on brand choice was mediated by evalua-
tion, a mediation analysis was conducted. Controlling for the evaluation of 
the fear-beverage, when the evaluation of the disgust-beverage was entered 
simultaneous with thirst into a logistic regression predicting choice for the dis-
gust- over the fear-beverage, thirst no longer significantly predicted choice, 
B = -0.35, Wald(1,121) = 2.34, p = .12. Evaluation of the disgust-beverage did 
significantly predict choice, B = 1.38, Wald(1,121), p = .001. This constituted 
a significant mediational pattern, Sobel’s z = -1.74, p = .04, one-tailed.
Figure 4.2. Choice percentages (a) and negativity ratings (b)of beverages and airlines 
conditioned with either disgust or fear on low (-1 SD) or high (+1 SD) levels of thirst.
Finally, we tested whether this effect was due to the relevance of the emotion 
in relation with the product (a beverage), and not for example due to thirst 
leading to a higher sensitivity to disgust in general. The same analysis was 
conducted with choice for the disgust-airline as dependent variable. There 
were no a priori preferences for any airline, but more importantly, thirst was 
not significantly associated with choice, Wald’s < 1 (see Figure 4.2a). Also, the 
airlines did not differ in evaluation, nor was this difference related to the level 
of thirst, F’s < 1 (see Figure 4.2b). This suggests that thirst did not necessarily 
increase sensitivity to the emotion of disgust, but that it did so only with regard 
to a relevant target (i.e., a beverage rather than an airline).
In summary, results showed the expected pattern. For thirsty participants, 
the disgust-conditioned beverage was rated more negative, and was selected 
less in a forced choice than the fear-beverage. This provides initial evidence 
that EC is more effective when the procedure is goal relevant. 
Study 4.2
The primary aim of Study 4.2 was to replicate the results of Study 4.1, albeit 
under different conditions. In Study 4.1, the CS and the US were presented 
for equal time intervals, and were always clearly visible to participants. In many 
learning situations, this may not be the case. It would be interesting to exam-
ine whether goals also influence EC effects under less optimal circumstances. 
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Therefore, in Study 4.2, the CSs were presented in a subliminal way (17ms). 
Based on research on unconscious goal pursuit (Custers & Aarts, 2010), we ex-
pect that goals will also influence EC when the CS is presented subliminally. 
By doing so, this study may have implications for the question whether this 
process is dependent on contingency awareness (Corneille et al., 2009; Hütter, 
Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Stahl, 
Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009). However, as this issue is not the central to this 
paper, we will discuss this issue in further detail only in the General Discussion.
Method
Participants and Design. A total of 60 undergraduates participated for partial 
course credit. As in Study 4.1, they were subjected to a 2 (product; beverages, 
airlines) X 2 (emotional expression; disgust, fear) within-subjects design. 
Procedure. Study 4.2 employed the same materials and procedure as Study 
4.1, with one exception. In the conditioning phase, instead of presenting the 
brands for 2s, the brand pictures were presented for 17ms, which constituted 
1 frame on a 60Hz computer screen. This should prevent awareness of the 
link between the brand (CS) and the emotion (US). Brands were followed 
immediately by a 2s presentation of an emotional expression. To further 
ensure subliminal perception of the brands, they were preceded by a blurred 
composite of the brand pictures, presented for 150ms as a forward mask,. 
The presentation of a face immediately following presentation of the brand 
functioned as a backward mask, as both pictures were similar in size and 
contrast distribution (i.e., white near the edges, and colorful in the center). 
To examine contingency awareness, we checked awareness of the link 
between CS and US at the end of the experiment. To this end, all brands 
were presented sequentially, accompanied with the question whether it was 
present in the conditioning task, and if so, with the additional question 
which emotional expression it was paired with. Participants indicated on a 
3-point scale whether they had never seen the brand before, it had been 
paired with a disgusted emotional expression, or it had been paired with a 
fearful emotional expression. 
Results and Discussion
Five participants indicated knowing one of the brands, and were excluded 
from analyses.
For both beverages, approximately half of the participants indicated that they 
had not seen the brand during the conditioning phase (26 of 55 for the 
disgust-beverage; 27 of 55 for the fear-beverage). Of the remaining partici-
pants, there is no indication that they had actual contingency awareness as 
only half of them answered with the correct emotional expression (14 of 29 
for the disgust-beverage; 14 of 28 for the fear-beverage). There were only 
nine participants that correctly identified the link for both beverages. These 
participants were excluded from the analysis, but results were similar when 
they were included.
To test our main prediction that thirst would increase the effect of condition-
ing on a beverage with disgust compared to fear, a logistic regression analysis 
was conducted with choice for the disgust-beverage over the fear-beverage as 
dependent variable, and thirst as predictor. As expected, thirst was negatively 
related to choosing the disgust-beverage, B = -0.89, Wald(1,45) = 4.46, p = .04 
(see Figure 4.3a).2 Thus, even without contingency awareness, the effectiveness 
of conditioning a brand with disgust rather than fear was goal-dependent, 
that is, dependent on participants’ level of thirst.
A GLM repeated measures analysis was conducted with thirst as a covariate, 
and evaluation of the disgust-beverage and the fear-beverage as dependent 
variables. The main effect of emotional expression was not significant, neither 
was the main effect of thirst, F’s < 1. The interaction between emotional 
expression and thirst was also not significant, F(1,44) = 2.01, p = .16, η2 = 
.044, even though the pattern was similar to the effects in Study 4.1. Thirst was 
negatively related to the evaluation of the disgust-beverage, when controlling 
for the fear-beverage, although not significantly; β = -.10, t(43) = 0.70, p = .49 
(see Figure 4.3b). 
No significant effects were found when thirst was regressed on preference 
for the airlines, Wald’s < 1 (see Figure 4.3a), nor with regard to the evaluation 
of the airlines, F’s < 1 (see Figure 4.3b).
The results with regard to participants’ choice again indicated that goals 
influence the effectiveness of evaluative conditioning, depending on whether 
the unconditioned and conditioned stimuli are both relevant to the goal. 
Furthermore, these results seem to suggest that the effect does not depend 
on contingency awareness. Although the effect of goal relevance is larger 
when participants were aware of the contingency (see footnote 8), even when 
participants were not aware of the contingencies, conditioning a CS with a 
goal relevant US yielded larger effects on the choice participants made than 
conditioning it with an irrelevant US. 
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Figure 4.3. Choice percentages (a) and negativity ratings (b) of beverages and airlines 
conditioned with either disgust or fear on low (-1 SD) or high (+1 SD) levels of thirst.
General Discussion
The results of two studies provided good support for the prediction that the 
effectiveness of conditioning depends on both the present goal of the indi-
vidual, and the relevance of the unconditioned stimuli to the individual’s 
goal. Specifically, both studies demonstrated that for thirsty (versus non-thirsty) 
participants, conditioning beverages with an emotional expression of disgust 
is more effective than conditioning beverages with an emotional expression 
of fear. These effects were not found when disgust and fear where conditioned 
on a goal-irrelevant category (i.e., airlines). Together, these findings demon-
strate that conditioning is more than merely attaching a certain stimulus to 
either positive or negative affect: beyond this, the effect is sensitive to whether 
both the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli have relevance to the target 
individual’s current goals.
It is interesting to note that our findings show a differential effect between 
CSs conditioned with different emotions of the same valence. Most research 
in evaluative conditioning has focused on a more general positive/negative 
distinction. Our findings are in line with recent research demonstrating that 
non-evaluative properties of the US can also transfer to the CS (De Houwer, 
Baeyens, Randell, Eelen, & Meersmans, 2005; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011). 
The current findings demonstrate that the valence of a specific emotion 
will also transfer to the US (i.e., making the US less positive), but only if the 
emotion has relevance to both the CS and the individual’s current goal. 
There are several theories that provide an account of the underlying process 
by which goals may affect EC. As none of these accounts is consistent with 
all the findings, EC is seen as a phenomenon with several distinct underlying 
processes that each have their explanatory power in different situations. How 
does the current pattern of findings relate to these accounts? According to 
misattribution theory, conditioning effects may occur due to misattribution 
processes (Jones et al., 2009). Whenever the CS and the US are paired, the eval-
uative response towards the US can be implicitly misattributed to the CS, 
resulting in a change in liking of the CS. In line with this reasoning, it was 
demonstrated that mildly valenced USs yield stronger effects than strongly 
valenced USs, as feelings evoked by mild stimuli are more easily misattributed. 
Theoretically, goals might increase misattribution of relevant information to the 
CS. For example, thirsty individuals will probably map feelings of disgust onto 
a beverage more easily than feelings of fear. However, misattribution of feelings 
evoked by a clearly visible US to a subliminally presented CS (as was done in 
Study 4.2) is difficult to explain from this perspective, making the misattri-
bution account an unlikely candidate for explaining the current findings. 
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Another theory suggests that EC can arise due to propositional processes 
(De Houwer, 2009). In this view, EC is dependent on a conscious proposition 
that the CS is paired with a valenced US. As relevant stimuli attract more 
attention (Bargh, 1982), and memory for goal-relevant information is better 
(Huffman & Houston, 1993), it could be that goals ensure easier and more 
durable formation of the proposition. As the results show that the influence 
of goals on EC effects under supraliminal conditions were more pronounced 
than under subliminal conditions, it is probably the case that propositional 
processes underlying evaluative conditioning are influenced by goal relevance. 
However, goals also seem to influence EC effects when the US was presented 
subliminally (obstructing the formation of propositions), indicating other 
processes might be at work as well.
Several theories of EC share that mere co-occurrence of the CS and US causes 
an association to form automatically between CS and US (Baeyens, Eelen, 
Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; Martin & Levey, 1978). These accounts 
especially stress the possibility of EC without contingency awareness, and, thus, 
are compatible with the specific pattern of results of the current studies. 
However, this raises the question of how goals influence the automatic for-
mation of associations. It could be that goals bias encoding of (evaluative) 
information of goal relevant stimuli. Affective responses may be stronger 
upon perception of a goal-relevant (rather than goal-irrelevant) affective 
stimulus, causing a stronger association between CS and US, and perhaps also 
more endurable effects. It could also be the case that goals do not influence 
the strength of the association through encoding, but affect retrieval processes. 
As retrieval of goal relevant knowledge is facilitated (e.g., Aarts et al., 2001), 
evaluations that are goal relevant should come to mind more easily, which 
could result in a greater impact on choice behavior. In future research, it would 
be interesting to examine which of these (non-exclusive) explanations drive 
the current effects.
The results of Study 4.2 provide some preliminary evidence that goal-relevant 
EC also outperforms irrelevant EC when participants are unaware of the CS-
US contingencies. Whether evaluative conditioning in general can occur 
without contingency awareness, however, is subject of debate (Hütter et al., 
2012; Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Stahl et al., 2009). In 
our study, two strategies were used to ensure unawareness. First, CSs were 
presented subliminally (17ms, pre- and postmasked). This prevents awareness 
of presentation of the CS, obstructing awareness of the coupling of a specific 
CS to a US. Secondly, as there are individual differences in the threshold for 
conscious perception we also excluded from analyses those participants that 
showed contingency awareness in the awareness test. As results still showed 
differential effects on EC based on the goal-relevance of the procedure, this 
suggests that this effect is not dependent on the awareness of the contingency 
between the CS and emotional expressions.
However, there are some limitations to this argument. First, Pleyers and 
colleagues (Pleyers et al., 2007; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Luminet, 
2009) argue that testing contingency awareness on the level of participants 
ignores the possibility that participants are almost never aware of all or none 
of the contingency. They propose that awareness should be controlled for on 
the level of stimulus pairings. The EC effect of every CS should be compared 
on whether that particular CS-US contingency was successfully remem-
bered. As in the current study only one CS was used for any condition, this 
comparison is not feasible, forcing us to resort to the less strict comparison 
based on participants’ awareness. We acknowledge that this prevents any strong 
claim of EC effects in absence of contingency awareness. Second, Stahl, 
Unkelbach, and Corneille (2009) demonstrate that EC might especially de-
pend on awareness of the valence of the US, and not on awareness of the 
identity of the US. In our study, we measured awareness of the emotional 
expression displayed in the US, which is more general than identity awareness, 
but more specific than valence awareness. As such, we have not determined 
the absence of valence awareness. However, in most EC studies, effects are 
expected (and found) to differ between CSs conditioned with USs of different 
valence, not of different identity. As in the current study the differential effect 
is found between different emotional expressions, contingency on the level 
of emotion is the most relevant feature to determine awareness. Even if par-
ticipants showed valence awareness, this would be the same valence for all 
conditions (negative), making it a less likely explanation for the differences 
between these conditions.
It is important to note that the results in Study 4.1 (in which conditioning was 
supraliminal) and in Study 4.2 (in which conditioning was subliminal) were 
somewhat different. In Study 4.1, we showed that goals differentiate prefer-
ences between relevant and irrelevant conditioning both on an evaluation 
scale and on forced choice. In fact, the effect of the goal on the option that 
participants preferred in a choice was mediated by the evaluation. In Study 
4.2, however, the goal predicted only choice. Even though evaluation and 
choice were highly correlated, no effect was found on evaluation, nor did it 
mediate the effect on choice. This may indicate that different processes are at 
work, resulting in similar effects on choice. Perhaps, when the CS was pre-
sented supraliminally, participants could develop a well-defined evaluation 
to report on a Likert scale, and they could make their choice based on this 
explicit preference. In Study 4.2, the subliminal nature of the conditioning 
procedure may have been resulted in an implicit associative preference, but 
not in an explicit preference that participants are able to report on a Likert 
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scale. This explanation is speculative, but it would be interesting for future 
research to examine whether evaluative measures requiring more deliberative 
versus spontaneous responses would yield different effects, especially under 
subliminal circumstances.
A point of interest is whether the present findings can be generalized to 
goals other than thirst. Thirst is a basic survival need, and, therefore, might 
have stronger, or even different, effects than less basic, higher-order goals. It is 
an interesting question whether, for example, the goal to “achieve” influences 
EC effects of relevant stimuli to the same extent. Next to that, in the current 
studies thirst was measured at the end of the experiment. This enables the 
possibility that conditioning beverages with negative stimuli could result in 
biased ratings of thirst. However, as all participants received a similar condi-
tioning procedure (with equal pairings of the beverages to disgust and fear) 
this bias could not have influenced the results. However, in future studies, it 
would be desirable to manipulate thirst.
Despite these limitations, this research provides some indication that goals can 
also influence EC without of contingency awareness. It could even be the case 
that goals enable unconscious evaluative conditioning. In our design we did 
not include a baseline of evaluation (or neutral conditioning) of beverages 
and airlines, and as such, we cannot make any claims about the effect of our 
independent conditioning manipulations; we can only compare them. It could 
be the case that conditioning a drink subliminally with an irrelevant US did 
not lead to an EC effect, whereas conditioning it with a relevant US did. In 
line with this reasoning is a growing body of research showing the impor-
tance of goals in unconscious processes. For example, in Unconscious Thought 
Theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), it has been demonstrated that 
unconsciously ‘thinking’ (i.e., while being distracted) about a complex deci-
sion has benefits over conscious thought, but only if the goal to make the 
decision is still active (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & Baaren, 2008). In another line of 
research, subliminal advertising has been shown to only affect product 
choice if the primed product is goal relevant (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; 
Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006). Such findings, together with the current 
results, suggest that goals are focusing unconscious processes toward what 
is relevant. It seems that, even though the unconscious has vast processing 
capacity, it still adheres to a principle of efficiency.
In summary, the current research demonstrates that goals direct evaluative 
learning processes, and influence the (automatic) formation of preferences. 
It has been well established that the automatic evaluative system is sensitive 
to goals (Ferguson, 2008). The current results are in line with that notion, and 
show, in addition, that goals not only create preferences for goal-relevant 
stimuli, but also prepare us for learning goal-relevant information. In other 
words, as we cannot learn everything, it is necessary that we learn especially 
those things that serve our (current) needs.
 
Footnotes
1 Including all participants did not change the pattern of results. Choice was predicted by 
thirst, B = -0.38, Wald(1,124) = 4.19, p = .04, and the interaction between emotional 
expression and thirst was significantly predicting evaluation, F(1,125) = 4.30, p = .02.
2 One participant was excluded from this analysis as his Cook’s Distance was larger than 
1. Including this person in the analysis yielded similar results, B = -0.89, Wald(1,46) = 4.46, 
p = .04. When the participants that reported correct contingencies for both beverages 
were included in the analysis, similar results were observed, B = -1.13, Wald(1,53) = 7.30, 
p = .007. When all participants were included, even those who knew one of the brands, 
results remained similar, B = -0.64, Wald(1, 59) = 4.18, p = .04. 
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Chapter 5
Warning: 
You are Being Primed! 
The Effect of a Warning on the Impact 
of Subliminal Ads.
This chapter is based on:
Verwijmeren, T., Karremans, J.C., Bernritter, S.F., Stroebe, W., & Wigboldus, D.H.J. (2013). Warning: 
You are being primed! The effect of a warning on the impact of subliminal ads. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 49, 1124-1129.
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Abstract
As it has been demonstrated recently that subliminal advertising can affect 
consumers’ decisions – if the ad is goal relevant – the question rises whether 
consumers are able to shield themselves from subliminal influences. In the 
present research it was examined whether warning people of the presence 
of subliminal ads could decrease subliminal advertising effects. In Study 5.1, 
it was demonstrated that warning people of subliminal ads indeed diminished 
priming effects on consumer choice, whereas subliminal advertising effects 
were replicated for people who were not warned (i.e., people for whom the 
primed brand was goal relevant were more likely to select it when primed). 
Study 5.2 extended these findings, revealing that both participants warned 
before and after the priming manipulation were less influenced by subliminal 
brand primes than controls. This suggests that the warning does not decrease 
participants’ sensitivity to the prime, but instead affects the influence of the prime 
at the behavioral level. Several explanations and implications are discussed.
 
Subliminal advertising has been a controversial topic since the 1950’s. It 
has been unclear for decades whether subliminally presenting a brand name 
was effective in influencing consumer choice. However, as we will review 
below, recently evidence was obtained demonstrating that under specific 
conditions subliminal advertising can affect behavior and consumer choices 
(e.g., Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006). Such findings are accompanied by 
concerns regarding the ethical appropriateness of subliminal persuasion 
techniques (Nebenzahl & Jaffe, 1998). By definition, subliminal advertising 
operates via an automatic process of which people are not aware, which 
fuels the idea that people may not be able to protect themselves from this 
type of persuasion, violating the right of autonomy. Hence, a theoretically 
and practically important issue is whether people indeed are helpless against 
subliminal influences. To address this issue, in the current research, we examine 
whether people are able to shield themselves from subliminal advertising 
effects when they are warned of subliminal influences. 
Subliminal advertising
Half a century ago, the marketer James Vicary introduced the subject by 
claiming that he had increased the sales of popcorn and Coke in a movie 
theatre by presenting the sentences “Drink Coke” and “Eat Popcorn” for a 
fraction of a second during the movie. However, the data of this study were 
never published, and when several scientific replication attempts failed (e.g., 
Hawkins, 1970; Weir, 1984), Vicary finally revealed his claim as a hoax. 
However, after years of controversy (Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1988; Trappey, 
1996), recently, subliminal advertising has been shown to be effective, but 
only under certain conditions (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans et al., 
2006). Research on this topic was re-instigated based on the more general 
finding that subliminal priming is more effective if the prime is goal-relevant. 
Specifically, in a series of studies, Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna (2002) showed 
that subliminally priming a goal-relevant cognition (e.g., thirst) affected the 
persuasiveness of a supraliminal ad targeting the goal (e.g., quenching one’s 
thirst), when they were motivated to pursue the goal (i.e., when they were 
thirsty). Karremans and colleagues (2006) applied this notion to subliminal 
advertising. They found that subliminally priming a brand of soft drink 
increased choice for that drink, but only for participants who were already 
thirsty and the primed brand was thus goal relevant. Conceptually replicating 
these findings, Bermeitinger and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that espe-
cially people for whom energy pills were goal relevant – those that felt tired, 
and were primed with the goal to concentrate – were susceptible to subliminal 
priming of the logo of a brand of energy pills. Finally, we demonstrated that 
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subliminal brand priming only affected brand choice for thirsty people if the 
primed brand was a non-habitual brand (see Chapter 2). Together, these 
findings demonstrate that, when certain boundary conditions are met, sub-
liminal advertising can affect consumer choices.
Controlling subliminal advertising effects?
Subliminal advertising is not only controversial scientifically. People generally 
abhor the idea that they can be influenced without their knowledge, and 
more importantly, without being able to control it (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999; Wegner, 1994). As a case in point, advertising ethics have proposed that 
subliminal advertising violates basic ethical concerns (Nebenzahl & Jaffe, 
1998). This concern is grounded in the belief that the effects of subliminal 
advertising cannot be controlled, challenging fundamental beliefs in free 
will. Indeed, people are generally inclined to feel uneasy with the notion 
that much of their behavior is automatic (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Sub-
liminal advertising is not only testament to this idea, but also provides another 
person with the tools to operate these automatic influences to their own 
benefit. 
However, although the assumption that controlling subliminal influences is 
impossible firmly exists in the public opinion, it is unclear whether people are 
actually unable to shield themselves from subliminal advertising. Is it neces-
sarily the case that, if people are unable to detect and identify the subliminally 
presented stimulus, they are also unable to protect themselves from its effects? 
What if people are made aware of the presence of subliminal influences? In 
other words, what if they are warned that they are being influenced? To answer 
these questions it is important to take a closer look at the processes underlying 
subliminal advertising effects.
It is generally understood that subliminal priming causes the primed construct 
to become more easily accessible from memory: The construct attains a state of 
higher cognitive accessibility (Loersch & Payne, 2011). As such, it can influence 
behavior in a multitude of ways, mainly directed by the specific task demands 
that are present at that moment. For example, if the construct of intelligence 
is made more accessible through priming, it can lead to a person performing 
better on an intelligence task (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998), or it 
can lead to judging someone else as more intelligent if provided with the 
task to evaluate others (cf. Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). In a similar vein, 
subliminal advertising increases the accessibility of the advertised brand 
name, which may lead to an increased choice for the primed brand, especially 
if that brand is goal-relevant. 
However, there is accruing evidence that people’s responses are not always 
automatically influenced by highly accessible information (e.g., Schwarz 
& Clore, 2003). Situations where ‘nothing is wrong’ allow for a heuristic 
processing style in which people respond primarily on cognitively accessible 
information that is readily available. However, when caution is necessary, people 
become vigilant and stop trusting these automatic tendencies, engaging in 
a more deliberative processing style that may overrule responses based on 
readily accessible information (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Bless 
& Schwarz, 1999; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Clore, Gasper, & 
Garvin, 2001; De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008; Holland, De Vries, 
Hermsen, & Knippenberg, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). Put differently, in 
the absence of threat, people rely on their automatic tendencies and exert 
little effort over their behavior. In contrast, a state of vigilance induces people 
to rely less on automatic impulsive tendencies. 
There is indirect and direct evidence for these claims. Holland and colleagues 
(2012), for example, demonstrated that among individuals who are sad – 
 arguably a cue indicating that “something is wrong” (cf. Estes & Adelman, 
2008; Pratto & John, 1991) – behavior is relatively strongly predicted by 
belief-based attitudes, whereas the behavior of happy, non-vigilant, individ-
uals is more strongly predicted by the concepts that are most accessible at 
that moment. Similarly, Hänze and Meyer (1998) found weaker automatic 
semantic priming effects (i.e., accessibility effects) among sad as compared 
to happy people. More directly related to the current research, DeMarree 
and colleagues (2012) recently demonstrated that inducing a feeling of 
doubt decreases the relationship between primes and behavior. For example, 
in one of their experiments, when participants described past occurrences 
in which they felt confident, priming a self-improvement goal or the goal 
to save money influenced donations to a charity more strongly than when 
participants wrote about occurrences in which they felt doubt. Moreover, 
Loersch and Payne (2012) demonstrated that when it was pointed out to 
participants that their behavior was being influenced by subliminal messages, 
priming effects were no longer observed. For example, in one study they 
demonstrated that subliminally priming participants with either ‘fast’ or 
‘slow’ affected their subsequent reading speed accordingly, however, this effect 
disappeared when participants were made aware that they had been exposed 
to subliminal primes. Together, these findings suggest that behavior is less 
likely to be automatically influenced by construct accessibility (induced by 
priming), when people are in a vigilant, cautious, state of mind. The current 
research is designed to test whether this idea also translates to subliminal 
advertising.
Based on the above, we predicted that subliminally advertised products (i.e., 
increased brand accessibility) may affect consumer choices to a lesser extent 
when consumers are being warned, as a warning may reduce reliance on 
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readily accessible information when making a choice. Two studies examined 
this basic prediction. In both studies, half of our participants were provided 
with a disclaimer disclosing the presence of subliminal ads and their un-
conscious effect on behavior. In the first study, we tested whether warned 
participants would be less affected by a subliminal prime than participants 
who did not receive a warning. In the second study, we examined at what 
moment a warning is needed to reduce priming effects: Some participants 
were warned before the priming manipulation, whereas others were warned 
after the priming manipulation, but before the moment of choice. 
Study 5.1
To test our basic prediction, in Study 5.1, half of the participants received a 
warning that they would be unconsciously influenced, while the other half did 
receive no such warning. After a priming manipulation, in which participants 
were subliminally primed with a brand of beverage, they made a choice 
between the primed brand and an alternative brand. We expected that, when 
no warning was given, participants would choose the primed brand more 
often than the alternative, but – as in previous research – only when par-
ticipants were already thirsty. However, when participants were warned, we 
expected the effect of subliminal priming to decrease. 
To explore a possible underlying mechanism, we manipulated cognitive load 
while participants made the choice. Based on the assumption that cognitive 
load would disrupt the possibility to override automatic responses, we explored 
whether load would negate the effects of the warning, causing subliminal 
primes to influence behavior even when warned. 
Method
Participants and design. A total of 173 students of Radboud University 
participated in this experiment for money or partial course credits. One 
participant did not finish the experiment and was omitted from the analyses. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a cell within a 2 (prime: ‘Nestea’ vs. 
‘7Up’) X 2 (warning: yes vs. no) X 2 (load; high vs. low) between subjects 
design. Furthermore, we measured thirst as a continuous factor and brand 
choice as dependent variable.
Procedure. At the start of the experiment, participants were told they were 
participating in consumer research, and asked to report their level of thirst 
on four items on a seven-point Likert scale (e.g., “I feel thirsty”). 
In the next part of the experiment, participants were subliminally primed 
with one of two brands (‘Nestea’ or ‘7up’; these brands were selected from 
a pre-test in which they scored similarly on liking, their ability to quench 
thirst, and habitual consumption). Primes were presented as words in the 
center of the screen. To ensure participants paid attention to the computer 
screen, they were given a filler task. This task was adapted from Karremans 
et al. (2006): Participants had to count the number of lowercase letters in 
strings containing mostly uppercase letters, and after every 5 strings, report 
this count. Primes were presented for 17 ms just before every string, and 
were masked by a random letter string, presented for 500 ms before every 
prime. The priming task consisted of 20 trials.
For half of the participants, the priming manipulation was preceded by a 
warning that subliminal primes would be embedded in the task. The warning 
contained the following information (translated from Dutch): “The next 
task contains subliminal ads, which are messages that are not consciously perceptible. 
Subliminal ads can influence your behavior unconsciously, without your notice. Please 
try your best to shield yourselves against this influence.” The other half did not 
receive a warning. None of the participants were informed about the nature 
of the subliminal messages (i.e., that they were drinks), nor did they know 
in what way they had to protect themselves from its influence.
Immediately after the priming manipulation, participants were asked to 
make a hypothetical choice between the primed brand and an alternative. 
Additionally, as a manipulation of cognitive load, participants were instructed 
to remember a number. This number was presented just before the measure 
of choice, and participants could report the number immediately after the 
choice. Half of the participants were presented with a 1-digit number (low 
load) and half of the participants were presented with a 6-digit number 
(high load). In the choice measure, the brands were presented left and right 
of the screen (counterbalanced over participants), and participants could select 
one of the brands by pressing a left (Q) or a right button (P).1
Habitual consumption of the two brands were measured using 7 point Likert 
scales (e.g., resp. ‘I really like this brand’; ‘How often do you drink this 
brand?’ – ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Always’).2 Finally, participants were 
checked for awareness through a funneled debriefing procedure. First, they 
had to report whether they had any idea what the study was about, and if they 
noticed anything peculiar in the priming task. Second, they were informed 
that the priming task contained primes, and were asked to indicate which 
brand they thought was primed – having the same two brands as options.
Results and Discussion
An initial logistic regression analysis identified five participants that had an 
excessive influence on the regression equation, indicated by a Cook’s value 
larger than 3 SDs from the mean. The following analyses were conducted 
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excluding these five participants (Cousineau & Chartier, 2010).3 The excluded 
participants were equally distributed over the prime and warning conditions. 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted with choice for the primed 
brand as dependent variable and thirst, warning, cognitive load, and their 
interactions as predictors. As habits are a strong determinant of consumer 
choice (Triandis, 1979), we partialed out the role of habits by including 
habitual preference as a covariate. 
Habit had a strong positive effect on choice for the primed brand: if partici-
pants indicated that they more often consumed the primed brand compared 
to the alternative, they were also more likely to select the primed brand, B 
= 3.26, Wald(1, 158) = 36.66, p < .001. Neither the main effect, nor any of 
the interactions with cognitive load were significant, p’s > .05. Also, the 
main effects of warning and thirst were not significant, p’s > .05. 
Most importantly, because we expected that thirst would be related to the 
choice for the primed brand only in the no-warning condition, and not in the 
warning condition, we predicted a significant interaction between warning 
and thirst. Indeed, this interaction was significant, Wald(1,158) = 5.33, p = 
.021. To further examine this interaction, simple effects were calculated with 
the simple slope method (Aiken & West, 1991). Replicating previous findings 
(Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans et al., 2006), if people were not 
warned, thirst significantly predicted choice for the primed brand: Thirstier 
participants were more likely to choose the primed brand, B = 0.83, Wald(1,158) 
= 4.93, p = .026. Thus, as in previous research, priming a beverage affected 
brand choice, but only for thirsty people. Importantly, this effect disappeared 
when participants had been warned against subliminal advertising: In this 
condition, thirst no longer predicted choice for the primed brand, B = -0.31, 
Wald(1,158) = 1.02, p = .313 (see Figure 5.1).4
It is important to note that the interaction of thirst and warning was depen-
dent on the specific primed brand. A logistic regression analyses with all the 
above factors, including prime as a factor yielded a significant three-way 
interaction between prime, thirst, and warning, Wald(1,154) = 5.67, p = .017. 
Further inspection demonstrated that the expected interaction was present 
when participants were primed with ‘Nestea’, Wald(1,154) = 8.40, p = .004. 
No such effect was observed among participants primed with ‘7Up’, 
Wald(1,154) = 0.02, p = .897. In fact, in the ‘7Up’ condition, no effects of 
thirst on priming were observed, regardless of warning, as the simple effect 
of thirst on choice for the primed brand among participants primed with 
‘7Up’ was non-significant, B = 0.21, Wald(1,154) = 0.33, p = .566. It is hard 
to pinpoint a specific explanation for this difference. It could be that the 
load manipulation interfered with priming ‘7Up’, as both the prime and the 
manipulation contained digits. In Study 5.2, which did not contain the load 
manipulation, the warning effects were independent of the brand that was 
primed.
Figure 5.1. The effect of (standardized) thirst on choice for the primed brand for 
warned vs. not warned participants
We found no evidence that awareness of the primed brand influenced any 
of the effects: None of the participants reported the correct brand as the 
primed brand in the open-ended question. In the forced choice, 76 of the 
167 (46%) participants correctly selected the primed brand, and were coded 
as correct identifiers. Including this factor did not influence any of the 
reported effects. It did however marginally significantly predict primed 
brand choice, B = 1.44, Wald(1,151) = 8.15, p = .054. However, this finding 
is more likely due to consistency in choosing the same brand as before, than 
that it reflects actual awareness of the primed brand, as the same bias was ob-
served among incorrect identifiers (resp. 71% and 68% congruent choices, 
χ2 = .68). It is noteworthy that this congruency bias was equally high among 
warned and control participants (69% and 70%, χ2 = .97), suggesting that 
most participants thought that they chose the primed brand regardless of 
being instructed not to.
The current study suggests that warned people are not influenced by sub-
liminal advertising. At least for those primed with ‘Nestea’, we replicated 
previous research, showing that priming a brand increases brand choice, if 
the brand is goal relevant. Warning participants of the presence of subliminal 
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messages eliminated these effects. An induction of cognitive load in working 
memory did not seem to affect these results.5 
Study 5.2
As a next step, in Study 5.2, we narrowed down on the underlying mechanism 
by varying the moment of warning. Specifically, in this study, we warned 
participants either before or after the priming manipulation – but always 
before the measure of choice. This served two goals. It excludes the possibility 
that participants used strategies to prevent the prime from entering their 
perceptual system (e.g., closing their eyes, looking away from the screen), 
which is a possible explanation for the effects found both in Study 5.1 as 
well as in previous research (Loersch & Payne, 2012). Next to that, warning 
participants only after the priming manipulation also excludes several mecha-
nisms through which the warning might have influenced priming effects. 
Specifically, there are two types of mechanisms that can be distinguished. 
First, a warning might decrease perceptual processing of the primed stimulus, 
resulting in less activation of the primed concept. Alternatively, a warning 
might not disrupt stimulus activation, but the extent to which this activation 
is predictive of subsequent behavior. As described in the Introduction, we hy-
pothesized the latter, as a warning might induce a state of vigilance, decreasing 
the influence of accessible information. If this is indeed the case, it should 
not matter whether participants are warned before or after the priming 
manipulation. Thus, in Study 5.2, we expected to replicate the findings of 
Study 5.1, and expected that the order of priming and warning would not 
affect the impact of a warning. 
Method
Participants and design. A total of 195 people participated in this experiment. 
One of these participants did not finish the experiment and was excluded 
from analyses. Participants were randomly assigned to a cell in a 2 (prime; 
‘Nestea’ or ‘7Up’) X 3 (warning; before prime vs. before choice vs. no 
warning) between subjects design.
Procedure. Unlike Study 5.1, we now tested participants who were already 
thirsty when they came to the lab, and for whom priming effects of beverages 
are thus expected. Hence, participants were requested not to eat or drink 3 
hours prior to the experiment. Upon entering the lab, participants indicated 
their level of thirst on a 7 point Likert-scale on four items (e.g., ‘How thirsty 
are you at the moment’). The mean level of thirst was above the midpoint 
of the scale; M = 4.57, t(193) = 6.64, p < .001, compared to 4.
The priming manipulation followed the same procedure as in Study 5.1, 
except that the load manipulation was dropped from the procedure. Next to 
that, participants were now randomly divided into three groups. The first 
group was informed about subliminal advertising just before the priming 
task. The second group was warned immediately after the priming task, just 
before the measure of choice. The third group did not receive a warning at 
all and served as a control group. 
After the priming task, participants were given a choice between the two 
brands in the same way as in Study 5.1. Finally, habitual consumption was 
assessed for each brand on 7 point Likert scales. 
Results and Discussion
Three outliers (Cook’s value 3 SD’s from the mean) were identified and 
excluded from the analysis (Cousineau & Chartier, 2010).6 A logistic regression 
was conducted with choice for the primed brand as a dependent variable, and 
the presence of a warning as a categorical predictor. Habit was controlled 
for as a covariate. To contrast the different groups of the warning condition, 
planned Helmert contrasts were calculated, comparing the control group 
with both warning groups in a first contrast, and the warning groups with 
each other in a second contrast. As in Study 5.1, habit strongly predicted 
choice for the primed brand, B = 3.15, Wald(1,189) = 49.41, p < .001. 
Furthermore, results revealed a significant main effect of warning, Wald(1, 
189) = 8.25, p = .016. The contrast between the control group and both 
warning groups was significant, B = 1.31, Wald (1, 189) = 7.77, p= .005, 
demonstrating that the effect of priming a brand is larger in the control 
condition than in both warning conditions. The contrast between the warning 
conditions was not significant, Wald < 1, suggesting no difference in priming 
effect between presenting a warning before or after the priming manipulation.
To further examine whether priming influenced choice in the different 
conditions, choice for the primed brand was compared against chance level 
(50%) in all conditions separately. Replicating previous findings, and the 
results of Study 5.1, these analyses revealed that participants chose the 
primed brand above chance level in the control group, M = 61.9%, B = 1.13, 
Wald(1, 62) = 15.20, p = .007. However, in both the warning-before-prime, 
and the warning-before-choice condition, choice for the primed brand did 
not differ significantly from chance, p’s < .30, respectively M = 42.2% and 
M = 49.8. Thus, again, the subliminal priming effect disappeared when 
participants were warned that they were unconsciously influenced, and this 
occurred both when warned before and after the priming procedure (see 
Figure 5.2). These effects were not dependent on the specific brand that was 
primed, as none of the interactions with the primed brand were significant.
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Figure 5.2. Percentage of participants that chose the primed brand when they are warned 
before the priming manipulation, before the choice, or not at all.
General Discussion
The current research demonstrated that informing participants of the presence 
and influence of subliminal advertisements eliminates their effect. In both 
studies, findings from previous research on subliminal advertising were rep-
licated: Participants were more likely to choose the primed brand if the 
brand was goal-relevant. However, if participants were warned that they 
were being influenced by subliminal ads, this effect was no longer observed. 
Furthermore, in Study 5.2, it was demonstrated that a warning eliminated 
subliminal priming effects not only when it was presented before the prime 
manipulation, but also when it was presented after the prime, just before the 
moment of choice.
These results contribute both to the understanding of subliminal priming in 
general and subliminal advertising in particular. The current findings are in 
line with recent theorizing on the role of vigilance on processing style. In 
situations that require caution, people rely less on automatic tendencies, such 
as accessible schemas or information (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). Indeed, the 
current findings contribute to the growing body of evidence that automatic 
processes – priming behavior links – can be disrupted in situations where 
“something is wrong” and people do not rely on their gut feeling (DeMarree 
et al., 2012; Holland et al., 2012; Loersch & Payne, 2012). In line with recent 
theorizing, we argue that, under ‘normal’ non-threatening circumstances, 
accessibility effects caused by a prime are due to misattribution processes: 
Participants believe that the primed and thus accessible stimulus is caused by 
internal events (i.e., their ‘own’ thoughts), and therefore act in line with the 
accessible information. When participants are made aware of the prime, they 
are more likely to attribute their thoughts (i.e., the accessible information) 
to external causes (the prime), and then are less likely to respond based on the 
prime. In other words, informing people about the presence of subliminal 
messages creates a degree of distrust toward accessible information, causing 
the subliminal prime to fail to influence behavior. 
Furthermore, the present research excludes two important alternative explana-
tions. Informing participants about the presence of subliminal messages 
might have increased sensitivity for the primes, lowering the threshold for 
subliminal presentation. This could cause participants to become aware of the 
primed concept. As it is already well-known that awareness of the presence 
of obvious or consciously remembered primes negates their effect (Lombardi, 
Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Martin, 1986), it is paramount to ensure that par-
ticipants were unaware of the primes. In the current research, we excluded this 
possibility in two ways. In Study 5.1, awareness was checked with a funneled 
debriefing task. People in the warning condition who correctly selected the 
primed brand in a binary forced choice were not better in negating the 
effect of subliminal ads. If anything, there seems to be a bias for identifying the 
selected brand as the primed brand, suggesting that participants generally 
believed that their choice was influenced by the prime. As this tendency was 
equally high among warned versus non-warned participants, this suggests 
that people are not conscious of their ability of resisting subliminal primes. 
Second, in Study 5.2, the effect of subliminal advertising was also eliminated 
when the warning was presented after the priming manipulation, excluding 
increased awareness of the primes. 
Moreover, a warning could not only induce distrust of the activation caused by 
the prime to an internal source, but it could also disrupt perceptual processes 
during the priming manipulation. In other words, the question remained 
whether, among participants who were warned, the primes simply did not 
enter these participants’ cognitive system, causing no activation at all, or 
whether the primed concept was activated, but was not misattributed. 
Warning participants after the priming manipulation ensured that the primes 
were processed during the priming task. This excludes the possibility that 
the warning prevented priming to cause any activation at all, and instead 
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demonstrates that even if a concept is already activated, a warning eliminates its 
effect. Taken together, this research is in line with the notion that awareness 
of the presence of subliminal messages, without knowledge of the content 
of these messages, creates a degree of distrust towards the accessibility that is 
caused by the subliminal primes, nullifying their effect on behavior.
In the current research, we observed two null-effects that we (carefully) 
 interpret to speculate further about possible mechanisms. Firstly, in Study 
5.1, we did not observe any interaction of the warning effect (or the simple 
priming effect) with the induction of cognitive load. If anything, the effect 
was (non-significantly) stronger in the high load condition.14 This suggests 
that participants were not using cognitive resources to determine what to 
choose, but merely disregarded the (distrusted) accessibility of the primed 
brand. Secondly, additional analyses did not reveal an interaction of habitual 
consumption with the warning effect. In both studies, only the main effect 
of habitual consumption was significant. This indicates that a warning did 
not cause participants to discount just any accessible information in making 
their choice, but suggests that the effect of the warning was specific to the 
accessibility of the prime. However, as these speculations are based on null-
effects, it is necessary to examine both suggestions in future research.
Another important contribution of the present research is that it expands 
the understanding of subliminal advertising, revealing another boundary 
condition. Previous research has demonstrated goal relevance and habits as 
important limiting factors (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans et al., 2006). 
The current research demonstrated that subliminal advertising is limited to 
situations where people are not aware of being influenced. The current results 
may even imply that subliminal ads are not effective whenever people are 
cautious. For example, subliminal priming would be less effective for choices 
that people generally make more cautiously, such as purchasing something 
expensive or very important. This notion also suggests that people who are 
chronically in a cautious mindset (e.g., prevention-focused people; Higgins, 
1998) may be less susceptible to subliminal ads in general. Furthermore, 
although the current research was not designed to solve the ethical contro-
versy surrounding subliminal advertising, it does invite for a more thorough 
study of the matter. For example, if a simple warning can prevent consumers 
from being influenced by subliminal ads, are they still a violation of autonomy?
In the current studies, the warning was strongly linked to the measured 
behavior. Participants were provided with only one opportunity to choose, 
and it was obvious that the priming manipulation was aimed at influencing 
this choice. It is interesting to examine whether a warning would also disrupt 
subliminal advertising effects in a more complex situation. For example, if 
the measure of choice would be embedded among other choices, it could be 
that people particularly use an analytic processing style during the first choice, 
but not while making subsequent choices. Future research could investigate 
whether the impact of the warning is diminished in a real-life situation, 
where the link between the warning and the behavior is often not as clear-cut 
as in our present studies.
In summary, the present research provides more insight into the processes 
underlying priming effects, demonstrating that awareness of the presence of 
subliminal messages, without any knowledge of their content, disrupts the 
effect of accessibility of the primed concept on behavior. Furthermore, it 
highlights the sensitivity of subliminal advertising effects yet again, by uncov-
ering another boundary condition. Moreover, it provides evidence for the 
notion that subliminal advertising is not necessarily the threat to autonomous 
decision making that it is believed to be: People’s consumption choices can be 
influenced by subliminal primes of a brand, but only if the primed brand is goal 
relevant, and, as the current research demonstrates, if they are not suspicious 
of an influence.
 
Footnotes
1 After making a choice, participants were asked in what way they made this choice, 
focusing on whether they made it spontaneously or deliberatively (e.g., “I made the choice 
based on my gut-feelings.”). Moreover, participants in the warning condition were asked 
how they tried to protect themselves from the subliminal messages. No indication of any 
strategic difference in making the choice was observed.
2 We also measured evaluation of the brands in Study 5.1 and 5.2. As in previous research 
(e.g., see Chapter 3), in both studies, priming effects were only observed on choice, and 
not on evaluation of the primed brand.
3 Including these participants led to similar results, although not significant.
4 Excluding the load manipulation as a factor from the design led to similar results. A 
logistic regression with warning, thirst, and their interaction as predictors and choice for the 
primed brand as dependent variable yielded a marginally significant interaction between 
warning and thirst, B = -0.88, Wald(1,161) = 3.43, p = .06. In the warning condition 
thirst significantly predicted choice, B = 0.83, Wald(1,161) = 4.91, p = .03, whereas this 
effect was not found among warned participants, B = -0.05, Wald(1, 161) = 0.03, p = .86.
5 Although the three-way interaction was not significant, the interaction between thirst 
and warning was significant in the high load condition, Wald(1,159) = 6.70, p =.010, but 
not in the low load condition, Wald(1,159) = 0.29, p = .591. This difference should not 
be interpreted, as the three-way interaction was not significant, but it demonstrates that, 
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if anything, the data do not support a decrease in the effect of warning under higher 
cognitive load.
6 Effects were similar including these participants. All reported significant effects 
remained significant. 
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Chapter 6
The Effect of Subliminal 
Brand Priming on Brand 
Accessibility is 
Moderated by Goals
 
This chapter is based on:
Verwijmeren, T., Karremans, J. C., Stroebe, W., Wigboldus, D. H. J. (in preparation). The effect of 
subliminal brand priming on brand accessibility is moderated by goals.
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Abstract
Recently, it has been demonstrated that subliminal advertising can be feasible, 
as long as the advertised brand is goal relevant. Although previous research 
has provided insight into the question of when subliminal advertising may 
work, little is known about how it may work. Based on recent theorizing on 
the underlying mechanisms of priming effects, in this paper we report two 
studies that examined whether goals modulate the effect of subliminal brand 
primes on accessibility. Study 6.1 demonstrated that, only among participants 
for whom a brand of beverage was goal relevant (i.e. thirsty participants), 
subliminally priming that brand increased attention bias toward that brand in 
a dot-probe task (a proxy of accessibility). In Study 6.2, thirsty (in contrast to 
non-thirsty) participants were more likely to generate a brand from memory 
when it had been primed. These findings indicate that subliminally priming 
a brand name only increases the brand’s accessibility if it is goal relevant.
 
Subliminal advertising has been a controversial topic ever since James Vicary 
falsely claimed to have influenced sales at a movie theatre in the fifties 
(Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1988). Although social scientists in the following 
decades generally failed to find a reliable effect of subliminal advertising on 
consumer behavior (Hawkins, 1970; Weir, 1984), recently, evidence has accrued 
demonstrating that subliminal advertising can be feasible, as long as the adver-
tised brand is goal relevant (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; Karremans, Stroebe, 
& Claus, 2006). Although this research has provided insight into the question 
of when subliminal advertising may work, as yet little is known about how 
it may work. Based on recent theorizing on the underlying mechanisms of 
priming effects (Loersch & Payne, 2011; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009), in 
this paper we report two studies that examined whether goals modulate the 
effect of subliminal brand primes on accessibility.
The mechanism that is generally proposed to underlie (subliminal) priming 
effects is an increase in cognitive accessibility of the primed concept (Higgins, 
1996; McNamara, 2005), which in turn can lead to overt behavioral effects 
(Bargh, 2006; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009). Exposure 
to a stimulus activates the cognitive structures associated with the stimulus, 
which facilitates recognition or recall of that stimulus (Bruner, 1957). For 
example, when people have to decide whether a string of letters is a word 
or a non-word, they are faster and more accurate in responding to words 
that have been primed just before (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Moreover, 
high construct accessibility has been demonstrated to increase the likelihood 
of associated judgments and behavior to be in line with the construct (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Sedikides & 
Skowronski, 1991; Srull & Wyer Jr., 1979). For example, when a subtle scent 
associated with cleaner solution is present, the concept of cleaning becomes 
more accessible, and people are more likely to display cleaning behavior 
(Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005). 
Similar to such findings, subliminally priming a brand name should increase 
accessibility of that brand, making it more likely to be selected in a subsequent 
choice, as indeed is suggested by previous work (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; 
Karremans et al., 2006). In line with this accessibility explanation, previous 
studies have shown that subliminally priming a brand that already is chronically 
highly accessible (i.e., a habitually consumed brand) does not increase brand 
choice (see Chapter 2). This suggests that, if there is little room to increase 
accessibility through brand priming, subliminal advertising indeed does not 
affect brand choice. 
However, as briefly noted above, several research findings have now shown 
that subliminal advertising affects consumer choices only if the primed 
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brand is relevant to a perceiver’s current goal state (Bermeitinger et al., 2009; 
Karremans et al., 2006; cf. Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002). For example, 
priming a brand of beverage does increase choice for the primed brand, but 
only for people who are already thirsty (i.e., who have the goal to quench their 
thirst; Karremans et al., 2006). Similarly, Bermeitinger et al. (2009) demon-
strated that subliminal ads for dextrose pills only affect choice for the primed 
brand among people who are tired and motivated to concentrate. In both 
these studies, if the primed brand did not relate to a relevant goal, subliminal 
priming did not affect product choice.
How can these findings be understood in light of the proposed accessibility 
explanation of subliminal advertising? First, it is possible that, irrespective of 
goal relevance, the primed brand increases brand accessibility. If the primed 
brand is not goal relevant, increased accessibility simply might not translate 
into overt behavior. For example, subliminally priming brand A may increase 
cognitive accessibility of brand A for both thirsty and non-thirsty people, 
however, for non-thirsty people it may not influence brand choice simply 
because they more or less randomly pick a brand when a choice is offered.
However, a second possibility is that goal-relevance of the subliminally 
primed brand modulates accessibility. For example, subliminally priming a 
brand of beverage may only increase accessibility for thirsty people (i.e., for 
whom the brand is goal relevant) and not, or less so, for non-thirsty people for 
whom the brand is not goal relevant. In the current paper, we examine these 
possibilities by testing whether goal relevance of the subliminally primed brand 
indeed may – or may not – moderate accessibility of the primed brand. Such 
findings may help to further explain previous findings demonstrating that 
subliminal advertising only works if the advertised product is goal relevant. 
There are several indications that goals may influence the effect of priming 
on accessibility. Recent theorizing on priming has focused on top-down 
 influences on prime-induced accessibility (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, 
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). In this framework, Dehaene and colleagues distin-
guish two factors responsible for variation in the strength of priming effects: 
Bottom-up stimulus strength and top-down amplification. In the case of 
subliminal advertising, the stimulus is presented so briefly that bottom-up 
stimulus strength is weak. According to the model, a top-down mechanism 
is necessary for a prime to have any effect. Goals could serve such a top-down 
function as they create a state of perceptual readiness toward goal relevant 
stimuli (Bruner, 1957). Goal relevant words are more easily identified and 
recalled (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & de Vries, 2001; Moskowitz, 2002), whereas 
concepts that might obstruct goal pursuit are inhibited (Shah, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2002). Next to that, goals guide our attention toward stimuli 
that can aid in goal attainment both volitionally (Yantis, 2000) as well as 
automatically (Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, Van Damme, & Crombez, 2010). 
In other words, goals ready the cognitive system for incoming stimuli that 
are possibly beneficial to goal attainment. 
 There is some empirical backing for the notion that goals may enhance the 
accessibility of subliminally presented stimuli. Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert 
and Hermans (2012) demonstrated that subliminally priming an affective 
word facilitated pronunciation latency for affectively congruent words more 
strongly when participants had the goal to attend to affective information. 
Kiefer and Martens (2010) provide additional evidence for facilitation of goal-
related processing of unconscious stimuli. In their research participants were 
instructed to attend either to semantic or perceptual features. In a subsequent 
task, subliminal stimuli were presented prior to every trial of a lexical decision 
task. Semantic priming effects on reaction times in the lexical decision task 
were larger for those with a semantic processing goal than for those with 
a perceptual processing goal. Their study demonstrates that increases in ac-
cessibility (as indicated by faster semantic processing) due to subliminally 
presenting a stimulus can be dependent on the task goal. Thus, taken together 
these findings provide suggestive evidence that priming may affect accessibility 
differently depending on goal-relevance of the prime. 
In the current research, we tested whether this idea more directly, and 
whether it translates to subliminal advertising. In two studies, brands of bever-
ages were subliminally primed, followed by a measure of accessibility. Across 
the studies, we used two different indicators of accessibility. In the first study, 
we measured the tendency of a stimulus to attract attention – an indirect 
measure of accessibility (Bargh & Pratto, 1986). In the second study, acces-
sibility was measured more directly: After being subliminally primed with a 
brand, participants had to list several brands of the same product type. If a 
brand is highly accessible in memory, it is more likely to be recalled. In both 
studies, we tested whether thirsty (vs. non-thirsty) participants would display 
an increased accessibility of the primed brand, as indicated by a stronger 
attention bias for the primed brand (Study 6.1) or a higher likelihood of 
mentioning the primed brand (Study 6.2).
Study 6.1
In Study 6.1, we examined whether an increase in brand accessibility due to 
subliminally priming the brand is dependent on goal relevance of the brand. 
In this study accessibility was measured indirectly, using attention as a proxy 
for accessibility. In the absence of stimuli that are very salient or threatening, 
attention is generally directed toward stimuli that are accessible in the mind 
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(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). To illustrate, if someone is looking at a picture, 
she is probably faster to spot the old man in the photograph when she just 
overheard a conversation about elderly people, and the construct of ‘elderly 
people’ is thus accessible. 
In the current study, attention was measured with a dot-probe task. Two brands 
of soft drink were presented shortly on the screen, followed immediately by 
a dot on the location of one of the two brands. Participants had to indicate 
whether the dot was on the left or right side of the screen. Their latency 
served as an indication of attention to the brand that was presented at that 
location. We tested whether thirst would be related to a stronger attention 
bias toward the primed brand of beverage.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 76 participants were subjected to a 2 
(prime congruency; congruent vs. incongruent) within subjects design, 
with thirst as a continuous between-subjects variable.
Procedure. Participants were first subjected to a modified version of the 
dot-probe task (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994), designed to measure attention 
bias toward a primed brand. Each trial consisted of two parts: In the first part 
a brand was primed subliminally; in the second part attention was measured 
by a dot-probe trial. The priming part constituted of five presentations. 
Each presentation started with a random string of uppercase letters (500ms), 
which served as a forward mask and a fixation point. The prime followed 
immediately, and was presented for 17ms. Then participants were presented 
with a string of uppercase letter B’s (1000ms). In approximately half of these 
5 presentations, a lowercase letter b was embedded in this string. Participants 
had to indicate after these 5 presentations whether more or less than half of 
the presentations featured a lowercase letter. 
After participants’ responses, the dot-probe task started with a fixation cross 
(500ms). Then, two brands were presented for 150ms; one centered on the 
left side of the screen, one centered on the right side. In each trial one of 
these brands had just been primed as described above. Whether the primed 
brand was presented left or right was counterbalanced across trials. The brands 
were immediately followed by a dot appearing on the location of either the 
left or the right brand, and participants had to indicate the location of this 
as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing a right key (‘L’) or a left key 
(‘A’). As each trial consisted of two different tasks, participants were informed 
about the upcoming task by a 2s warning (e.g., “react to the dot”). In half of the 
trials the dot appeared at the same location as the primed brand was presented 
(congruent trials), in the other half, the dot appeared on the other side of 
the screen (incongruent trials).
After this task, thirst was measured on a 7-point Likert scale with 4 items 
(e.g., “I feel thirsty”; α = .93).1 Afterwards, participants were thanked for 
their effort, debriefed, and paid ten Euros or partial course credit.
Selection of trials. Brands were a selection of ten well-known soft-drinks 
(Coca Cola, Pepsi Cola, Fanta, Sisi, Nestea, Lipton Ice, Seven Up, Sprite, Evian, 
Spa Rood). To create the brand pairs for the dot-probe task, these ten brands 
were paired with each other in all possible combinations (i.e., unique 45 
brand pairs). These brand pairs were combined with every combination of 
prime congruency (2 levels), prime location (2 levels), and brand location (2 
levels, e.g., Nestea, Fanta vs. Fanta, Nestea) to create a pool of 360 trials. A 
subset of 120 trials (1/3 of the total pool of trials) was selected for each partic-
ipant, counterbalanced on prime congruency and prime location, by picking 
a random selection of the 90 brand pairs (45 brand pairs, mirrored on brand 
location) for each of the possible combinations. However, as the remaining 
pool was used for the next participant, in the end, all possible brand pairs 
were used evenly in every possible combination.
Results and discussion
The latencies on correct trials of the dot-probe task were log-transformed 
to conform to the normality assumptions of the subsequent statistical tests. 
Nine participants made more than 10 errors (i.e., indicated the location of the 
dot incorrectly) on either the congruent or the incongruent trials, and were 
excluded from the analysis. The attention bias was computed by calculating the 
difference score of the mean of incongruent trials and the mean of congruent 
trials. This resulted in a higher score for those participants who were on average 
faster to react to trials in which the dot was presented at the same location 
as the primed brand, indicating that their attention was drawn towards the 
primed brand. One participant had an attention bias score three SD’s above 
the sample’s mean and had an exorbitant influence on the regression model 
(Cook’s Distance > .4), and was excluded from the analysis.2 
The data of 66 participants were subjected to a regression analysis, with 
attention bias as dependent variable, and thirst as a predictor. The analysis 
yielded a significant effect of thirst, β = .27, t(65) = 2.24, p = .029: Level of 
thirst was associated with faster responses on congruent trials compared to 
incongruent trials, indicating that thirst (the goal) was positively related to 
an attention bias for the primed brand of beverage (see Figure 6.1). This 
finding supports the notion that goals modulate the effect of subliminal 
priming on accessibility of the primed brand, as indirectly measured with 
attention. Subliminally priming a brand name causes the brand to become 
temporarily more accessible, especially if that brand is related to an active 
goal. As a result, attention is drawn to the accessible brand.
115114
The Effect of Subliminal Brand Priming on Brand Accessibility is Moderated by Goalschapter 6
Figure 6.1. The effect of thirst (standardized) on predicted (and actual) scores of 
attention bias toward the primed brand.
Study 6.2
Study 6.1 provides initial evidence for the idea that an increase in accessibility 
is goal dependent. In Study 6.2, we aimed to conceptually replicate this 
finding, using a different measure of accessibility. We measured brand acces-
sibility as the likelihood that a participant would mention the brand when 
asked to list ten brands of soft drinks. This operationalization is interesting for 
two reasons. First, cognitive accessibility is defined as the ability to retrieve 
from memory and to bring to mind an instance of a category (Higgins, 
1996; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Thus, it is a more 
direct measure of accessibility, successfully used in previous research (Higgins 
et al., 1982). Second, the free recall of brand names relates to an important 
concept in consumer psychology: Consideration sets. Consideration sets are 
lists of options within a product category that are considered by consumers 
before making a choice (Narayana & Markin, 1975). Consumer choice can 
be split into two stages: Retrieving the possible options from memory, thus 
forming a consideration set, and then weighing the options to come to a 
choice (Nedungadi, 1990). Thus, the content of a consideration set is a critical 
predictor of consumer choice. Subliminal advertising research has mainly 
focused on measuring effects on the second stage: The options were provided, 
and participants were asked to select their choice (e.g., Bermeitinger et al., 
2009; Karremans et al., 2006). The current method of brand recall enables us 
to study the first stage as well: Are participants more likely to spontaneously 
consider a (goal relevant) brand, when it is primed?3 
In summary, we tested whether thirst would be positively associated acces-
sibility of the primed brand, as indicated by a higher likelihood of listing the 
primed brand of soft drink. Finally, instead of measuring thirst, in Study 6.2 
thirst was manipulated.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 140 undergraduate students participated 
in this experiment. They were subjected to a 2 (prime; ’7Up’ vs. ‘Nestea’) X 
2 (thirst; low thirst vs. high thirst) between subject design. Participants were 
rewarded with partial course credit or 7.50 Euros.
Procedure. First, thirst was manipulated. Half of the participants received a 
piece of salty licorice and had to determine which letters were printed in 
relief using their tongue (Aarts et al., 2001). The other half of the participants 
did not receive such a manipulation. Subsequently, participants were primed 
20 times with either the brand ‘7Up’ or ‘Nestea.’ These brands were used in 
previous research (see Chapter 5) and scored similarly on habitual consump-
tion and preference in a pre-test. These primes were subliminally presented 
in a task, in which participants had to count the number of lowercase letters 
in a string of mainly uppercase letters. Before each presentation of such a 
string, a prime was presented for 17ms, preceded and followed by a random 
letter string serving as a mask (adapted from Karremans, et al., 2006). 
After the priming task, participants were asked, ten times in a row, to type 
in a brand of soft drink. Participants were not informed in advance about 
the number of brands that they had to list. Measures of accessibility were 
constructed in two ways: First, we calculated an ordinal accessibility score by 
checking at which trial participants first mentioned the primed brand. If 
they mentioned it in the first trial, participants received a score of 10. This 
number would be reduced by 1 with every later trial they would mention 
it (9 for the second; 8 for the third, etc.). If the primed brand would not be 
mentioned at all, participants received a score of 0. This variable will be referred 
to as relative accessibility.
Second, as only 50 out of the 140 participants mentioned the primed brand at 
any given trial, it was also checked whether the primed brand was mentioned 
at all in one of the ten trials. If the primed brand was mentioned participants 
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received a score of 1, if it was not they received a score of 0. This variable 
will be referred to as prime mentioned.
Finally, as a manipulation check, thirst was measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale, using four items (e.g., “I am thirsty”).
Results
Manipulation check. Unfortunately, no effect was found of the thirst manipu-
lation on the measure of thirst, F < 1. People who tasted licorice did not 
report higher levels of thirst than people who did not (respectively, M = 
4.15 and M = 3.98). As the manipulation of thirst clearly did not induce 
thirst, in the subsequent analyses we will analyze the data with self-reported 
thirst instead.
Accessibility. An ordinal regression analysis with relative accessibility as depen-
dent variable and thirst as predictor yielded a trend of thirst, B = 0.27, 
Wald(1,139) = 2.37, p = .12, indicating that, albeit non-significantly, higher 
levels of thirst tended to be positively related to mentioning the primed brand 
on an earlier trial. A logistic regression analysis with prime mentioned as the 
dependent variable and thirst as a predictor yielded a marginally significant 
effect of thirst, B = 0.34, Wald(1,139) = 3.41, p = .065.
Further scrutiny revealed that these findings may have been contaminated 
by the fact that barely any of the participants mentioned Nestea in the 
accessibility task (of all 140 participants only 9 filled in Nestea in any of the 
ten trials).4 When accessibility of 7Up was analyzed separately, the results 
became much clearer. When relative accessibility of 7Up was regressed on 
thirst, prime and their interaction, results show a significant interaction of thirst 
and prime, B = 0.67, Wald(1,138) = 4.62, p = .032. When 7Up mentioned is 
regressed upon thirst, prime and their interaction, the same pattern emerges. 
The interaction of prime and thirst significantly predicted whether 7Up is 
mentioned, B = 0.93, Wald(1,138) = 5.78, p = .016 (see Figure 6.2). Both 
interactions demonstrate that, when participants are primed with 7Up, 
compared to being primed with Nestea, they are more likely to mention 
7Up (and in an earlier trial) when they report higher levels of thirst.5
Summarized, the results demonstrate that brand accessibility is influenced 
by priming a brand, but in line with previous work, only when that brand 
is goal relevant. 
Figure 6.2. The effect of thirst (standardized) on predicted likelihood of mentioning 
7Up in the brand recall task when 7Up versus Nestea was primed.
General Discussion
The current research demonstrated that the increase of accessibility of a primed 
brand is sensitive to goals. In the first study, priming increased an attention 
bias toward the primed brand of beverage – a proxy of accessibility of that 
brand – if participants were thirsty, and thus the brand was relevant to their 
goal. In Study 6.2, especially thirsty participants were more likely to generate 
a primed brand from memory. 
These findings are in line with previous research on subliminal advertising, 
in which goals have shown to be an important moderator of subliminal 
brand priming effects on choice (e.g., Karremans et al., 2006). Our results 
provide a viable mechanism for these effects, explaining how goal relevance 
of the brand influences the impact of the primed brand. We suggest that 
subliminally priming a goal relevant brand name increases its accessibility, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that this brand is chosen. In contrast, if 
a goal irrelevant brand is primed, the presentation of the brand does not 
seem to increase the brand’s accessibility, thus failing to influence choice. In 
parallel to the moderation by goals on accessibility, in Study 6.2, we replicated 
previous findings showing that brand prime affects choice among thirsty 
participants (see Footnote 5). However, there are two problems with claiming 
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accessibility as a mediator of subliminal advertising effects on choice. First, in 
both studies, we observed a correlation between thirst and accessibility of the 
primed brand. In Study 6.2, thirst was manipulated, but as this manipulation 
did not have the expected effect, a self-report measure of thirst was used instead. 
Thus, based on these two studies, we cannot make a strong claim of causality 
(i.e., that the level of thirst affected the influence of prime on accessibility). 
Second, it is problematic when attempting to test whether scores on an ac-
cessibility measure serve as a mediator between a prime and overt behavior 
(e.g., the accessibility measure itself serves as a prime, which may overrule the 
effect of the prime; for an overview of problems with testing for mediation, see 
Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010). Therefore, we cannot provide hard evidence 
for the mediation of subliminal advertising effects on choice by accessibility. 
However, our results can serve as an indication that increased accessibility of 
a primed goal relevant brand could be the underlying process.
More generally, our results provide an interesting perspective on the link 
between priming, goals and construct accessibility. Accessibility previously 
has been described as a function of goals and priming independently. Bruner 
(1957) suggested that goals create a state of perceptual readiness, increasing 
the potential for activation (i.e., accessibility) of goal relevant constructs. In 
most priming research and theorizing, the effect of priming on accessibility 
is a given (e.g., Loersch & Payne, 2011). Based on this, one would expect 
priming and goal relevance to influence accessibility independent of each 
other. The present findings challenge this view, by demonstrating that priming 
effects on accessibility can be moderated by goals. We suggest that in some 
situations construct accessibility is not merely dependent on the presentation 
of a stimulus in the sensory field, but is a function of both the presence of a 
stimulus and the goal relevance of the associated construct. 
In this paper, we make a distinction between priming effects on cognitive 
accessibility and on behavior. However, in the presented studies we did not 
measure accessibility directly, but used behavioral measures to infer cognitive 
accessibility. Do the current findings then provide evidence that the effect 
of priming on accessibility is moderated by goals, or is it the link between 
accessibility and behavior that is moderated? Even though we cannot com-
pletely rule out the latter possibility, especially the results from Study 6.1 
suggest otherwise. The accessibility measure in Study 6.2 is an overt, explicit 
measure, relying on awareness and reportability of the stimulus. One could 
argue that failing to recall a brand name does not exclude cognitive acces-
sibility on a more implicit level. However, the measure of accessibility in Study 
6.1 suggests that this is not the case. As attention is often seen as a requirement 
for controlled processing (Bargh, 1994), the allocation of attention focus is 
automatic (Bargh, 1982).
The different nature of the two measures of accessibility is also of value for 
the application of subliminal advertising. In previous research, the effects of 
subliminal advertising were always assessed by presenting several options, 
one of which was the primed brand. It could be, as the findings of Study 6.1 
suggest, that an increase in accessibility of the brand guides attention toward 
that brand, increasing the likelihood that the brand is being selected. In a 
situation in which the options are not directly presented, however, this process 
would not lead to increased choice. The results of Study 6.2 provide evidence 
that subliminal advertising might influence consumption, even when the 
primed brand is not given as an option directly. As noted, the free recall of 
brand names closely resembles the measurement of a consideration set. 
Results of Study 6.2 demonstrate that subliminally priming a brand increases 
the likelihood that this brand is considered for consumption. This finding 
adds to existing research in that it suggests that subliminal advertising might 
not only be effective in a direct choice situation, but also at an earlier stage, 
when contemplating the possible options (for example, when writing a 
shopping list). 
In conclusion, the current research demonstrates that subliminal priming of a 
brand name raises the accessibility of the brand if that brand was goal relevant. 
This expands our insight of priming more generally by underlining the role 
of motivational factors in subliminal priming. Moreover, it provides a viable 
mechanism for understanding subliminal advertising effects. In conclusion, 
it seems that only those things that resonate with our current goals can 
make enough of an impact to cause any mental activation.
 
Footnotes
1 In addition, habitual consumption of each the ten brands was measured on 7-point Likert 
scales. As habitual preference did not correlate with latencies on the dot-probe task, 
r(4560) = .013, p = .376 (analyzed on trial level), we did not include it in our design.
2 Including this participant yielded similar results. Thirst was still positively related to atten-
tion bias toward the prime, albeit not significantly, β = .14, t(1,66) = 1.15, p = .254.
3 Although free recall of brand names is not the same as a consideration set (as the brands that 
are considered by consumers in an actual choice situation can also be shaped by preferences, 
for example), recall is a strong determinant of the content of consideration sets (Nedungadi, 
1990).
4 This may relate to a distinction between accessibility and availability, where availability 
refers to whether or not a concept is actually stored in memory and accessibility is the like-
lihood that this concept is activated (Higgins, 1996). As availability is a necessary condition 
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for accessibility, a lack of availability of the brand “Nestea” might have obstructed any 
measure of accessibility. 
5 We also measured choice, after the measure of accessibility. A logistic regression with 
choice for the primed brand as a dependent variable yielded a significant effect of thirst, 
replicating previous work, in that people were more likely to choose the primed brand 
when they reported higher levels of thirst, B = 0.52, Wald(1,140) = 7.91, p = .005. For 
obvious reasons (i.e., the accessibility measure may serve as a prime itself), the theoretically 
assumed mediation of the effect of prime on brand choice by accessibility could not be 
analyzed. Like in Study 6.1, habitual consumption and evaluation of the brands was mea-
sured. Habitual preference did not predict whether the brand was mentioned, B = -0.07, 
Wald(1,138) = 0.15, p = .698. On evaluation, in line with the measure of choice, for 
thirsty people, the prime influenced the preference for 7Up relative to Nestea, t(1, 136) 
= 3.98, p < .001. If 7Up was primed, thirst was marginally significantly positively related 
to preference for 7Up over Nestea, β = .21, t(1, 136) = 1.73, p = .086. If Nestea was 
primed, thirst was negatively related to this preference, β = -.44, t(1, 136) = 3.99, p < .001.
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Overview of the empirical chapters
In earlier studies on subliminal advertising, the most pertinent question was 
whether subliminal advertising might affect consumer choice. Although 
some researchers found effects many others did not (for a review, see Theus, 
1994). Analyzing 33 studies on subliminal advertising in a meta-analysis, 
Trappey (1996) concluded that, if any effect existed, it was negligible. Still, 
as subliminal priming more generally yielded more reliable results, the 
phenomenon was not yet discarded. More recently subliminal advertising 
was described as a field in which we lack understanding (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, 
& Smith, 2005). As probably is the case in many other instances of scientific 
development, the answer to the controversy of subliminal advertising is not 
black or white. The question whether subliminal advertising is effective in 
changing consumer behavior does not require a simple yes or no. Instead, 
asking not whether, but when subliminal advertising affected consumer 
choice solved it.
Goal relevance was identified as a crucial requirement of subliminally influ-
encing brand choice. Karremans, Stroebe and Claus (2006) demonstrated 
that subliminally presenting a brand of soft drink affected choice among 
those who were thirsty, and, thus, the brand was highly relevant. Building 
upon this finding, in the first part of this dissertation, we focused on the 
question when subliminal ads might affect consumer behavior. 
In Chapter 2 we describe an important moderator, limiting subliminal 
advertising in many situations: Habits. More specifically, in a situation where 
participants could choose between two brands, subliminal presentation of a 
goal relevant brand was demonstrated effective when participants had no 
habitual preference. However, more importantly, would subliminal ads still 
affect behavior when either of the brands was consumed more often than 
the other? If the habitual brand is primed, subliminal presentation of the 
brand no longer affected brand choice. In fact, a ceiling effect was observed: 
if participants habitually preferred the primed brand to the alternative, they 
chose this brand regardless of whether it was primed. However, interestingly, 
this was not observed when the non-habitual brand was primed. In this case, 
priming the brand did increase choice for that (non-habitual) brand, if the 
brand was goal relevant. In short, subliminal advertising cannot add to habits, 
but it can compete with them.
In Chapter 3, we examined the role of the context in which subliminal ads 
were presented. More specifically, we primed a brand either in a positive 
movie clip or in a negative movie clip. Whereas we replicated previous findings 
when the brand was primed in a positive movie clip, we found opposite results 
when primed in a negative movie clip: priming the brand was related to a 
decrease in choice for that brand, if the brand was goal relevant. In contrast 
with previous studies, specifically in the negative movie condition, we 
observed evidence for mediation by evaluation, suggesting that the negative 
valence of the movie was transferred upon the brand through evaluative 
conditioning. Unfortunately, in study 3.3, we could not replicate these patterns 
for reasons, which we cannot fully explain. 
As the role of motivation on evaluative conditioning is unexplored, in Chapter 
4, we inspected this relation more closely. In fact, we found that goals moder-
ated the evaluative conditioning effect, such that effects were stronger if not 
only the brand was goal relevant, but also the emotional content of the valence. 
More specifically, the strongest effects were observed among thirsty people, 
when brands of mineral water were coupled with faces displaying disgust, 
compared to faces displaying fear, or non-thirst related brands. Thus, it seems 
that the effect of subliminal advertising is dependent on the context in which 
it is presented, showing the largest effect when, not only the brand is goal 
relevant, but also the valence of the context is.
As the ethical controversy on subliminal advertising is mainly focused on the 
threat to autonomy that subliminal advertising is believed to be, in Chapter 
5, we examined whether warning participants about the presence – but 
not the content – of subliminal ads would mitigate their effect. Indeed, if 
participants were warned before or after the subliminal presentation of a 
brand, effects were no longer observed. This suggests that this warning puts 
people in a state of vigilance in which the accessibility of the primed brand 
is disregarded when making a choice.
In Chapter 6, we proposed a possible mechanism of subliminal advertising. 
We examined the general assumption that subliminal priming influences 
behavior through accessibility, and how goal relevance interplays with priming 
a brand name in increasing its’ accessibility. In two studies, we demonstrated 
that the accessibility of a primed brand is a function of goal relevance. 
The working of subliminal advertising
The current dissertation identified a viable mechanism for subliminal 
advertising effects. Based on recent theorizing and our empirical findings, 
we propose that subliminally priming a goal relevant brand increases acces-
sibility of the brand, which might serve as a heuristic when making a choice. 
Not only does Chapter 6 directly demonstrate that subliminal advertising 
increases accessibility of a goal relevant brand, Chapter 2 also provides indirect 
evidence for this mechanism. In this chapter, we demonstrated that priming 
a habitual, chronically accessible brand is less effective. This suggests that 
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priming a brand is most effective if there is the potential to increase its’ 
accessibility. If accessibility is already high (as is the case with habitual 
brands), no effect is observed. This notion is in line with the existing literature 
on priming more generally. Priming is argued to increase accessibility of the 
primed construct, creating the potential to influence subsequent behavior 
(Higgins, 1996; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). 
However, there are also other possible explanations for the effect of stimulus 
presentation on behavior, which we will discuss in the following section.
Affect as a mechanism?
Subliminally presenting a stimulus might not only increase accessibility of 
the stimulus, but may also alter the affective value of the stimulus. In this 
section, we will discuss two affective accounts that might explain subliminal 
advertising effects, and compare them with the accessibility explanation 
provided in the previous section. In both accounts, we discuss in what way 
subliminal advertising might influence evaluation of the primed brand, and 
how this evaluation subsequently affects choice.
Subliminal advertising might influence brand evaluation through mere 
exposure. The mere exposure effect is described as the increase of evaluation 
of a stimulus by merely exposing participants to it (Zajonc, 1968). For example, 
in a prototypical mere exposure experiment, unfamiliar Chinese ideographs 
that were presented for ten times were evaluated more positively than Chinese 
ideographs that were presented zero or five times. Moreover, this mere expo-
sure effect has been demonstrated to occur even when the stimuli have been 
presented subliminally (Bornstein, Leone, & Galley, 1987). As such, sublimi-
nally presenting a brand name might increase positive valence through mere 
exposure as well. If the primed brand is associated with higher levels of positive 
valence, it is plausible that it is more likely to be chosen. However, even as 
subliminal advertising resembles mere exposure procedures, we argue that 
mere exposure is not the driving mechanism. The mere exposure effect is 
strongest when unfamiliar, novel stimuli are compared. Although the effect 
does not disappear completely, mere exposure effects are less strong for 
familiar stimuli (Ye & van Raaij, 1997) – in fact, the mere exposure effect is 
often explained through an increase in familiarity causing a more positive 
evaluation (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994). This is incongruent with our 
current knowledge of subliminal advertising, as subliminal advertising is 
most effective when a brand is associated with an active goal, and, thus, has 
to be familiar to some extent. Moreover, in our experiments, we rarely observe 
subliminal advertising to affect evaluations of the primed brand. Thus, we 
believe a mere exposure explanation of subliminal advertising is unlikely.
Subliminal advertising might also influence brand evaluation through 
evaluative conditioning. Evaluative conditioning is defined as a change in 
evaluation of a conditioned stimulus by repeatedly pairing it with an affective 
stimulus (De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). Therefore, evaluative 
conditioning cannot explain subliminal advertising effects in neutral settings. 
However, if subliminal ads are presented in an evaluative context, brand choice 
might be influenced by a change in brand evaluation. In fact, in Chapter 3, 
we describe such a situation. Indeed, if a goal relevant brand is presented in a 
negative context, the negativity transfers to the brand, decreasing brand choice. 
Based on such considerations, we find evaluative conditioning as a default 
mechanism unlikely, however, in affectively relevant situations evaluative 
conditioning might occur.
Motivational versus non-motivation priming
Although the results presented in the current dissertation suggest accessi-
bility as the mechanism driving subliminal advertising effects, there are still 
different possible mechanisms with different consequences. The most notable 
distinction is whether priming has motivational or non-motivational effects. 
Non-motivational theories describe that there is a direct link between percep-
tion and behavior (e.g., ideo-motor theory; James, 1890). In these theories, 
the mental representation of an action is directly tied to the execution of the 
action; in other words, if such a mental representation is activated, the asso-
ciated behavior is more likely to be performed. For example, priming the 
concept of elderly activates the mental representation of ‘slow’, causing people 
to walk more slowly (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). In the case of sublimi-
nal advertising, the perception of a particular brand of beverage activates the 
mental representation of the beverage, making actually choosing the beverage 
more likely. On the other hand, motivational theories describe that a prime 
might not only activate semantic concepts related to the prime, but also a 
goal that is associated with the prime. For example, priming words related 
to ‘achievement’ might not just activate the achievement related cognition, 
but might also activate the goal to achieve. Related to subliminal advertising, 
priming the brand might not only make the brand itself accessible, but also 
the goal to drink the brand.
Not only is it theoretically interesting to distinguish whether a goal or a 
construct is primed, there are also different consequences of construct versus 
goal priming (for an overview, see Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). 
For example, whereas construct activation decreases with the time passed 
since activation, goal activation only diminishes if the goal is achieved (Marsh, 
Hicks, & Bink, 1998) or a conflicting goal is activated (Shah, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2002). Is the mechanism driving subliminal advertising effects 
on consumer choice motivational or non-motivational? It is hard to imagine 
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that merely priming a brand name activates a goal – just as priming the 
word ‘lamp’ would not in itself activate the goal to turn on the lights, prim-
ing a brand name would not activate the goal to buy the brand. However, 
subliminal advertising affects choice only if the brand is associated with an 
active goal. As a result, the brand becomes accessible as a means to that goal. 
The question remains whether the effects of priming a means to an active 
goal resemble effects caused by goal priming or semantic priming. Future 
research could delve into this issue, applying the seven principles of goal 
activation (as described in Förster et al., 2007) to distinguish between these 
two mechanisms.
A note on “subliminal”
Not only has the effect of subliminally presented stimuli often been disputed, 
also the term “subliminal” is controversial. When is a stimulus presented below 
the subjective threshold of awareness? There are two distinctive definitions. 
The absolute threshold is defined as the length or intensity of exposure at 
which a stimulus is correctly identified 50% of the time. The recognition 
threshold is defined as the length or intensity of exposure on which a stimulus 
is correctly reported (Hawkins, 1970). In most of our studies, we measured 
both absolute and recognition thresholds for all participants, after the experi-
ment. In general, we found no evidence for awareness. When participants 
were asked to choose between two brands which one was presented, the 
mean correct answers was 50%. However, as an absolute threshold was not 
measured for participants individually, but was established on a group level, 
we cannot be certain that the subliminal presentation of the brands remained 
under the absolute threshold for all of our participants. More importantly, 
none of our participants were able to consciously report the subliminal primes 
(for an exception, see Study 3.2, where some participants were excluded as 
they could report the prime), demonstrating that the subliminal ads were 
presented below the recognition threshold. In conclusion, although we cannot 
rule out awareness of the stimuli in our participants in the strictest sense, the 
fact that participants were never able to consciously report the stimuli is, in 
our view, sufficient to speak of subliminal advertising. 
Can subliminal advertising be applied? 
– The limits of subliminal advertising
An interesting question is whether subliminal advertising can be applied 
successfully as a marketing technique. The controversy surrounding the topic 
in the last half of the twentieth century was in a large part concerned with 
this question. How do the findings presented in this dissertation add to this 
discussion? Is subliminal advertising a viable advertising technique? The 
current studies show foremost that subliminal advertising can affect consumer 
behavior if certain boundary conditions are met. In the present dissertation, 
we have discussed four such conditions, but this list is obviously not complete. 
How are the boundaries presented in the current dissertation restricting the 
feasibility of subliminal advertising? Are there other boundary conditions? 
Based on the findings presented in this dissertation, we can distinguish four 
different types of limitations, based on a) the type of brand, b) the type of 
situation, c) the type of choice, and d) the type of person.
The type of brand
In this dissertation, two limitations are provided that limit the type of brand 
that can be successfully advertised with subliminal primes: goal relevance of 
the product and habitual consumption of the product. If a brand needs to be 
goal relevant, not only does there have to be an active goal, but the presented 
brand should also be associated with the goal – specifically, as a means to 
reach that goal. This would suggest that subliminally priming a novel brand 
(i.e., a brand without any existing associations) would not be effective. On the 
other hand, the results from Chapter 2 also suggest that priming an overly 
famous brand does not affect consumer behavior, as habitually consumed 
brands benefit less from subliminal ads. Thus, subliminal advertising seems to 
merit especially those brands that are well known (and, more importantly, 
strongly related to the goal), but are not the first to come to mind. 
The type of situation
Next, the type of situations in which subliminal ads can be effectively applied 
is limited. First and foremost, subliminal advertising is most effective if there 
is a single goal that can generally be expected to be active in that situation. 
Such situations are common: In a restaurant, for example, people are likely 
to have the goal to eat, so subliminally priming one of the possible food 
options may be effective. However, in other situations this might not be that 
obvious. Following Vicary’s famous example, in a movie theatre, people are 
very likely to have the goal to buy snacks and drinks, but it is questionable 
whether they have this goal active during the movie or during the break. 
Another important aspect of the situation is its context. As Study 3.2 in 
Chapter 3 indicates, subliminal priming in a negative context decreases 
consumption of the primed brand. Therefore, effective subliminal advertising 
is limited to positive or neutral contexts. 
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The type of choice
The type of choice might also influence the impact of subliminal ads. In all 
chapters of this dissertation, a choice was made between two brands that 
were pretested to be equal in liking and their relation to the goal. If the 
available options have very large differences in purpose – such as a drink to 
grant more energy versus one to quench thirst (see Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 
2002) – priming might not affect choice behavior, as goal relevance is a 
much stronger predictor of behavior. The same might hold for pre-existing 
attitudes. If one of the drinks is liked much more than the other, subliminal 
advertising of the least liked drink is unlikely to have any effect. Furthermore, 
as Chapter 5 describes that vigilant people are less susceptible to subliminal 
influence, the effect might also be restricted to choices that people make 
relatively impulsively. In contrast, choices that are generally made with more 
deliberation (e.g., buying a very expensive product) might be less influenced 
by subliminal ads.
The type of person
Another factor that might affect subliminal influences is personality. For 
example, people in a negative mood might be less likely to be influenced. As 
described in Chapter 5, a negative mood is associated with higher vigilance, 
which might lead to a weaker link between the accessibility of the primed 
brand and choice. Also, more chronic aspects of the person might be of 
importance. For example, people with a high Need for Cognition might be 
influenced to a greater degree, as they are more susceptible to subliminal 
priming in general (Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, Horcajo, & Strathman, 2008). 
On the other hand, neuroticism might be negatively related with the strength 
of subliminal influence, as people high in neuroticism are chronically less 
likely to have a heuristic processing style (e.g., Hilbig, 2008). As personality 
is an understudied phenomenon in (subliminal) priming research, this is a 
particularly interesting topic for future research.
Duration of the effect
Another critical limitation is the duration of subliminal advertising effects. 
If the effect on consumer choice would only last a few moments, the impact 
of subliminal ads on actual consumer behavior would be negligible. The 
duration of priming effects is a matter of dispute. In semantic priming research, 
the effect of a prime on reaction times to a congruent versus an incongruent 
response deteriorates as a function of the delay between prime and target 
within 100 milliseconds (Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996). However, 
there are factors that can increase the duration of priming effects from a 
mere second to minutes, hours, or even to months or years (e.g., Althaus & 
Kim, 2006). First, the duration of priming effects is predicted by presentation 
frequency of the prime (Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985). In their study, 
Higgins and colleagues primed a concept frequently or more recently 
(but just once). After a 15 second delay, the more recent prime exerted a 
stronger influence. However after a 120 second delay, the more frequent 
prime influenced judgments more strongly. In our experiments, participants 
were generally exposed to 20 to 25 primes, which was, as our results demon-
strate, frequent enough to overcome the delay of a few minutes in between 
the priming manipulation and the measure of choice. Another factor that might 
affect the duration of the effect is whether the effect of subliminally priming 
a goal relevant brand resemble goal priming effects. As described above, goal 
priming lasts until the goal is fulfilled or is inhibited by a conflicting goal. If 
it simply activates a means to a more general goal, the effect will most likely 
last only a few minutes. However, if subliminal advertising of a goal relevant 
brand generates an effect with goal-like properties, the duration of effect 
would be sufficient to significantly influence consumer behavior.
In conclusion, although there are several boundary conditions to the effect 
of subliminal ads, and probably many more have to be discovered, subliminal 
advertising has shown throughout this dissertation to exert a reliable influence 
on choice behavior. Like with any persuasion attempt, it is of importance 
which product is promoted, in which situation, to what person, and at what 
moment. Meeting these boundary conditions is not impossible, and subliminal 
advertising has thus shown to be a feasible marketing technique. 
Is subliminal advertising ethical?
As the current results suggest that subliminally priming a brand can affect 
consumer behavior, a note on the ethical aspect is necessary. Most and foremost, 
the effect of a subliminally presented stimulus threatens people’s sense of au-
tonomy. People believe it is impossible to regulate the influence of something 
that cannot be seen, and stays hidden in our unconscious. Subliminal adver-
tising is testament to the fact that much of our behavior is driven by uncon-
scious influences, and provides another person with the tools to operate these 
influences. So, is it ethical? Should there be stricter legislation against the 
use of subliminal ads? Their use is prohibited by law in Great-Britain and 
Australia; in the U.S. it is not illegal, but the National Broadcasting Association 
states to withdraw any broadcaster’s license if subliminal ads are used. This 
means that television broadcasters are restricted in their use, but other media 
are free to make use of subliminal ads (e.g., movie theatres). As far as we know, 
other countries have no legislation against subliminal advertising. 
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An interesting perspective might be to ask to what extent subliminal adver-
tising differs from more conventional, less controversial, types of advertising. 
A lot of persuasion techniques rely on the unconscious to be effective, 
which leads consumers to be reactant to such hidden persuaders (Brehm, 
1966). In some cases, out of ethical considerations, audiences are warned of 
the presence of these techniques (e.g., product placement; Wenner, 2004). 
Such a disclaimer provides people with the feeling that they can pay attention, 
notice the source of persuasion, and be impervious to its influence. With 
subliminal ads, this does not comfort the consumers, as subliminal messages 
are by definition undetectable. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, people 
are no longer influenced by subliminal ads, if such a warning is presented. 
The catch, however, is that people lack awareness of this finding: Participants 
in these studies generally did not feel in control, as almost 70% indicated 
that the brand they chose was the primed brand (when in fact only 50% 
chose the primed brand). So, whereas a disclaimer eliminates the subliminal 
influence, people still feel threatened in their sense of autonomy. In summary, 
whereas subliminal advertising might not be the threat to autonomy that it 
is generally believed, this belief itself makes it a hard sell. Even if legislators 
do not officially prohibit subliminal ads, the negative reputation of subliminal 
advertising in public opinion might ruin a brand or marketing company 
associating itself with it.
Implications
The current work has implications for two major fields of study: Social 
cognitive priming research and advertising research. In the next section we 
will describe how our findings contribute to these fields.
Priming research
Goal relevance. It has been a common assumption in psychological literature 
that subliminal priming effects are driven by accessibility of the primed 
construct (Higgins, 1996). This consequence of priming has often been de-
scribed as part of the definition of priming, and is therefore often concep-
tualized as unconditional. The current dissertation parts with that idea, 
demonstrating that goal relevance is an important requirement for subliminal 
priming to occur. This corroborates with two recent developments in the 
theoretical understanding of priming effects. First, Wheeler and colleagues 
(Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009; Wheeler et al., 2007) have proposed the active-
self account of priming. In this theory, they state that a person will only be 
influenced by priming if the prime is, in some way, incorporated in the self. 
Goal relevance of the subliminally primed brand could strengthen the link 
between the prime and the self, facilitating priming effects. Second, Dehaene 
and colleagues (2006) propose that priming effects are dependent on two 
factors: bottom-up strength of the stimulus and top-down attention. As 
such, they differentiate four quadrants of priming effects. If stimulus strength 
is high (e.g., the prime is presented supraliminally), attention governs awareness 
of the stimulus. In both quadrants, priming has an effect, but, only when both 
stimulus strength and attention are high, the participant is aware of the prime. 
However, if stimulus strength is low (e.g., the prime is presented subliminally), 
attention is proposed to be necessary for the prime to affect the participant at 
all. The current findings fit with this model: It could be that goal relevance 
of the brand functions as a top-down mechanism increasing attention to the 
prime.
Misattribution. The current dissertation provides further insight in the working 
of subliminal advertising, providing evidence for a misattribution explanation 
of priming effects. Loersch and Payne (2011) have proposed that primes 
influence behavior because accessibility caused by the primed is misattributed 
to an internal cause, instead of to the prime. They demonstrated that, if this 
misattribution is prevented, priming effects do not occur (Loersch & Payne, 
2012). This fits well with observations in the current dissertation. In Chapter 
4, it is demonstrated that participants who are warned of the presence of 
subliminal ads are no longer influenced. It could be argued that these 
participants no longer attribute the increased accessibility of the primed brand 
to their own internal thoughts, and are able to choose on different grounds. 
As it is demonstrated in Study 5.2 that a warning effectively eliminates 
subliminal priming effects if presented both before and after the warning, 
this chapter adds to the findings of Loersch and Payne, in that it excludes a 
perceptual explanation (i.e., poorer encoding of the primes), and, thus, provides 
stronger evidence for a misattribution account. 
Controversy. Recently, priming has become a controversial topic: The replica-
bility and reliability of priming effects was doubted and priming as a field of 
study was openly discredited (Yong, 2012). The current dissertation might 
have important implications for this discussion. It demonstrates foremost 
that subliminal priming (of a brand) is only a reliable predictor of behavior 
if certain requirements are met. It could be that this is the case for other 
types of priming as well. For example, in a paper reporting the failure to 
replicate Bargh and colleagues’ study (in which participants walked slower 
after being primed with the concept of elderly), Doyen, Klein, Pichon, and 
Cleeremans (2012) demonstrated not only that the simple priming effect 
did not replicate, but that it depended on experimenters’ awareness of the 
hypothesis emphasizing the priming effect. This relates to the model proposed 
137136
General Discussionchapter 7
by Dehaene and colleagues (2006) in which top-down modulation of weak 
bottom-up stimulation is necessary to cause priming to affect behavior. As 
described above, the current dissertation provides evidence along these 
lines, demonstrating goal relevance to be crucial in subliminal advertising. 
We suggest that priming research should not necessarily focus on whether 
priming can affect behavior, but under what conditions.
Advertising research
A central message of the dissertation is that subliminal advertising is limited 
by several factors. Can these findings be generalized to other types of adver-
tising? In the next section, we will discuss how goal relevance, habits, and 
context could influence different forms of advertising. 
How would the relevance of a product in other types of advertisement to a 
viewer’s goal be related to advertising effectiveness? First, in the relevance-
accessibility model of advertising effectiveness, motivation is related to 
deliberation about the ad (Baker & Lutz, 2000). Whereas in a irrelevant 
selection liking of the ad and the product is the best predictor of choice, in 
a selection process that is goal relevant, people’s choices are best predicted 
by accessible goal relevant information related to the product. Thus, similarly 
to the current findings, accessibility of goal relevant information is related 
to choice only if a goal is active. Second, goals automatically guide attention 
(Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, Van Damme, & Crombez, 2010) toward goal 
relevant stimuli. Hence, an advertisement promoting a goal relevant product 
should automatically grab attention, making it more likely to influence behav-
ior. Initial evidence for this to occur in subliminal advertising is provided in 
Study 6.1, where we show that automatic, pre-conscious, attention toward 
a primed (i.e., advertised) brand is predicted by the strength of a relevant goal. 
Third, for less obtrusive forms of advertising, priming effects similar to the 
one described in this dissertation could occur. For example, the effectiveness 
of product placement – the (supraliminal) embedding of products within a 
television program – could greatly depend on goal relevance of the presented 
product. However, there is little research examining the relation between goals 
and advertising strength, making this an interesting topic for future research. 
In general, habits are hard to break (Jager, 2003; Schneider & Shoenberg, 1999; 
Verplanken & Wood, 2006). A simple informational message is not enough 
to change peoples’ habitual behavior and intentions are a poor predictor of 
behavior when they are competing with habits (Verplanken & Wood, 2006). A 
way to change habits are point-of-choice prompts (i.e., form implementation 
intentions; Lewis & Eves, 2012) in which the wanted behavior is encouraged 
by a reminder just before the moment of decision-making. This relates to re-
sults of Study 2.1, as the subliminal (counter-habitual) messages were presented 
just before the measure of choice. It could thus well be that advertising can 
effectively compete with habits, but that the ad needs to be temporally 
proximal to the moment of choice. 
It has been demonstrated that the context in which an ad is presented can 
influence its effectiveness. For example, if an ad contains humor, the advertised 
brand is associated with positivity, and, as a result, is more likely to be chosen 
(Strick, Holland, van Baaren, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 2013). Context 
might play an even more prominent role in the effect of product placement. 
As this form of advertising is, like subliminal advertising, embedded in the 
television program itself, the role of context could be similar as described in the 
current dissertation, such that embedding a product in a negative context 
may have negative effects. This is especially relevant as products are embedded 
in a negative context (28%) at least as often as in a positive (26%), neutral 
(18%) or mixed (28%) context (Galician & Bourdeau, 2004). It would thus be 
interesting to examine whether the results presented in the current dissertation 
also replicate to product placement.
In conclusion, the current dissertation generates a set of interesting questions 
for future research not only within subliminal advertising, but also in advertis-
ing more generally. It is interesting how advertising that targets conscious 
processes (e.g., through the formation of intentions) differs from advertising 
that targets unconscious processes (e.g., through accessibility and liking) in 
this regard. We suggest that the findings presented in this dissertation are 
likely to generalize especially in the latter field.
Other Implications
The current dissertation also has implications for consumer behavior. It has 
been demonstrated that food deprived shoppers buy more food than those 
who had recently eaten (Nederkoorn, Guerrieri, Havermans, Roefs, & Jansen, 
2009; Nisbett & Kanouse, 1969). Hunger can also cause consumers to buy 
different products: For example, recently, it has been demonstrated that hungry 
consumers not only buy more food, but also buy products with more calories 
(Tal & Wansink, 2013). The findings presented in this dissertation suggest 
that hunger can also increase the odds of an unconsciously processed adver-
tisement to influence choice. For example, a hungry consumer might be 
more likely to be swayed by the promotion of an expensive brand. 
As described in this dissertation, subliminal priming – at the right moment 
– might be a feasible technique to change existing bad habits. For example, if 
someone wants to refrain from snacking in the afternoon break, a program 
installed on the computer could flash healthy alternatives a few minutes before 
the break starts. In line with this, recently, it has been demonstrated that 
people can change their unhealthy eating behavior by linking a stop signal 
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to (i.e., refraining from reacting to) palatable food stimuli, but only if people 
were hungry at the time of training (Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2013). This 
dissertation suggests that such an effortful training might not even be necessary: 
A few subliminal cues just before the moment of choice might be sufficient 
to change habitual unhealthy behavior. However, it must be noted that the 
choices presented in this dissertation were always within product between 
brand choices. Future research could examine whether subliminal advertising 
might also influence choices between, for example, healthy and unhealthy 
food.
Conclusion
Subliminal advertising has been a controversial topic for the several decades. 
This dissertation demonstrates not only that subliminal advertising can in-
fluence consumer behavior, but, more importantly, under which conditions. 
The influence of subliminally presented brand names on brand choice is 
dependent on goal relevance of the brand, consumers’ habits, the presentation 
context, and awareness of the influence. As such, the current dissertation has 
constructively disentangled the controversy, and has provided a strong basis 
for future research on this topic. To conclude, let us go back to the example 
we started with: Suppose you are walking through a supermarket browsing for 
some products. It is not very likely that your choices are being influenced 
by subliminal advertisements. As far as we know, advertisers tend to prefer 
more traditional, less controversial advertising strategies. However, it is not 
impossible that subliminal messages could have influenced your decisions, 
albeit in a limited way. Even though, if you would go shopping for some fruit 
and a toothbrush, you would not return with a toaster and some magazines, 
you might have purchased the red toothbrush instead of the blue and oranges 
instead of apples for no reason that you can think of.
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Het sturen van consumentengedrag op een manier die door de consument niet 
opgemerkt kan worden is de droom van menig reclamemaker en tegelijkertijd 
de angst van elke consument. In de jaren 50 werd de wereld opgeschrikt 
door de claim van James Vicary dat deze droom werkelijkheid zou kunnen 
zijn. James Vicary claimde dat de verkoop van popcorn en Coca Cola in een 
bioscoop substantieel was gestegen doordat hij tijdens de film voor een frac-
tie van een seconde de woorden “Eat Popcorn” en “ Drink Coke” flitste. 
Bezoekers van de film hadden niet door wat hen overkwam, maar waren in 
de pauze wel vaker geneigd om een bak popcorn of een flesje cola aan te 
schaffen. James Vicary was in een klap beroemd, en subliminal advertising – 
zoals de techniek genoemd werd – was een van de grootste en ogenschijnlijk 
gevaarlijkste ontdekkingen in het koude-oorlog tijdperk.
James Vicary kon echter geen enkel wetenschappelijk bewijs leveren voor 
zijn claim. Toen hem gevraagd werd om zijn experiment te herhalen, gaf hij, 
3 jaar na zijn ontdekking, toe dat hij zijn experiment had verzonnen. Ook 
andere onderzoekers konden zijn resultaten niet repliceren. Toen bijvoorbeeld 
Del Hawkins (1970) de woorden “Coke” of “ Drink Coke” flitsten werd er 
niet vaker voor cola gekozen. Wel gaven deelnemers aan meer dorst te hebben. 
De uiteindelijke conclusie na tientallen jaren van onderzoek was dat het 
sturen van keuzes door subliminale boodschappen niet mogelijk is. Niks aan 
de hand dus? Was alle ophef voor niets?
Recent wisten Karremans, Stroebe en Claus (2006) een ander, genuanceerder, 
verhaal te vertellen. In plaats van zich enkel en alleen op de vraag te focussen 
of subliminale reclame gedrag kon beïnvloeden, richtten zij zich op de vraag 
wanneer dit het geval zou kunnen zijn. In andere woorden, zijn er bepaalde 
omstandigheden waaronder subliminale reclames invloed kunnen hebben 
op consumentenkeuzes? Zij lieten zien dat het flitsen van een merknaam 
wel degelijk effect kan hebben, mits de merknaam doelrelevant is. Om dit 
te onderzoeken hadden zij bij deelnemers het doel om hun dorst te lessen 
actief gemaakt door hen op een zeer zout dropje te laten zuigen. Daarna 
werd de merknaam Lipton Ice subliminaal aangeboden – dus zonder dat 
mensen zich ervan bewust werden. Dit merk werd gekozen omdat dit door 
veel mensen gezien werd als een uitstekend middel om dorst te lessen. 
Inderdaad bleek dat deelnemers die deze merknaam subliminaal was aange-
boden eerder voor dit drankje kozen, maar alleen als het doel om dorst te 
lessen was geactiveerd. In een ander onderzoek (Bermeitinger et al., 2009) 
werden deelnemers tijdens het spelen van een computerspelletje sublimi-
naal blootgesteld aan een logo van energiepillen. In een korte pauze in het 
experiment konden deelnemers hun energie aanvullen door energiepillen te 
eten. Voor hen op tafel stonden twee bakjes; een met het logo dat subliminaal 
was geflitst en een met een ander logo. Alleen die deelnemers die het doel 
hadden om zich te concentreren en aangaven moe te zijn, consumeerden 
meer energiepillen uit het bakje met het logo dat subliminaal verstopt zat in 
een computerspel. Deze onderzoeken laten dus zien dat enkel mensen voor 
wie het product doelrelevant is, beïnvloed worden door subliminale reclame.
Na een controverse van meer dan 50 jaar was er dus, door een meer theorie-
gedreven houding aan te nemen, initieel bewijs gevonden met betrekking 
tot de effectiviteit van subliminale reclame. Een volgende stap is gezet in dit 
proefschrift: Wat zijn de factoren die de werking van subliminale reclame 
beïnvloeden? En, welke factoren beperken subliminale reclame? In dit proef-
schrift heb ik in 5 hoofdstukken een aantal van deze factoren onderzocht, 
zoals gewoontes, context en waarschuwingen.
Wat is subliminaal?
Het woord subliminaal komt uit het Latijn en betekent “onder de drempel” 
(sub limen). Binnen het menselijk perceptuele systeem worden twee drempels 
onderscheiden: een objectieve en een subjectieve waarnemingsdrempel. De 
objectieve waarnemingsdrempel wordt bepaald door het fysieke systeem. 
Mensen kunnen bijvoorbeeld objecten die zo klein zijn als een atoom niet 
zien, doordat ons oog een beperkte resolutie heeft. De subjectieve drempel 
is echter beperkt door ons bewustzijn. Aangezien bewuste verwerking van 
waarnemingen beperkt is worden de meeste indrukken die ons zintuiglijke 
systeem binnenkomen (en dus de objectieve drempel overschrijden) onbewust 
verwerkt. Als een indruk niet genoeg aandacht krijgt of te weinig intensiteit 
heeft, dan wordt deze onbewust verwerkt en overschrijdt deze stimulus dus 
niet de subjectieve waarnemingsdrempel. Subliminaal aanbieden betekent 
dus dat een stimulus zo wordt gepresenteerd dat deze niet de subjectieve 
drempel overschrijdt.
In de experimenten die in dit proefschrift zijn besproken wordt dit telkens 
gedaan door een merknaam ongeveer 17 ms aan te bieden. Om bewuste 
waarneming nog moeilijker te maken, werd voor en na de merknaam een 
reeks met willekeurige letters aangeboden. Aan het eind van elk experiment 
werd getest of er sprake was van bewuste waarneming (en dus van subliminale 
aanbieding) door te vragen of proefpersonen bewust waren van de reclame. 
Ook werden deelnemers soms gevraagd om nog een keer goed te kijken of 
ze in een aantal nieuwe presentaties een merknaam konden identificeren. 
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reclame een positief effect heeft als het in een positief filmfragment wordt 
aangeboden, maar een negatief effect heeft als het in een negatief fragment 
wordt aangeboden. Deze bevinding werd echter niet gerepliceerd in Studie 
3, wat interpretatie moeilijk maakt. Kortom, subliminale reclame kan werken 
in een natuurlijke, complexe reclameomgeving zoals een film, maar het is 
nog de vraag of de inhoud van de film invloed heeft.
Doelrelevantie in evaluatief conditioneren
Nadat in Hoofdstuk 3 is aangetoond dat het aanbieden van een merknaam 
in een negatieve context de evaluatie van het merk sterker negatief beïn-
vloed als het merk doelrelevant was, heb ik in Hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht of 
een doelrelevante conditioneringsprocedure sterkere effecten heeft dan een 
irrelevante procedure. Proefpersonen werden onbekende drankjes getoond, 
gecombineerd met doelrelevante geladen plaatjes (walgende gezichten) of 
irrelevante geladen plaatjes (angstige gezichten). Een relevante relatie tussen 
de stimuli (drankjes en walging bijvoorbeeld) leverde enkel sterkere condi-
tioneringseffecten op als de stimuli ook persoonlijk doelrelevant waren. 
Met andere woorden, alleen door dorstige proefpersonen werd het drankje 
dat gecombineerd was met walging negatiever beoordeeld dan het drankje 
dat gecombineerd was met angst. Evaluatief conditioneren is dus afhankelijk 
van de relatie tussen de neutrale en geladen stimulus, maar alleen als deze 
relatie betekenisvol is voor de persoon in kwestie.
Kunnen we ons beschermen? Het effect van een 
waarschuwing
Subliminale reclame is een controversieel onderwerp omdat mensen over 
het algemeen niet houden van het idee dat hun gedrag automatisch kan 
worden gestuurd, zonder dat ze daar zelf een stokje voor kunnen steken. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 heb ik onderzocht of mensen in staat zijn om zich tegen 
subliminale reclame te beschermen? Het is moeilijk voor te stellen: als je 
niet weet door welke reclame je wordt beïnvloed, als je zelfs niet weet dat je 
wordt beïnvloed, hoe kan je je dan beschermen tegen deze reclame? In dit 
hoofdstuk werden proefpersonen ingelicht over de aanwezigheid van subli-
minale reclames, en werd ze daarnaast de instructie gegeven om hun keuze 
hierdoor niet te laten beïnvloeden. Ondanks het feit dat proefpersonen niet 
wisten welk merk werd aangeboden, verdween toch het effect van subliminale 
reclame bij proefpersonen die gewaarschuwd waren. Dit (uitblijven van 
een) effect trad niet alleen op als proefpersonen vóór de subliminale reclame 
werden ingelicht, maar ook als ze erná werden ingelicht. Het effect van een 
waarschuwing treedt dus niet op tijdens het aanbieden van de reclame, maar 
op het keuzemoment. Gewaarschuwde proefpersonen namen waarschijnlijk 
Overzicht van de bevindingen
De rol van gewoontes
Gewoontes hebben een belangrijke invloed op ons gedrag. Eerder uitgevoerd 
gedrag is de beste voorspeller van huidig gedrag (Triandis, 1979). Gewoontes 
beïnvloeden gedrag vaak op een automatische manier, zonder dat mensen zich 
bewust ervan zijn. Hoe beïnvloeden gewoontes het effect van subliminale 
reclame? In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht ik hoe het effect van subliminale reclame 
voor een merk (Lipton Ice) wordt beïnvloed door de gewoonte om dit merk 
(in plaats van een ander merk; Spa Rood) te kiezen. Als er geen gewoonte-
voorkeur was voor een van beide merken, repliceerden we eerdere bevin-
dingen: het subliminaal aanbieden van een merknaam verhoogt het aantal 
keuzes voor dit merk, mits het merk doelrelevant is. Dit effect werd niet 
gevonden als proefpersonen een sterke gewoonte-voorkeur voor het geflitste 
merk rapporteerden. In dat geval kozen de meeste mensen al voor het merk, 
en kon subliminale reclame hier niets aan toevoegen. Interessant genoeg 
werd het effect echter wel gerepliceerd als proefpersonen een gewoonte-
voorkeur hadden voor het niet-geflitste merk. Dus voor dorstige mensen 
gold dat zelfs als zij aangeven in het verleden vaker een ander merk te kiezen, 
ze toch voor het geflitste merk gingen. Kortom, subliminale reclame kan 
niets bijdragen aan gewoontegedrag, maar kan er wel de competitie mee 
aangaan.
De rol van context
Een tweede belangrijke factor die het succes van subliminale reclame kan 
beïnvloeden is de aanwezigheid van context. In psychologische experimenten 
is het vaak van belang om zo weinig mogelijk context te hebben om de 
invloeden van buitenaf te minimaliseren. Echter, reclame komt zelden in een 
contextloze omgeving voor. In Hoofdstuk 3 heb ik onderzocht of subliminale 
reclame werkt in een afleidende en complexe context, zoals een film. In de 
eerste studie in dit hoofdstuk liet ik zien dat subliminale reclame ook werk-
zaam is als het in een film wordt aangeboden, mits de reclame doelrelevant is. 
Context is echter niet alleen afleidend, evenzo heeft het een bepaalde inhoud 
die het effect van subliminale reclame zou kunnen beïnvloeden. Maakt het 
bijvoorbeeld uit of subliminale reclame in een positief of een negatief film-
fragment wordt aangeboden? Door het herhaaldelijk aanbieden van een 
neutraal product in combinatie met positief of negatief geladen film kan de 
evaluatie van dit product verschuiven in de richting van de evaluatie van 
de geladen stimulus. In Studie 2 en 3 heb ik onderzocht of een positieve of 
negatieve film verschillende effecten van subliminale reclame teweeg kan 
brengen. Resultaten in Studie 2 laten zien dat doelrelevante subliminale 
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hun keuze op een andere, voorzichtigere manier, waardoor ze minder werden 
beïnvloed door de subliminale boodschappen. Dit laat zien dat het mogelijk 
is om je te beschermen tegen subliminale reclames. Het is dan wel belangrijk 
om op een voorzichtige manier je keuzes te maken, wat waarschijnlijk niet 
altijd mogelijk is.
Toegankelijkheid als onderliggend proces
Wat is het onderliggende proces van subliminale reclame? Er wordt vaak 
verondersteld dat het aanbieden van een merknaam de cognitieve toeganke-
lijkheid verhoogt van die merknaam. Deze verhoogde toegankelijkheid 
maakt het waarschijnlijker dat geassocieerd gedrag (zoals keuzegedrag) wordt 
uitgevoerd (Loersch & Payne, 2011). Aangezien het effect van subliminale 
reclames afhankelijk is van de doelrelevantie van het merk, is het de vraag of 
de toegankelijkheid van een geflitst merk ook beïnvloed wordt door doel-
relevantie. Dit heb ik in Hoofdstuk 6 op twee manieren onderzocht. In de 
eerste studie werd de attentiebias ten opzichte van een geflitst merk gemeten. 
Er kwamen telkens kort twee merknamen aan weerszijden van het scherm 
in beeld, waar een van was geflitst. Deze merknamen verdwenen en werden 
gevolgd door een stip links of rechts in beeld. Deelnemers moesten aangeven 
of de stip links of rechts in beeld was gekomen. Proefpersonen reageerden 
sneller als de stip verscheen op de plek waar zojuist een geflitst merk was 
aangeboden, maar alleen als het merk doelrelevant was. Dit geeft aan dat 
proefpersonen hun onbewuste aandacht op die plek gericht hadden, wat 
een indicatie is voor toegankelijkheid van het merk. In een tweede studie 
onderzocht ik toegankelijkheid op een directere manier. Toegankelijkheid is 
gerelateerd aan het gemak waarmee een merk in je op komt. Proefpersonen 
werden daarom gevraagd om tien merken op te noemen, nadat er één 
merknaam subliminaal was aangeboden. Niet alleen het percentage van 
proefpersonen is een indicatie van toegankelijkheid, maar ook de rangorde van 
het merk ten opzichte van andere merken. Een merk dat als tweede genoemd 
wordt, is dus toegankelijker dan een merk dat als zevende genoemd wordt. 
In lijn met de verwachting noemden dorstige proefpersonen het geflitste merk 
vaker en eerder in hun opsomming dan niet dorstige proefpersonen. Deze 
twee studies laten zien dat toegankelijkheid van een geflitst merk afhankelijk 
is van doelrelevantie van het merk en dat dit waarschijnlijk het onderliggende 
proces is van het effect van subliminale reclame op merkkeuze.
Conclusie
Subliminale reclames kunnen effect hebben op keuzegedrag. Dit effect is 
echter genuanceerder dan vaak werd verondersteld. Dit proefschrift levert 
een belangrijke bijdrage aan de kennis over subliminale reclame doordat het 
een aantal factoren heeft geïdentificeerd die invloed hebben op de werking 
en beperkingen van subliminale reclame. De studies in dit proefschrift keer 
op keer zien dat subliminale reclame voornamelijk invloed heeft als het een 
doelrelevant merk betreft. Daarnaast werden de effecten van gewoontes, context, 
en waarschuwing onderzocht. Deze bevindingen bieden al met al meer inzicht 
in de werking van onbewuste processen en onder welke omstandigheden deze 
processen invloed uitoefenen op bewust keuzegedrag in een consumenten-
setting. Om die reden heeft het huidige proefschrift ook implicaties voor de 
toepassing van subliminale reclames als beïnvloedingsstrategie, de ethiek van 
subliminale beïnvloeding, en de mogelijke maatregelen die de maatschappij 
tegen dit soort technieken zou willen treffen. Een andere implicatie is dat 
er eindelijk zicht is op een oplossing in de controverse rondom subliminale 
reclame. De voorlopige conclusie: Subliminale reclame werkt onder bepaalde 
omstandigheden.
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Het is een raar besef dat dit boekje helemaal van mij is. Ik vind het onvoor-
stelbaar dat het zover gekomen is. Ik was niet de makkelijkste leerling. Ik kon 
wel goed studeren maar als ik iets niet leuk vind, dan vind ik het moeilijk 
om het te doen. Hoe schrijf je dan toch een proefschrift? Wetenschap is 
hartstikke interessant, maar er zijn heel vaak momenten waarop het even niet 
zo soepel loopt, en er veel wilskracht nodig is om verder te gaan. Gelukkig 
heb ik dit proefschrift mogen schrijven met heel veel mensen om me heen 
die me enorm stimuleerden, die me waar nodig structureerden, en, voor mij 
misschien wel het belangrijkste, met wie ik heel veel plezier heb beleefd. 
Het eindresultaat is een proefschrift waar ik erg trots op ben en een periode 
uit mijn leven waar ik met veel plezier aan terugdenk.
Er wordt wel eens gezegd dat er teveel kapiteins op een schip kunnen zijn, 
en dit project met drie begeleiders met een sterke mening (en een koppige 
AiO) had zo’n schip kunnen zijn. Dit was echter helemaal niet het geval. Ik 
heb juist ervaren hoe drie sterke begeleiders elkaar aan kunnen vullen en 
heb me dan ook vaak erg gelukkig geprijsd met jullie.
Johan, vanaf het moment dat ik bij jou student-assistent werd heb je mij onder 
je hoede genomen. Meer als een mentor dan als begeleider. Ik kon van je 
afkijken omdat je ongelooflijk scherp en doortastend bent als wetenschapper. 
Daarnaast heb je mij altijd goed aangevoeld en me ondersteund waar ik dat 
nodig had. Je had een goed oog voor zowel mijn sterke als mijn zwakke 
kanten en hebt me telkens de mogelijkheid gegeven en aangespoord om te 
groeien. Het tekent je stijl van begeleiden dat je AiO’s jou als academische papa 
en elkaar als broers en zussen zien. Heel erg bedankt voor een fantastische 
tijd. Ik kan me geen betere begeleider voorstellen!
Wolfgang, jij hebt mij in de afgelopen jaren zeer geïnspireerd. Je onvermoei-
bare interesse voor een breed scala aan onderwerpen leerde mij dat er weinig 
grenzen zijn, en een onderzoeker vooral moet doen wat hij/zij interessant 
vindt. Je wijsheid als onderzoeker om integer en nauwkeurig te werk te 
gaan en het grote plaatje nooit uit het oog te verliezen is van onmisbare 
waarde geweest voor het proefschrift dat er nu ligt. Ik wil je heel erg bedanken 
voor je kritische blik en je bijdragen in altijd interessante discussies in Nijmegen 
of Utrecht die mijn proefschrift tot een hoger niveau hebben getild.
Daniël, als mijn promotor en als baas van de negende heb ik jou altijd 
meegemaakt als een ontzettend betrokken persoon. Alles gaat jou aan, en 
niets is jou teveel als je iemand kan helpen. Toen ik als voorzitter van de 
studiereiscommissie als derdejaars student bij jou aanklopte deed jij er wonder 
boven wonder alles aan om die reis mogelijk te maken. Zo heb je je in de jaren 
daarna ook ingezet voor mijn project en mijn persoonlijke ontwikkeling. Ik 
heb van jou dan ook geleerd dat alles mogelijk is (alleen moet je er soms wat 
harder voor werken). Daarnaast ben je inhoudelijk en conceptueel onmisbaar 
geweest voor het schrijven van dit proefschrift. Bedankt voor je scherpte, je 
vrolijkheid, en je onuitputtelijke energie! Oh, en als er nog taalfouten in mijn 
proefschrift staan heb ik ze waarschijnlijk toegevoegd na jouw correcties, 
ook nog bedankt voor je precisie daarin! 
Johan, Wolfgang, en Daniel, jullie waren niet alleen de beste begeleiders die 
ik me kon wensen, ik heb ook heel veel plezier gehad aan jullie. Ik kan me 
menig afspraak herinneren waarin ik voor of na de inhoudelijke discussie 
mocht luisteren naar een van de vele anekdotes die jullie altijd weer voor 
handen hadden. Ik ben zelf niet de stilste maar ik moet toegeven dat ik er 
bij jullie vaak niet doorheen kwam. Ik heb hier enorm van genoten en veel 
van geleerd. Ik drink zelfs af en toe groene thee met een citroentje.
Mijn promotoren waren natuurlijk niet mijn enige bron van inspiratie, 
structuur en plezier. Alle mensen op de negende verdieping hebben hierin 
een rol gespeeld. De heersende cultuur van labgroepen, BBL’s, discussies in de 
gangen, maar ook de borrels, filmavonden, en ongepaste gesprekken tijdens de 
lunch hebben mij een tijd gegeven van wetenschappelijke en persoonlijke 
ontwikkeling. Iedereen met wie ik in de afgelopen jaren gewerkt heb of een 
biertje heb gedronken na (of op) het werk, heel erg bedankt!
Lieke, mijn roomie. Onze kamer was altijd thuiskomen. We voelden elkaar 
goed aan. Soms was het tijd om te spelen, soms was het tijd om stil te zijn en 
te werken. Van Geo Challenge tot Electric Sheep. Samen taart regelen of een 
doelenschema maken (en volgen). Onze Big Lebowski avond was legendarisch. 
SinterDaniël werd een traditie waar we samen een dag (of twee) hard om 
konden lachen. Bedankt voor jouw luisterend oor, zowel privé als weten-
schappelijk, en voor het samen bedenken en uitvoeren van allerlei grappige 
rare plannetjes.
Gijs, al strijdbroeders sinds de master! We stonden zij aan zij tijdens vele 
sollicitaties. Wel concurrenten maar altijd samen strijdend. Bedankt voor jouw 
luchtigheid, humor en je vermogen in alle situaties rustig te blijven. Annemarie, 
altijd scherp en doortastend. We discussieerden al veel tijdens de master en dat 
is eigenlijk nooit opgehouden. Bedankt voor al je bijdragen en voor je hoge 
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stemmetje waarmee je me altijd aan het lachen maakte. Tila, mijn grote zus. 
Jij had een voorbeeldfunctie voor mij. Altijd alles onder controle. Goedlachs, 
sterk, met een focus op kwaliteit van werken én plezier. Aukje, de leukste 
thuis. Altijd een grap en dan een knorrende giechel. Tom, bedankt voor alle 
uitdagende gesprekken. Ik vind je een held omdat je zo anders durft te denken. 
Altijd in voor een geintje. We reisden van Lissabon naar Dublin tot San 
Francisco. Je was een goede hotelbuddy, al kreeg ik altijd het kleinste bed. 
Sanne, jouw kritische blik en vermogen om experimentele zwaktes te ont-
dekken is fenomenaal. Ik ben blij dat ik zo’n grote periode van mijn AiO-tijd 
een labgroep met je heb gedeeld. Wieteke, je leek stil en een beetje verlegen, 
maar dan ineens een slimme opmerking en een wheelie. Bedankt voor jouw 
perspectief en optimisme. Barbara, stoere vrouw, lief meisje. Stille wateren heb-
ben diepe gronden. Toen ik jou beter leerde kennen bleken we elkaar best goed 
te liggen. Simone, we zijn pas sinds kort aan het samenwerken maar dat bevalt 
heel erg goed. Ik hoop dat we dat in het vervolg nog veel vaker zullen doen. 
Ron, mijn buurman en mede-nerd. Met jou kan ik altijd een interessant 
gesprek hebben. Over welk onderwerp binnen de sociale psychologie dan ook. 
Maar ook over God (die wilde ik toch even noemen in dit dankwoord), 
Diablo of Starcraft, wiskunde, politiek, ja zelfs over sport. Of eigenlijk niet 
over sport, maar over het fenomeen sport. Bedankt voor jouw inspiratie en 
provocatie. Het was niet half zo interessant en leuk geweest zonder jou. 
Matthijs, gelijkgezinde. We zochten samen naar intimiteit zonder verantwoor-
delijkheid. We zijn flierefluiters, op zoek naar het leven. Ik hoop ooit nog met 
je te kunnen gaan reizen. Maarten, je was te lang voor mij om fatsoenlijk 
mee te kunnen praten, maar we hebben wel een hoop lol gehad. Volgens mij 
snapten we elkaar toch wel. Martijn, stoere man. Wat heb ik veel van je geleerd 
tijdens mijn onderwijs van gedragsverandering. Bedankt voor alle opbouwen-
de kritiek, de flauwe filmpjes en de ‘literatuur’ die je me aanraadde. Harm, 
bedankt voor je scherpe visie op onderzoek en voor je droge humor die me 
altijd aan het lachen maakt. Ook heel erg bedankt voor de ondersteuning 
de laatste tijd tijdens mijn eerste stappen als docent. Ap, ik heb jou vooral in 
de laatste fase van mijn project leren kennen en leren waarderen. Ik vind je 
een rebel en een wijze man. Bedankt voor je inzicht en de losse sfeer die je 
altijd weet te creëren. Hein, bedankt voor jouw perspectief op mijn onder-
werp. Ik heb veel baat gehad bij jouw kennis over de meer basale processen 
van het menselijk functioneren. Roos, bedankt voor jouw alternatieve kijk 
op zaken. Ad, bedankt voor je scherpte en nimmer falende motivatie. Rob, een 
tweede mentor kan nooit kwaad. Bedankt voor je voortreffelijke begeleiding 
tijdens de Master, wat de basis heeft gelegd voor al het andere. Tijdens mijn 
promotietraject stond je op de achtergrond, maar ik kon altijd bij je terecht 
voor raad of voor een interessante inhoudelijke discussie. Het lijkt me geweldig 
om weer eens echt samen te werken!
Amras, bedankt voor alle koffiebreaks. Lekker luchtig over D&D of, minder 
vaak, over ons werk. Het was een genoegen om je stempels te krijgen als jij 
betaalde. Daniël! Aegina, Brussel, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Nijmegen. Dank 
je wel voor alle te gekke avonturen. Samen meisjes versieren of een limousine 
regelen, wat gaan we de volgende keer doen? Erik, samen de straten afstruinen 
van San Antonio op zoek naar een kroeg die open is. Altijd weer op zoek 
naar meer en meer. Bedankt voor alle hilarische situaties. 
Het is fijn om ondersteund te worden. De Negende kenmerkt zich niet alleen 
door een goede groep onderzoekers maar heeft daarnaast ook een fantastisch 
ondersteunend team. Marjo, dank je wel voor de ondersteuning en het geduld 
als ik ergens niet op tijd mee was. Marijke, bedankt voor alles wat je voor 
me hebt geregeld. Madelon, bedankt voor jouw bijdrage tijdens de laatste 
loodjes. Ronny, bedankt voor alle hulp in het lab. Mijn studies waren nooit zo 
mooi geweest als jij niet altijd klaar had gestaan en alles mogelijk had gemaakt. 
Meta, bedankt voor de ondersteuning met de IRIS-cheques en je eeuwige 
geduld.
Pinar, een speciale plek van dank voor jou. We hebben samen 5 jaar van ons 
leven gedeeld en je bent van grote invloed geweest op mijn persoonlijke en 
wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling. We waren echt gewaagd aan elkaar. Ik kan 
met niemand discussiëren zoals met jou. Bedankt voor jouw steun tijdens 
de research master, de tijd in Utrecht en het begin van mijn promotietraject. 
Dank je wel voor een fantastische tijd samen!
Suzanne, bedankt voor een plekje om bij te komen. Ik heb veel plezier met je 
gehad in ‘ons’ appartement. Het kamertje dat je voor me vrijmaakte voelde 
echt als thuis en ben heel erg dankbaar dat ik daar meer dan een jaar bij je 
heb mogen wonen.
Reine, mijn kleine zusje, mijn Donna. Zonder jou had ik het nooit gered. Ik 
heb ongelooflijk veel aan je gehad op werk, maar meer nog als vriendin. We 
kunnen samen lachen, huilen en kibbelen als een getrouwd stel. Dank je wel 
voor alle reminders, al het advies en commentaar, alle dropjes, de vakanties, de 
dronken avonden, de avonden ‘Suits’, het meest geweldige sinterklaasgedicht, 
je geduld als ik weer eens over ‘iets’ of ‘iemand’ moest praten, alle keren dat ik 
geld of iets anders kon lenen omdat ik het zelf was vergeten, en vooral voor-
alle liefde, en alle eerlijke woorden. Fijn! Dank je dat je er altijd voor me bent!
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Als laatste wil ik mijn familie bedanken. Papa, Mama, ik vind het echt fantastisch 
hoe jullie altijd voor ons klaar staan. Ik besef niet vaak genoeg hoe makkelijk 
ik het heb met jullie als ouders. Bedankt voor alle steun, voor alle bezorgde 
woorden, en vooral voor jullie vertrouwen in mij. Mart en Lisa, mijn liefste 
broertje en zusje. Wij kregen het Bourgondische leven met drank, spelletjes 
en plezier al met de paplepel ingegoten. Bedankt voor alle competitie, alle 
liefde, en het grootste plezier. Ik vind ons echt het allerleukste gezin. Laten we 
altijd blijven spelen!
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